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1.1 Background
The current European policy frameworks for the marine environment
(Common Fisheries Policy (CFP), Marine Strategy Framework Direc-
tive) aim at a progressive implementation of an ecosystem approach to
fisheries, coupled with the objective of providing EU citizens with a sta-
ble, secure and healthy food supply for the long term. To achieve the
objectives of the CFP (EU, 2013), EU fisheries will be mostly managed
by multi-annual plans and governed by both the ecosystem approach and
the precautionary principle. The challenge is therefore set to make fish-
ing environmentally, economically, and socially sustainable. The elimi-
nation of discarding unwanted catches was identified as one of the main
objectives under the 2012 reform of the CFP (Box 1; EU (2011a,b,c)).
Hence, an important component of the new CFP is the introduction of
a landing obligation — also known as a discard ban — prohibiting the
at-sea disposal of some or all commercially valuable species from 2015
(Box 2, Article 15, Regulation (EU) 1380/2013; EU (2013)).
Box 1. Why is discarding a problem?
Throughout this thesis, discards are defined as the part of the
catch that is brought on deck only to be returned to the sea. In
most cases discarded organisms do not survive. Discarding is a
global problem (FAO, 2016). The practice is widely known as
a waste of living resources (human food and economic resources,
biological resources), and therefore undermines conservation poli-
cies by killing fish without making any economic returns. Discards
are also a source of unaccounted mortality as long as this catch is
unreported and mortality rates of releases undocumented, increas-
ing the uncertainty of stock assessments (Cardinale and Svedäng,
2004; Diamond and Beukers-Stewart, 2009; Jensen and Vester-
gaard, 2002).
By discarding juvenile fish, fish of little or no economic interest
or those which are over-quota, future yields are being lost. Dis-
cards of mature fish both waste resources in the short term and
reduce the amount of adult fish which would otherwise have been
available to support future productivity (EC, 2007).
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Box 2. CFP- Landing Obligation covered in
Article 15
The CFP is the EU’s instrument for the management of fisheries
and aquaculture. In 2013, the Council and Parliament reached
agreement on a new CFP for the long-term environmental, eco-
nomic, and social sustainability of fishing and aquaculture activi-
ties. The new CFP’s basic regulation (EU, 2013) entered into force
on 1 January 2014. The regulation makes fundamental changes
to the way that Europe’s fisheries are managed, with the aim of
managing fish stocks sustainably to ensure a prosperous fishing
industry and a healthy marine environment. Thus, the reform
includes making use of the MSY reference points as targets for
exploiting commercially important fish stocks.
One of the most important points in the CFP is the introduction
of a landing obligation. The landing obligation is only applicable
to TAC-regulated species in the Atlantic and to species previously
subject to minimum landing size regulations in the Mediterranean
Sea. Thus, catches must be retained on board, recorded, and
landed. The landing obligation requires all catches of regulated
commercial species on-board to be counted against quota whilst
undersized fish cannot be marketed for direct human consumption
purposes. It is being phased in across fisheries and species, start-
ing with pelagic fisheries and fisheries in the Baltic Sea in 2015
and is to be completed by 2019, in accordance with a specified
time frame (Fig. 1.1).
Figure 1.1: Time-frame for the landing obligation implementation.
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In theory, the introduction of the landing obligation should facilitate the
application of an ecosystem approach to fisheries: all catches of quota-
regulated species from the North-East Atlantic are being landed and
the total amount can be constrained by species-specific total allowable
catches (TACs). This implies that vessels must ideally have adequate
quotas for all species included in the ban that they are likely to catch
during the course of their operations. Failing that, the fishery would
need to be restricted or closed once one or more quota for the stocks are
exhausted, even if quotas were still available for other species.
While some elements of the landing obligation are set out in European
Regulations, there are also some exemptions and flexibilities in how to
implement them, both at Member States (MS) and national level (Box
3). The implementation of the landing obligation therefore requires high
levels of at-sea monitoring and effective control. However, there are no
specific additional requirements for its monitoring and control, except
for an obligation to document the catches. This means that MS need to
address a number of new problems to help ensure compliance with the
landing obligation and operate in the context of other elements of the
CFP such as maximum sustainable yield (MSY) and maintenance of the
reproduction viability, regionalisation, and multi-annual plans.
Box 3. Landing Obligation:
exemptions, provisions and requirements
By 2019, all species subject to TAC limits and minimum conser-
vation reference sizes (MCRS, comparable, but not equivalent, to
the previously known minimum landing size) in the Mediterranean
will be subject to the landing obligation. The landing obligation
is applied fishery by fishery. Details of the implementation are
included in multi-annual plans, or in specific discard plans when
no multi-annual plan is in place. The plans detail the species
covered, provisions on catch documentation, MCRS, and exemp-
tions for different areas. The plans have a maximum duration of 3
years and the provisions of the landing obligation will eventually
become incorporated into multi-annual plans.
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Exemptions:
The landing obligation includes three specific exemptions in case
of which catches can be returned to the sea:
• species for which fishing is prohibited (e.g. basking sharks,
some ray species),
• species that have high survival rates after being discarded
(taking into account gear, fishing practice and environment),
and
• catches that fall under the de-minimis exemption of up to
5% of the total annual quota to be discarded under certain
circumstances (and up to 7% and 6% in the first two years
respectively).
The de-minimis exemption shall apply in the following cases:
– where scientific evidence indicates that increases in se-
lectivity are very difficult to achieve; or
– to avoid disproportionate costs of handling unwanted
catches, but only where the bycatch of the gear in ques-
tion does not represent more than a certain percentage
of the catch.
Provisions and requirements:
TACs are adjusted to account for the previously discarded part
of the catch, although the details of this adjustment are not clear
(EU, 2016). To mitigate the strict implications, the Regulation
includes:
• Inter-species flexibility derogation: the ability to deduct
catches of a species for which quota is no longer available
from the quota of another species, by up to 9% of the quota
of the target species (only applicable where the stock of the
non-target species is within safe biological limits).
• Year to year flexibility derogation: banking and borrowing
provision, whereby up to 10% of a quota can be utilised in
addition to the full quota or saved to be utilised in the next
year.
17
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Box 4. Trends in discards
The practice of discarding occurs in almost all developed fisheries
worldwide (Kelleher, 2005). In the past, total estimates performed
by the UN Food and Agricultural Organisation (FAO) have pro-
vided a yearly mean global estimate of 27 million tonnes of dis-
cards (a discard ratio of approximately 35%) (Alverson et al.,
1994). A decade later, an update estimated global average yearly
discards as 7.3 million tonnes (a ratio of approximately 8%). These
two assessments, while not directly comparable owing to their dif-
ferent methodologies, suggest a significant decline in global dis-
cards in the ten years between the studies.
A recent study by (Pauly and Zeller, 2016) reflects declines in in-
dustrial catches and, to a smaller extent, declining discards despite
industrial fishing having expanded from industrialised countries to
the waters of developing countries (Fig. 1.2).
Figure 1.2: Reconstructed catches for all countries in the world, plus High
Seas, by large-scale (industrial) and small-scale sectors (artisanal,
subsistence, recreational), with discards (overwhelmingly from in-
dustrial fisheries) presented separately. Source: Pauly and Zeller
(2016).
Globally, high levels of discards in many fisheries have been considered
an issue for many years (Fig. 1.2).In the European Union, discards rep-
resent a major source of undocumented (or poorly documented) mortal-
ity, contributing to the overfishing of European fish stocks (EU, 2011b).
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Discarding involves a conscious decision made by fishers to reject part
of the catch (Box 4). These large quantities of releases have attracted
worldwide attention in the recent past (Alverson et al., 1994; Andrew
and Pepperell, 1992; Kennelly, 1995; Saila, 1983) and continue to be one
of the most important issues (EU, 2013).
The discarding of target species can occur for several reasons. One
reason is related to fishing regulations, such as if fish are below the min-
imum landing size or if the fisher holds insufficient quota for the species
(Catchpole et al., 2005) (Box 5). When the quota for a species has been
exceeded, the decision is often taken, especially in mixed fisheries, to
continue fishing for other species even when this implies discarding in-
dividuals of the species for which the quota has been exceeded (Bellido
et al., 2011). There are also economic reasons, such as differences in the
market prices of different species and/or size classes, and so-called "high
grading", whereby less valuable species and size classes are discarded to
use the limited storage space for the more valuable catch (Punt et al.,
2006). Other reasons for discarding include damage or degradation of
the catch, and catching non-commercial species.
Discard surveys in recent years have revealed that discards may corre-
spond in some cases to a substantial part of the catch and, for some
stocks may even exceed the reported landings (ICES, 2013). Discarding
levels in EU fisheries vary between locations, gears, species and fishing
grounds (Siguroˇardóttir et al., 2015; Uhlmann et al., 2013). In general,
there is a relationship between the selectivity of the fishing gears and
the percentage of catch discarded. The use of gears with a large mesh
size induces less discarding (10-15% by weight) than the use of gears
with a small mesh size (50% or more in some cases) (Villasante et al.,
2015).
Demersal trawling is the most problematic form of fishing with respect
to discards (Hall and Mainprize, 2005). It accounts for approximately
22% of the world’s total landings but 50% of the total estimated discards
(Kelleher, 2005) (Box 6). Consequently, the main focus throughout the
thesis is on discards within demersal trawl fisheries.
19
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Box 5. Global causes of fisheries discards
Discarding is influenced by various economic, sociological, techni-
cal, legislative, environmental and biological factors (Vestergaard,
1996).
Fishing gears generally are not perfectly selective and thus gener-
ate catches containing unmarketable fish such as undesired species
or non-commercial, rare, or protected species. Furthermore, they
can also generate catches containing under-sized target species,
non-target species, over-quota catches, and lower valued fish of
quota species. These catches are subsequently discarded (Catch-
pole et al., 2005; Gillis et al., 1995).
Minimum landing size regulations also lead to some discards when
the selectivity of the gear is such that some fish below the min-
imum landing sizes are caught. This is particularly the case in
mixed fisheries as there is not one gear design which corresponds
to the minimum landing size of all the species caught together
(Feekings et al., 2012; Madsen, 2007; McClanahan, 2010; San-
turtún et al., 2014).
Other reasons for discarding relate to both market considerations
and regulatory requirements. Market-driven discarding (high grad-
ing) can take place when low market price, or catch of non com-
mercial species because of low demand that do not compensate
sorting and handling costs. Species with no demand, as well as
individuals of certain sizes and/or in poor quality condition (e.g.,
damaged or not fresh) may result in fish being discarded. A man-
agement system which relies on landing quotas as the main reg-
ulator of fishing activity will lead to discards particularly when
various species are caught together in mixed fisheries. For exam-
ple, quota restrictions for a stock below safe biological limits with
advice to reduce fishing mortality – but retaining opportunities for
other species – e.g. cod (Gadus Morhua) in early 2000s; or lack of
quota opportunity for species historically allocated to others- e.g.
hake (Merluccius merluccius).
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Box 6. Bottom trawl discards
The FAO defines trawling as the use of “cone-shaped netting bags
that are towed through the water to catch different target species
in their path” (FAO, 2016). Bottom trawling is based on the
contact of the net with the sea floor with the aim of catching
benthic or bottom-dwelling species. Trawls can be towed with one
or two boats (pair trawling) and a range of different kind of rigs
can be used (e.g. twin and triple trawls). The gear and method
used depends on the fishing target. Trawls are used throughout
most of the world’s oceans (FAO, 2016), despite the fact that
they are poorly selective and retain large quantities of non-target
species (Broadhurst, 2000).
Within Europe, 60-70% of discarded resources are roundfish and
flatfish species. These discards originate mostly in the demer-
sal trawl (otter trawl and beam trawl) fisheries targeting round-
fish, flatfish and Norway lobster (Nephrops norvegicus) (Catchpole
et al., 2005). North-East Atlantic pair trawlers discard 40-60% of
their catch, while single bottom trawlers discard 20-40% of their
catch throughout the North-East Atlantic (STECF, 2006). In the
Mediterranean, discard ratios from bottom trawlers show large dif-
ferences between areas and operations, varying from 20% to 65%
(Bellido Millán et al., 2014; Tsagarakis et al., 2014). For pelagic
fisheries, discard ratios are generally known to be low, although
the discard data available for these fisheries is very limited.
The main objective of any catch quota management system with landing
obligations is to create economic incentives for the industry to reduce
the capture of both unwanted species and smaller individuals through
improvements in selectivity (Kindt-Larsen et al. (2011); Marine Manage-
ment Organisation, 2012). It could also improve accuracy in recording
catches and prevent wastage of food (Clucas, 1996). However, this ob-
jective is difficult to achieve for mixed fisheries, where there is a potential
mismatch between the current allocated TACs and the catch distribu-
tion (Kraak et al., 2013). A section of the catch in these mixed fisheries
will always consist of species or commercial categories that cannot be
sold on the human consumption market due to weak or absent demand
21
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or because they consist of fish under the minimum landing size.
A total discard ban may compromise the profitability of some discard-
intensive fisheries (at least in the short term) because retaining, ma-
nipulating and landing size categories or species that were previously
discarded will reduce income-per-unit-effort (Condie et al., 2014). Po-
tentially, there would still be some economic incentive to discard if the
catch included significant proportions of unwanted organisms. Further-
more, the immediate loss of landings incurred through discard reduction
measures will remain an obstacle to their implementation (Catchpole
et al., 2005).
In contrast, poor enforcement in European fisheries has often been iden-
tified as a factor that contributes to a situation where the potential
economic benefits for fishers of non-compliance often outweigh the risks
of detection (Catchpole et al., 2005) and the cost of sanctions (Batsleer
et al., 2013). Non-compliance is likely to remain a significant problem
because, for those likely to incur increased costs due to discard limita-
tions, there may be little incentive to comply with regulations as long
as enforcement remains weak. In general, the success of fisheries man-
agement regimes, such as a discard ban, can be said to be strongly
dependent on compliance from the industry, which itself depends on a
delicate balance between enforcement costs and benefits, and between
the establishment of mechanisms to promote active voluntary compli-
ance and the unavoidable control measures necessary to discourage and
punish non-compliance.
Fisheries advice should be extended to offer predictions of stock trajec-
tories not only under a range of possible management measures, but also
for a number of realistic outcomes in terms of compliance and enforce-
ment of regulations (Fulton et al., 2011). Following these predictions,
and prior to implementation, a discards management regime should be
evaluated (to the extent possible) by simulation, to ensure its robust-
ness to prevailing uncertainties including those related to implementa-
tion (Butterworth, 2007; Punt and Donovan, 2007).
1.2 Thesis objective
The aim of this PhD is to explore the effects of fisheries management
plans regarding discard reductions on the population dynamics of fish
22
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stocks and the economics of mixed fisheries. To this end, this thesis ad-
dresses three key aspects of the implementation of a landing obligation.
Box 7. Worldwide discard management
regimes experiences
Discard restrictions and discard management regimes have been
implemented to different extents in a number of fisheries around
the world (e.g., Chile, Norway, Faroe Islands, Iceland, New Zealand,
Namibia, Canada, and the US).
Experiences from fisheries around the world show that choosing
the right measures is not a simple process. Different regulations
are required for different fisheries, dependent upon the distribu-
tion of activities, the gear in use, the scale of enforcement that
is available, and the species that are targeted and incidentally
caught (Hutton et al., 2010).These measures will mean little un-
less fishing mortality is constrained to a sustainable level, whether
through quotas or effort controls. These challenges will be faced
by fisheries managers throughout Europe if the proposed changes
to the CFP are implemented.
Figure 1.3: Main countries where discard bans are currently implemented.
The first chapter focuses on how discard problems have led to a variety
of management strategies worldwide that try to reduce the impacts of
large bycatches (Box 7). A key focus of this chapter, therefore, is to
review current experience at the global level, identifying the most im-
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portant factors affecting the implementation of these policies. Generally,
global experience has highlighted that a policy of mandatory landings
can result in a reduction in discards, but relies upon economic incentives
to encourage fishers to land more of their catch or to simultaneously im-
plement complementary measures that will encourage compliance with
discarding rules (Catchpole and Ribeiro Santos, 2015; Condie et al.,
2013; Hedley et al., 2015).
Changing the selectivity patterns of fishers is seen as one of the funda-
mental outcomes of the reformed CFP. Improving the selectivity of fish-
ing gears remains one of the most applied tools to avoid discards or min-
imise bycatch (Broadhurst, 2000). However, there are numerous ways
in which fishers may alter the selectivity of a trawl. Fishers can adapt
and change their behaviour in relation to imposed constraints, which
can lead to unforeseen consequences of fisheries management (Branch
et al., 2006; Hilborn, 1985). An exhaustive review of all potential gear
modifications is not possible, since it would need to be conducted at
the level of specific fisheries. Therefore, the second part of the thesis
focuses on Basque trawl fisheries (Box 8) and how they might alter the
selectivity of their fishing operations. This investigation considers both
the current technical measures in use and fisher behaviour.
The introduction of the landing obligation shifts the emphasis from pre-
scribing which fishing gears are permissible to a results-based system
where the onus is on the fishers to develop gears that will avoid un-
wanted catches. Such a shift to a results-based system presents both a
challenge and an opportunity to develop alternative gears that are more
selective to avoid unwanted catches of undersized species. Therefore, in
this second part, attention is specially focused on testing gear-specific
regulations to address whether the current Basque trawler gear configu-
ration effectively achieves the intended objective of releasing unwanted
catches. Furthermore, since no new technical measures are foreseen to
specifically accompany the implementation of the EU landing obligation,
attention is also given to how fishers may adapt their fishing behaviour
to mitigate the full impact of the landing obligation.
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Box 8. The Basque trawl fisheries
The Spanish trawl fleet operating in the Bay of Biscay, and partic-
ularly that of the Basque country, comprises vessels using either
bottom otter trawl (OTB) or high vertical opening pair bottom
trawl (PTB; Iriondo et al. (2008)). These vessels fish in one of
three fishing areas: ICES sub-areas 6, 7 and 8 (divisions 8a, 8b,
and 8d). The Basque trawl fleet is managed through total al-
lowable landings (TALs) and total allowable effort (TAE), as well
as other technical and physical measures (Iriondo et al., 2013).
The fleet operates as a mixed fishery, characterised by a complex
and variable catch composition. Vessels exploit a high variety of
species and present important seasonal differences in terms of tar-
get species and bycatch. The fishing characteristics of this fleet
changes with the gear used.
In the Basque fleet, discarding of target and bycatch species can
be substantial. For example, in 2012, discards represented ap-
proximately 60% and 15% by weight of the total estimated catch
of OTB and PTB, respectively (12,991 t and 6,622 t, respec-
tively; (Rochet et al., 2014)). Approximately 80% of the dis-
cards were made to adhere to fishing regulations. Vessels in this
fishery discard catch when there is a lack of quota for certain
species (e.g., mackerel (Scomber scombrus), when captured indi-
viduals are smaller than the minimum landing size (e.g., hake), or
in the absence of a market (e.g., horse mackerel (Trachurus tra-
churus) and blue whiting (Micromesistius poutassou)); (Rochet
et al., 2014)). The introduction of the landing obligation is thus
expected to negatively affect the fishery because it reduces the
short-term economic flexibility provided by discarding as a means
of accommodating several quota species for which single-species
quotas are set.
In recognition of the potential difficulties that fishing businesses may
face when making the transition to the new management system that
have been noted in Box 3, there are a number of exemptions (prohibited
and high survival species, de minimis exemption) and tools designed to
support its successful implementation (inter-species flexibility deroga-
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tion, year to year flexibility derogation and quota increases). However,
the influence of measures on the individual fisher and fishing commu-
nities are often overlooked, underestimating the range of factors likely
affecting fisher behaviour. To this end, borrowing methodology from the
more general question of state-dependent foraging decisions in ecologi-
cal systems (Clark and Mangel, 2000; Houston and McNamara, 1999),
simulation tools for such fisher responses are used to gain insight in the
spatial distribution of fishing fleets and to understand the decisions of
individual fishers when implementing a new management system (Box
9).
Box 9. Dynamic state variable model
Many fisheries are managed under TACs and a substantial part by
individual quotas. This approach has not been successful in mixed
fisheries where fishers continue to fish while discarding marketable
or undersized fish. Using a spatially explicit dynamic-state vari-
able model (Clark and Mangel, 2000; Houston and McNamara,
1999), the optimal fishing strategy of fishers that are both con-
strained by annual individual quotas and facing uncertainty in
catch rates can be studied.
New tools for studying state-dependent behaviour of individual
fishing vessels, translated into behaviour of the fleet and imple-
mented using stochastic dynamic programming, have been devel-
oped and applied in a broad range of fisheries-related problems
(Batsleer et al., 2015; Dowling et al., 2011; Gillis et al., 1995; Poos
et al., 2010). These models generally predict the effect in the short
term (within a fishing trip or a quota year) by optimising a utility
function and determining which choices yield the best chance of
increasing utility, while monitoring the state of each individual.
The effect of a choice on the utility depends on the economic envi-
ronment, such as the home port of the vessel and the distance to
fishing grounds, and the biological environment, such as the spa-
tial distribution of the resources. The effects of behaviours such as
discarding have been modelled using such dynamic variable state
models Batsleer et al. (2013, 2015); Gillis et al. (1995).
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The strength of this model approach is that it allows short-term
choices to be accommodated against long-term constraints, such as
fishers facing annual catch quotas and discarding limitations but
making decisions about the fishing ground, to deciding whether to
target or discard part of the catch, to deciding whether to go fish-
ing or not. Within this model it is possible to simulate how fishing
fleets will adapt to different discard management scenarios given
the spatial and temporal differential in catch rates, sizes compo-
sitions, prices, costs of fishing effort, quota constraints, discard
limitations, and fines.
The model used in this thesis extends the model structure in Bat-
sleer et al. (2015) to accommodate the range of quota flexibility
and exemptions proposed (EU, 2013). The model incorporates an-
nual fines for exceeding landings or catch quota as in Batsleer et al.
(2015, 2016), and extends earlier approaches by including errors
in decision-making (following Dowling et al. (2011)) rather than
assuming that individuals always make optimal choices. Extend-
ing the dynamic state variable model contributes to developing
a generic model to explore the consequences of implementing the
landing obligation management measures on short-term decisions.
The model includes more complex dynamics that govern decision-
making (and errors in decision-making) such as gear choice and the
spatial and temporal distribution of effort (and the socio-economic
consequences thereof) for a wider range of management systems
of demersal fisheries.
Fishers will be prompted to avoid catching low-value fish because these
will be deducted from their quota allocation. They will also avoid those
species with the most restricted quotas because catching these could
result in an effort reduction for the fishing season. So, based on these
principles, fishers will be motivated to reduced undesirable catches of
undersized species for which they have limited quota and to catch other
valuable species. To achieve this, it is anticipated that fishers will change
the location, timing, and fishing gears used in order to control the un-
derlying selectivity patterns of harvests. Therefore, by combining the
different exemptions introduced by the new management system, the
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costs and benefits associated with the different behaviours adopted by
fishers are quantified.
If the landing obligation changes selectivity patterns as anticipated, then
longer term changes would also be expected to occur in both fish popu-
lations and the economy of the fishery. Such analyses are the domain of
bio-economic management strategy evaluations (MSE), where the feed-
back between fleet and stock dynamics are modelled explicitly (Ander-
sen et al., 2010; Prellezo et al., 2016; Punt et al., 2016). Therefore, the
third part of the thesis focuses on such models, in which the effects of
the changing selectivity of the fishing fleets on the reference points for
sustainable exploitation can be evaluated (Box 10).
To enable longer term prediction of the effects of changes in fisheries
management, and thus complete the MSE (Bunnefeld et al., 2011; Sains-
bury, 2000; Smith, 1994), one needs to couple the fleet dynamic models
that forecast the fleet response to management (Box 9) with biological
dynamic models that forecast the fish population responses to the chang-
ing fleet response. In other words, it is necessary to measure changes
in population abundance in order to measure the effect of the potential
consequences associated with the fishers’ optimal choices and to locate
the underlying assumption of the current state-dependent behaviour of
individual fishing vessels.
A key focus of this chapter, therefore, is to understand the fleet dynam-
ics in a spatially and temporally heterogeneous, mixed, quota-regulated
fishery while it changes from unmanaged (unconstrained catch quota)
to management by MSY. Therefore, this chapter encompasses the in-
dividual decision-making process of the fisher and the socio-economic
drivers of management effectiveness, evaluating whether this approach
leads to a better balance between quotas and catches under the new
management system. Doing so involves creating simulation models that
best represent current knowledge and uncertainty on the dynamics of
fish stocks under fishing pressure, the effect of variations in stock sta-
tus and availability on fishers, and their responses to changes to both
management regimes and stock. Costs and benefits, both economic and
in terms of risks to both stock and livelihoods, can be computed and
compared across scenarios and management regimes.
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Box 10. Management Strategy Evaluation
(MSE) framework
Management strategy evaluation (Bunnefeld et al., 2011; Sains-
bury, 2000; Smith, 1994) seeks to study the implications of man-
agement strategies using simulation (Punt et al., 2016). Such
simulation should include all the important processes of a fish-
ery (an inherently socio-ecological system) with coupled dynam-
ics of the fishing fleets, the exploited stocks, and their governance
(Punt et al., 2016; Rademeyer et al., 2007). In such a modelling
framework, advice and management systems can be quantitatively
evaluated (Dichmont et al., 2013; Kell et al., 2007). Such analyses
are the domain of bio-economic management strategy evaluations
where the feedback between fleet and stock dynamics are modelled
explicitly (Andersen et al., 2010; Prellezo et al., 2016; Punt et al.,
2016). In such models, the effects of the changing selectivity of the
fishing fleets on the reference points for sustainable exploitation
can be evaluated.
The framework consists of an operating model (OM) and a man-
agement procedure (MP) (see Fig. 5.1 on page 127). In the
fishery, there are three essential elements: (i) a collection of size
structured fish stocks, whose dynamics are governed by annual re-
production, growth, migration, and mortality; (ii) a management
body that evaluates the fishing pressure and aims to set annual
quotas in accordance with fishing mortalities dictated by Fmsy
reference points; and (iii) a fleet of individual fishers who aim
to make the best use of their annual quota. Within this mixed
fishery, individual vessels make adaptive choices about fishing lo-
cation and discarding that depend on the distribution of the re-
sources, and the quota that hold, the (real or perceived) local
abundance and catchability of the fished stocks, and various re-
source costs, principally that of fuel. The constraints include the
obvious management-imposed constraints such as levels of TAC,
and economical constraints such as the contribution of the annual
fines for exceeding catch quotas.
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1.3 Thesis outline
Chapter 2 addresses a global review of different conceptual papers
that explain and identify different management regimes and regulatory
factors and the key drivers of the effective implementation of policies
limiting or eliminating discards at sea.
Chapter 3 deals with testing gear-specific regulations to address if the
current Basque trawler gear configuration effectively achieves the in-
tended objective of releasing unwanted catches. The introduction of the
landing obligation shifts the emphasis from prescribing the fishing gears
that are permissible, to a results-based system where the onus is on the
fishers to develop gears that will avoid unwanted catches.
Chapter 4 investigates the effects of various implementations of dis-
card managements on the spatial distribution of the Basque trawl fleet.
Constraints set on discards play an important role in structuring the
spatio-temporal distribution of fishing effort and also in varying the
catch rates.
Chapter 5 shows the implications of the changing fleet dynamics on
the exploitation of a simulated mixed fishery, in terms of changing
selectivity-at-length resulting from the changes in spatial distribution
of the fishery when trying to reach the Fmsy.
Chapter 6 provides a general discussion of the results obtained. This
puts the findings in a broader perspective, discusses some of assumptions
made, as well as potential avenues for future research that could provide
answers to the questions that remain.
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2.1 Abstract
Discarding is a common practice in fisheries. Although discards have
been recognised to be substantial around the world, estimated to be as
much as 33% of global marine catch in commercial fisheries, there are
no recent reliable estimates. In EU fisheries, discards vary from more
than 60% of the catch (in weight) on average in beam trawls to very low
in others, such as pelagic trawl or seine fisheries. Discarding is an unde-
sirable practice because of the waste of resources. It is also contributes
to the overexploitation of fish stocks around the world as discards are
not correctly or fully monitored. Discarding restrictions and discard
management regimes have been implemented to different extents in a
number of fisheries around the world. This study compares the details
and performance of fisheries management regimes in the EU with those
of Chile, Norway, the Faroe Islands, Iceland, New Zealand, Namibia,
Canada and the US, which all implemented discard restrictions before
the discard ban imposed in the reformed European Common Fisheries
Policy.
Keywords:
landing obligation,
discard management regimes,
maximum sustainable yield,
Common Fisheries Policy
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2.2 Introduction
Discarding, where a portion of a vessel’s catch is returned to the sea dead
or alive (FAO, 2010), is a widespread problem in EU fisheries (STECF,
2006). The practice is a wasteful use of resources and an impediment to
the management and recovery of fish stocks, and thus many traditional
fisheries management measures, such as the EU quota system, have ef-
fectively encouraged discarding. The inferences made about the drivers
for discarding are numerous, including a mix of market, the length of
the fish being captured by fishing gear of limited selectivity, and the
existence of different regulations (MRAG, 2007). Despite the global
importance of discarding and growing attention to overfishing, some
assessed fish stocks worldwide continue to decline and still require re-
building (Worm et al., 2009). Unsustainable fishing emerges as the main
cause of this decline, with 31% of stocks considered overfished (WWF,
2016). The widespread recognition of the economic and ecological risks
caused by progressive depletion of global fisheries (Britten et al., 2017),
scientists and policy makers have shifted their focus to the rebuilding of
depleted stocks (Worm et al., 2009). In Europe, rebuilding initiatives
have received major support, with the major fisheries reform. The es-
tablishment of the landing obligation, also known as the discard ban,
is a major provision of the latest reform of the EU’s Common Fisheries
Policy (CFP) and aims to gradually eliminate discards of commercially
exploited stocks (Article 15 of EU Reg. 1380/2013; (EU, 2013)).
The gradual introduction of the EU’s landing obligation, in combina-
tion with exemptions, provisions and specific requirements, aims to al-
low the fishing industry to adapt their fishing practices to comply with
the changes introduced (EU, 2013). However, the costs and benefits
derived from different mechanisms and levels of enforcement, for both
direct users of the resource and society as a whole, are likely to be af-
fected by the implementation of any additional management measures.
In biological terms, a discard ban will be beneficial if total removals are
reduced (Condie et al., 2014) or if at the same amount of removals, these
are obtained from fishing pattern closer to the optimal exploitation pat-
tern (Frangoudes and Guillen, 2015). Such a reduction of removals can
take place without reducing landings, by avoiding undersized fish. Ex-
perience shows that in the absence of incentives to fish more selectively
and avoid the capture of formerly discarded catch, a discard ban will
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not result in more sustainable fisheries (Bellido et al., 2011). Hence,
in these cases where selectivity improvements cannot avoid the catch of
undersized fish and consequently reduce fishing mortality, it is necessary
to establish economic incentives to have a positive effect.
The implementation, monitoring and control of the landing obligation
generates some new challenges. Given the strong economic incentives
for discarding it must be expected that when a discard ban is imposed,
if there are no economic incentives to land the capture of formerly dis-
carded fish, discarding may still take place. Principally, under circum-
stances where enforcement is weak or the legal consequences do not
match the immediate economic benefits from discarding. Typically fish-
eries control and enforcement is quite costly (Arnason, 2014); in particu-
lar, the focus of monitoring and control shifts from landings to activities
at sea, leading to potentially higher costs of enforcement (Catchpole and
Ribeiro Santos, 2015). Consequently a high level of surveillance to en-
sure the full implementation of an EU discard ban could be very costly
considering the size of the EU fleet (Condie et al., 2014).
Discard restrictions and discard bans have been implemented in a num-
ber of fisheries around the world, including Norway, the Faroe Islands,
Iceland, New Zealand, Namibia, Canada and the US. Both Chile and
Europe are currently in the implementation phase. The aim of this
paper is to build a common framework based on the regulations and
measures employed to avoid and reduce discards in the countries that
have implemented discard bans and restrictions.
There is a need for better understanding of the importance of different
regulatory factors in the effective implementation of a policy limiting or
eliminating discards at sea in complex mixed fisheries that are managed
under catch limits. The following keys are used to structure this review:
(i) historical background and eliminating discards management strate-
gies, (ii) management measures enforced, and (iii) management effects
and later evaluations.
2.3 Drivers for successful discard bans
This section aims to assess the effect of discard bans around the world
and their surrounding management systems, identifying whether any
benefits of the policy have been observed in original scientific publica-
40
Drivers for successful discard bans
C
ha
pt
er
2
tions. The review includes papers that contained observations of imple-
menting discard management systems, review papers, and papers per-
taining to the enforcement of management measures, such as monitoring
through on-board observations, quota flexibilities, discarding exceptions
and real-time area closures (Annex I). These publications contribute to
a common data-frame from which it is possible to extract observations
and lessons that can be used by fisheries managers when implementing
the new discard management policy under the reformed CFP (Annex
II).
Historical background and discard management strategies
Each of the countries included in this review use management regimes
that are based on ITQ (individual transferable quota) systems. The ex-
ceptions are New Zealand, Europe and the Faroe Islands, which combine
both ITQs and extra management regimes ((Marchal et al., 2016; Motos
and Wilson, 2006; Sanchirico et al., 2006); Table 2.1). New Zealand also
has annual catch entitlements, which are generated by multiplying the
proportional ITQ by the annually available TAC, and can be bought
and sold independently (MRAG, 2007). Europe and the Faroe Islands
also operate under an effort management system. Furthermore, the EU
does not have authority to allocate quotas to individual fishers, and only
some member states have formally or informally adopted individual quo-
tas or ITQs for some of their fisheries (Marchal et al., 2016). The Faroe
Islands introduced the ITQ system with the establishment of a discards
ban (FHRG, 1994)).
In the selected case studies, discarding less valuable fish has been oc-
curring in order to maximise the benefits for fishers. Most now accept
discarding as an inevitable part of multi-species ITQ management be-
cause the ability to discard effectively eliminates the possibility that the
catch of one species may be limited by the TAC of another. The Faroe
Islands abandoned the system of ITQs only two years after its imple-
mentation (Hopkins et al., 2013; Jákupsstovu et al., 2007), in response
to wide-reaching criticism of both the TAC-based ITQ system from the
fishing industry, and extensive discarding as well as under- and misre-
porting of substantial parts of the catch (Gezelius, 2008; Johnsen and
Eliassen, 2011).
Despite using common management regimes, attitudes towards discard
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restrictions also differ across the case studies. Based on the reviewed
literature, the selected countries were aggregated by different ranges
of discarding restrictions managements (Table 2.1- Annex I), and the
complexity of their fisheries was categorised based on the number of
target species caught (Annex II). The value of this category could be low
(less than 5 target species), medium (between 5 and 10 target species)
or high (more than 10 species).
A total ban on discards applies in Norway, the Faroe Islands, Iceland and
Chile (Borges et al., 2016; Catchpole and Ribeiro Santos, 2015). Their
discarding bans were applied to limited number of stocks and were grad-
ually extended until they covered almost all commercial stocks. Chile
introduced a total discard ban in 1991, however it was not strictly en-
forced. Since 2012, a research and monitoring program has been devel-
oped to establish a baseline for evaluation of the implementation and
success of the discard ban and to help design technical and management
measures that will simplify its implementation (Ministerio de Economia,
Fomento y Turismo, 2013).
Namibia, New Zealand, Iceland and Europe have banned the discarding
of quota-managed species, with exceptions in the latter three cases for
species with high survival rates, non-commercial species, and undersized
fish (Arnason, 2014; EU, 2013; Villasante et al., 2015) respectively. In
order to allow fishers to adapt to the change, the EU landing obligation
will be introduced gradually between 2015 and 2019 for all commercial
fisheries, namely species under catch limits, TACs or under minimum
sizes.
Canada and the US have no formal bans on discards (Arnason, 2014).
However, in certain fisheries there are some retention requirements (i.e.,
discard bans) for some species, such as the Canadian Nova Scotia ground-
fish fishery, Canadian British Columbia groundfish fishery, and the US
Alaskan groundfish fishery (Table 2.1).
Attitudes towards discarding (before the discard restrictions) also dif-
fered across the different reviewed cases (Fig. 2.1). Levels of discards
before the ban ranged from 2% to 60% of the catch weight among the
different countries (Fig. 2.1). In some cases, there were no reliable
time series estimates of the levels of discards before ban implementa-
tions.
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Table 2.1: Summary of the management systems, complexity of fisheries and type
of discards bans applied in each country (Key: NOR (Norway), FRO
(Faroe Islands), CHL (Chile), ISL (Iceland), NZL (New Zealand), NAM
(Namibia), EU (European Union), CANNSG (Canadian Nova Scotia
groundfish fishery), CANBCG (Canadian British Columbia groundfish
fishery), USAALG (USA Alaskan groundfish fishery), ITQ (individual
transferable quota), TAE (total allowable effort), IQ (individual quota)
and ACE (annual catch entitlement).
Country Management Complexity of Type of
system the fishery discard ban
NOR ITQs Low
FRO TAE- ITQs Low Full
CHL* ITQs Medium ban
ISL ITQs Medium
NZL ITQs-ACE Medium Ban
NAM ITQs Medium on quota
EU * ITQs-IQ-TAE High species
CANNSG ITQs Medium Ban
CANBCG ITQs High on some
USAALG ITQs Low species
* Currently in the implementation phase of the ban
Fisheries with lower complexity within their catch distribution seemed to
have lower discard ratios according to these discards estimates (under
15% of catch weight, Table 2.1 and Fig. 2.1). Medium complexity
fisheries such as Iceland, New Zealand, Namibia and the Canada Nova
Scotia groundfish fishery suggest higher discard ratios (less than 40%
of catch weight, Table 2.1 and Fig. 2.1). European fisheries and the
Canadian British Columbia groundfish fishery cover the most complex
multi-species fisheries, with discard ratios of up to 60% of the catch
weight (Table 2.1 and Fig. 2.1). However, since no two fisheries are
alike, it is difficult to assess to what extent the complexity of the fisheries
or the level of discards before the ban contributed to the management
outcomes of these diverging discard policies of the different regions under
review.
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Figure 2.1: Discard ratio before the implementation of each ban. No data found for
Norway, Faroe Islands and Chile.
Management measures enforced
Changes in the incentives facing fishers through management measures
and flexibilities may have a positive impact on both the level of by-
catch and discards. The implementation, monitoring, and control of the
landing obligation generates some new challenges. A key focus of this
section, therefore, is to review current experiences from around the world
with respect to the multiple measures that support implementation and
encourage voluntary compliance with discarding rules.
Under the CFP regulation, all catches have to be kept on board, landed
and counted against the quotas. In order to facilitate the implementa-
tion of this policy, the EU regulation introduces some limited exceptions
in certain cases, such as where unwanted fish have a high chance of sur-
vival if returned to sea, where increases in selectivity are impossible to
achieve, or where fishers would incur disproportionate costs when han-
dling unwanted catches (EU, 2013). The details of the implementation
and requests for exceptions to be included in multi-annual plans, or
in specific discards plans when no multi-annual plans are in place, are
considered on a case by case basis (STECF, 2015, 2016).
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Monitoring
For the successful implementation of a discard ban, the focus of moni-
toring and control shifts from landings to activities at sea, leading to
potentially increased costs of enforcement as this might require full
observer coverage or self-reporting system monitoring (Catchpole and
Ribeiro Santos, 2015). Each of the case studies enforce their discard
bans by using onboard observers, but they do so to a very different ex-
tent (Fig. 2.2 and Annex II). Norway, the Faroe Islands and Iceland
have very low onboard observer coverage with values lower than 5%
(Buisman, undated; Gullestad et al., 2015). While New Zealand and
the Canada Nova Scotia groundfish fishery have a higher coverage of up
to the 20%. Namibia and the US have a very high observer coverage
in their fisheries of approximately 80% (Arnason, 2014). The Canadian
British Columbia groundfish fishery is unique with its full coverage of
onboard observers (Government of Canada, 2007).
Figure 2.2: Observer onboard coverage.
Chile is unique in that it relies on the use of closed circuit televisions
(CCTV) to directly monitor discarding practices (Fig. 2.3). The other
case studies rely on indirect evidence of discarding practices through a
combination of monitoring landings onshore and/or applying risk anal-
ysis based on catch statistics (Arnason, 2014). In other words, they
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compare observed catch compositions against unobserved reported catch
compositions as a mechanism to detect likely discarding. In the Faroe
Islands, where no direct discard observations are carried out, the whole
monitoring effort relies on monitoring landings in port (Hopkins et al.,
2013).
Figure 2.3: Monitoring means for the discard bans: onboard observers coverage,
CCTV system, catch statistics control and landings monitoring.
Experiences show that a range of other monitoring methods are imple-
mented in those countries where onboard observers are rarely or not at
all present. In the case of the EU, there are no specific additional require-
ments for monitoring and control, except for the obligation to document
the catches, details of which are again to be specified in multi-annual
plans (EU, 2013).
Quota flexibility mechanisms
All case countries have implemented considerable quota flexibility mech-
anisms in their management systems, albeit to different extents (Fig.
2.4). The flexibilities assessed in this chapter consist of:
• Feasibility to land and commercialise a limited amount of under-
sized fish without counting against the species quota. The main
goal is to incentivise fishers to retain the undersized catch that was
previously discarded.
• Feasibility to land and commercialise a limited amount of non-
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target fish without buying specific quota for it. The aim of this
measure is the same as the former.
• Possibility to aggregate species quota on one single quota to avoid
an early interruption of fishing due to the constraints of the quota
of one species.
• Possibility to move quotas between species within some established
limitations (e.g., inter-species swapping).
• Possibility of banking and borrowing quota between consecutive
years.
Iceland, New Zealand and the Canadian British Columbia fishery have
introduced a higher range of flexibilities into their management systems
(Fig.4). Globally, the possibility to catch and commercialise undersized
fish and non-target fish without using any quota is limited. Iceland has
implemented both measures, combining these flexibilities with real-time
area closures (RTCs). Fishers are allowed to land some undersized fish
and bycatch species before an area is closed (see section 2.3 on real-time
area closures) (Arnason, 2014).
Norway, New Zealand and the Canadian Nova Scotia groundfish fishery
have joint stock quota to avoid the closure of mixed fisheries when the
most restricting quota is filled. The landing of over-quota, non-target
or bycatch species is allowed, incentivising compliance (Hutton et al.,
2010). All countries except the EU have implemented the limited pos-
sibility to catch and commercialise non-target fish without using any
quota (Arnason, 2014). On the other hand, the EU, along with Ice-
land and the Canadian British Columbia fishery, have the possibility to
move some of their quota in certain species to other species, at a pre-
specified conversion ratio or conditions (Arnason, 2014; Condie et al.,
2014; Government of Canada, 2007).
In the Faroese case, the total allowable effort system replaced the ITQ
system. It consists of limited fishing days regulating the amount of time
to fish in approved areas. The existing ban on discards was continued,
with the exception of undersized fish regulations and protected species,
fishers are allowed to land and sell whatever they can catch within their
effort quotas (Hopkins et al., 2013).
In the case of the EU, the basic provision of the quota flexibility tool is
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to allow transfers of quota between donor (target) and recipient (non-
target) species. The tool allows for catches in excess of quotas or catches
of species for which a participating unit in the fishery has no quota. The
provision limits the transfer to 9% of the quota of the target species and
there is a condition which stipulates that the recipient non-target species
must be within safe biological limits (EU, 2013). However, speculative
use of this exchange quota or the absence of monitoring may cause seri-
ous stock impacts when quota from a high volume/low value species is
moved to a low volume/high value stock.
Figure 2.4: Quota flexibilities implemented by different discards limitations: Landing
and commercialisation of undersized fish outside quota, landing and com-
mercialisation of non-target fish without quota, aggregate quota for some
species, and species equivalence to substitute quota from one specie to
others, carry quota back from the previous year and carry quota forward
for the following year.
Regarding restrictions on borrowing and banking quota, New Zealand
and Canada are the only countries that have not established any limit
in quota flexibility across years (Arnason, 2014). In both cases, the bor-
rowed quota is discounted from the following year (Condie et al., 2014).
In addition, New Zealand has introduced the mechanism of deemed
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value, which works as a graduated penalty for overage, establishing an
over-catch trigger point at which deemed value is increased in order to
avoid abuse of the flexibility (Lock and Leslie, 2007; Mace et al., 2014;
Marchal et al., 2016). These countries also allow up to 10% of uncaught
quota to carry over to the next year (Arnason, 2014)). The Canadian
British Columbia fishery allows an extra over-quota allowance for hake
and halibut of 15% and 37.5%, respectively, on top of the existing 30%
borrow and bank quota (Condie et al., 2014). Namibia’s annual quotas
also have somewhat limited tradability (Arnason, 2014).
Norway is the only case where there is no possibility of banking and
borrowing (Johnsen and Eliassen, 2011). However, the system offers the
possibility to land small overruns of quota or larger catches if they are
caught unintentionally. This overrun catch is confiscated by the sales
organisation (Gezelius, 2008). Both the Faroe Islands and Chile cases
have no data available. This is due to the effort management system in
the Faroe Islands and the lack of implementation data for Chile.
Discarding allowance
Every case study has introduced some flexibilities within discard regu-
lations, allowing fishers to discard under some situations (Fig. 2.5 and
Annex II). In all cases, discarding is allowed for species for which scien-
tific evidence demonstrates high survival rates. Furthermore, where the
discard ban is not applied totally, species with no quota or those not
prohibited by the ban can be discarded.
The Canadian British Columbia fishery allows the discarding of quota
species if they have been recorded and counted against the quota. In
Namibia, fishers just may discard if the observer present allows it (Gov-
ernment of Canada, 2007). In Chile, the ban will not come into effect
until a research program has been completed (commencement in 2014;
(Borges et al., 2016)). This research program aims to quantify the ex-
tent of discards and incidental catches in the fishery and to identify the
causes of discards. The results will be used to create a reduction plan (a
set of measures to mitigate discards and incidental catches), to develop
of new markets for discarded species, and to provide incentives for the
development of innovative gear solutions. Under this program, discards
are allowed and non-sanctions are implemented to avoid bias in the data
(Borges et al., 2016).
49
Review of discard management regimes
C
ha
pt
er
2
Figure 2.5: Allowances for discarding under different conditions: species with high
survivability, species with quota after measuring and recording, species
with no quota.
In the case of Europe, the CFP have inserted a specific provision relating
to discard allowances under certain conditions. The basic elements of
the de-minimis provision include the establishment of limits on the per-
centage of catches that can be discarded under certain conditions (EU,
2013). These discards need to be recorded but do not count against quo-
tas and are intended to offer a limited facility to assist in the continuity
of fishing operations. The percentages of total catches concerned are
relatively small and will be phased in over a transitional period, mea-
suring 7% for first two years, 6% for next two years, and 5% thereafter
(EU, 2013).
Real-time area closures
Real-time area closures have been implemented to some extent in a num-
ber of countries (Fig. 2.6). The details of implementation vary from
place to place and depending on the nature of the feature being protected
(Bailey et al., 2010). RTC schemes are designed to achieve specific ob-
jectives in spatial areas where the level of bycatches and discards, the
number of undersized fish, or the fishing mortality of targeted species
exceeds permitted limits by temporarily closing certain areas.
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Figure 2.6 shows some of the RTC schemes adopted for the selected
cases. Norway, the Faroe Islands, Iceland, New Zealand, Canada, and
the US have implemented these area restrictions (Bailey et al., 2010;
Condie et al., 2014; Hopkins et al., 2013). In almost all cases, the tem-
porary RTCs have been included to protect juveniles, spawning fish, and
protected species, thus helping to reduce bycatch discards (for specific
reasons for area closures, see Fig. 2.6). However, it is difficult to eval-
uate how successful these measures have been in achieving conservation
benefits (Marchal et al., 2016). To date, the EU does not have a cen-
trally managed system of RTCs to lead closures when a high retention of
undersized fish is taken by a specific fishery. Rather, individual member
states have recently instigated national programs as part of efforts to
reduce the fishing mortality of cod (Bailey et al., 2010).
Figure 2.6: Real-time area closures according to various criteria for the different coun-
tries selected.
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Management effects and later evaluations
The enforcement and monitoring of rules on discarding is relevant for all
cases in this review. Discarding is no longer seen as a major problem in
any of the countries where a discard ban has been applied. It appears
that discards have been reduced over time due to the measures taken.
The rate of discards after the ban ranged from 0.1% to 13% of the
catch weight among the different countries (Annex II). However, much
uncertainty remains surrounding the effectiveness of the bans, as there
does not appear to be any assessment of whether or not the discard bans
have improved the situation for the countries that have implemented
them (Arnason, 2014). This is likely because an illegal activity such as
discarding fish at sea is notoriously difficult to detect.
The Canadian Nova Scotia ground-fish fishery required comprehensive
dockside and at-sea monitoring to ensure accuracy in reporting, while
the Canadian British Columbia fishery was required to cover the costs of
at-sea observers (Arnason, 2014). Iceland’s penalties have been difficult
to implement because the burden of proof has been excessively tilted
toward the prosecution (Arnason, 2014; Catchpole and Ribeiro Santos,
2015). However, it would appear that the implementation and enforce-
ment of Iceland’s no-discards policy has been quite effective, with indi-
cations that discards of catch in Iceland’s mixed fisheries are among the
lowest in existence (Arnason, 2014). In Norway, the number of infringe-
ments reported and later prosecuted is small (Arnason, 2014; Gullestad
et al., 2015).
In the Faroese case, self-reporting incentives related to bycatches have
appeared to work well (Hopkins et al., 2013) and the discarding of by-
catch has been negligible since the introduction of the TAE quota system
(Gezelius, 2008; Johnsen and Eliassen, 2011; Løkkegaard et al., 2007).
However, the Faroese Ministry of Fisheries has noted that there is no
scientific estimate of the effect of the closed areas on overall fishing mor-
tality (Hopkins et al., 2013). In another case, New Zealand’s ministry is
unable to provide enough observers to meet the assessment requirements
of the planned program. There are, however, indications that discards
of hoki have decreased substantially compared to earlier periods (An-
derson and Smith, 2005; MRAG, 2007). In Namibia, enforcement costs,
especially for the observer program, are very high. However, the contri-
bution of the observer program and the high penalties to the reduction
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in discards relative to other enforcement activities is not clear. Thus,
questions remain about the net benefits of the discard ban and its en-
forcement (Arnason, 2014).
The size of the discarding impact in the different countries depends
on the enforcement of the discard restrictions and on the discard reg-
ulations themselves. In general, the success of fisheries management
regimes, such as a discard ban, can be said to be strongly dependent
on compliance from the industry. The industry, in turn, depends on
a delicate balance between the costs and benefits of enforcement, and
between the establishment of mechanisms to promote active voluntary
compliance and the unavoidable control measures necessary to discour-
age and punish non-compliance.
2.4 Discussion- Overall Lessons
Flexible quota constraints, the ability to land unwanted catch without
it being counted against quota, RTCs, enforcement, and discarding re-
strictions are some of the ways to reduce discards under the discard
management regimes reviewed here. Discarding is no longer seen as a
major problem in any of the countries included in the review.
As shown in Iceland and North America, monitoring through self-reporting
or the implementation of an observer program leads to a greater like-
lihood of compliance. In these countries, a discard ban can result in a
reduction in discards and provide more reliable catch data. However,
implementing an observer program similar to that of Canadian British
Columbia in EU fisheries may be impractical (Condie et al., 2014). Total
observer coverage is expensive, and is unlikely to be cost-effective in the
case of EU fisheries (Graham et al., 2007).
Assessment of the effects of the introduction of the different discard bans
is sparse, and data risks should not be overlooked (Hentati-Sundberg
et al., 2014). In Northeast Atlantic (the EU), the lack of discard time
series data has long hampered the assessment accuracy of several fish
stocks, and thereby the advice to decision-makers on sustainable catch
levels (Viana et al., 2013). Current estimates of fisheries discards, ob-
tained through intensive observer programmes, might not be available in
the future as collecting scientific data about an activity that has become
illegal is likely to be difficult. It is likely not safe to assume that future
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estimates of total catch will be less biased than current ones (Bousquet
et al., 2010; Cotter et al., 2004; Walters and Maguire, 1996). It remains
to be seen whether the EU landing obligation will have marked effects on
the precision of stock assessments and, more generally, the performances
of the fisheries management system (Marchal et al., 2016).
Additional management measures, such as the ones introduced in the
CFP, are likely to be needed under any discard ban to incentivise more
selective fishing. Experiences from fisheries around the world have shown
that choosing the right measures is not a simple process. Implement-
ing gear restrictions or area closures may help to reduce discards by
encouraging a reduction in the capture of unwanted catch and moving
to areas where the catch composition is likely to be more appropriate
(Bailey et al., 2010; MRAG, 2007). In addition, increased flexibilities
in management systems that allow the transfer, purchase (annual catch
entitlements), or banking/borrowing of quota to match the catch compo-
sition of vessels will reduce the incentive to discard non-mandated catch
(Hutton et al., 2010; MRAG, 2007; Sanchirico et al., 2006). However,
flexibility mechanisms may increase the value generated by the multi-
species complex, but they may also increase the risk of overexploitation
without proper assignment and monitoring (Condie et al., 2014). On the
other hand, a very strict and rigid formulation will increase the incentives
for non-compliance, driven by the increase in operational costs. There-
fore, achieving the right balance between flexibility, over-exploitation
risk, and administrative simplicity is critical for the profitability and
sustainability of multispecies fisheries.
Anecdotal evidence from Norway and Iceland suggests that discard bans
and accompanying measures can generate social or economic incentives
for more selective fishing. However, the reviewed literature (Annex I)
concluded that very little data are available from the case studies to
suggest that a discard ban alone directly results in the avoidance of
unwanted catch. Moreover, encouraging compliance with a discard ban
through landing incentives may reduce the benefit of avoiding unwanted
catch (Clucas, 1997; MRAG, 2007).
Poor enforcement has often been identified as a factor in European fish-
eries, leading to a situation where the potential economic benefits for
fishers of non-compliance often outweigh the risks of detection (Catch-
pole et al., 2005) and the cost of sanctions (Batsleer et al., 2013). Within
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the CFP, it is unclear how the change in regime will develop and also how
some of the control and regulatory approaches will be (Catchpole and
Ribeiro Santos, 2015). Under a discard ban, there is no certainty that
the quota lease market or international swap arrangements will operate
in the same manner. The costs of this additional flexibility, however,
may be a loss of precision in TAC management, potential effects on
the performance of the lease market, and a greater administrative bur-
den. Mechanisms should be explored to ensure that the trade in quota
can continue. Moreover, different regulations will be required for differ-
ent fisheries. It is important to emphasise that each fishery is unique,
involving numerous biological, technological, and socio-economic vari-
ables. Management measures will mean little unless fishing mortality
is constrained to a sustainable level, whether through quotas or effort
controls. Therefore, fisheries advice should be extended to offer predic-
tions of stock trajectories not only under a range of possible management
measures, but also a number of realistic outcomes in terms of compli-
ance and enforcement of regulations (Fulton et al., 2011). Following
this, more extensive regional co-management should be developed and
evaluated by simulations to the extent possible. This will help ensure
the robustness of regulations to prevailing uncertainties, including those
related to discard plans implementation.
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Table 2.2: Summary of worldwide discard ban frameworks. Quantitative data sourced
from: Arnason (2014); Bailey et al. (2010); Bellido et al. (2011); Condie
et al. (2013); Gezelius (2008); Johnsen and Eliassen (2011); Khalilian et al.
(2010); MRAG (2007); Sanchirico et al. (2006).
Type of ban Country Date frame Complexityfishery
Discard ratio
before the ban
(%)
Management
regimes
Full ban
NOR 1983 low not reported ITQS
FRO 1994 low NA 90% effort 10%Quotas
ISL 1989 medium 0.8-22 ITQs
Ban on quota species
NZL 1986 medium 20-25 ITQs-ACE
NAM 2000 medium 35 ITQs
Ban on some species
CANNSG 1995 medium 9-20 ITQs
CANBCG 1995 high 2-46 ITQs
USA ALG 1998 low 13 ITQs
Ban to be implemented
CHL 1 2017 NA NA ITQs
EU 2015 high 20-60 ITQs Effort
1 In 1991 with the Fisheries Law discards were prohibited for all commercial species. However, the law was never implemented and discards continue normally.
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Table 2.3: Summary of worldwide implemented measures, focused just on the discard bans implementations. Quantitative data
sourced from: Arnason (2014); Bailey et al. (2010); Bellido et al. (2011); Condie et al. (2013); Gezelius (2008); Johnsen
and Eliassen (2011); Khalilian et al. (2010); MRAG (2007); Sanchirico et al. (2006).
Implemented measures:
Full ban Ban on quota species Ban on some species Ban to be implemented
NOR FRO ISL NZL NAM CANNSG CANBCG USAALG CHL EU
Monitoring
Observers on board (%) <5 0 <5 4-20 70-100 10-20 100 70-100 NA NA
CCTV 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 3 7
Catch statistics control 3 NA 3 3 NA 3 NA NA NA NA
Landings monitoring 3 3 NA NA 3 3 3 3 NA NA
Catch flexibilities
Undersized fish outside quota 7 3 3 7 NA NA NA NA NA 7
Non-target fish outside quota 3 - 3 1 3 2 3 NA 3 3 NA 7 3
Quota transfers
Carry-back quota (%) 0 - 5 no limit 2 NA no limit 30 NA NA 10
Carry-forward quota (%) 0 - 15 10 NA 0 30 NA NA 10
Aggregated quotas for some species 3 - 7 3 NA 3 NA NA NA 7
Species equivalence (%) NA - 3-5 NA NA NA 3 NA NA 9 3
Discarding exceptions
High survival species 3 NA 3 3 3 NA NA 3 3 3
Quota species 3 NA 3 3 3 NA NA 3 3 3 4
Other species 7 NA 7 no quota, <MLS no quota no groundfish All NA stocks with enoughdiscards information no quota
Real-time area closures
3 3 3 3 7 3 7 3 7 7
15% catch <MLS
juveniles > 30%
catch 4% trip <
40cm
10%trip<MLS
50%cod<50cm
50%haddock<45cm
overrun quota bycatch limits
Catch balancing period
(days after landing) 0 - 3 15 NA 45 (60 end of year) 30 3 NA NA
120% of the revenue NOR: Allow to overrun quota catches if are unintentional
2Deemed value FRO: Allow to dry all undersized fish for their own consumption without counting for statistics
39% inter-species quota flexibility NZL: Allow to buy ACE and if there is no balance, pay a deemed value on the excess
4up to 5-7% with de minimis NAM: Allow to discard fishes that are not entire
CANNSG: No groundfish discards on groundfish trawlers fihery
CANBCG: Allow to discard and quota species deducted from quota
USAALG: No groundfish discards on groundfish trawlers fihery
CHL: Fisheries participating on research program monitoring are exempted from the ban
EU: Allowed to discard 5-7% quota and recorded if demonstrate not possibility to improve selectivity
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Table 2.4: Effects and later evaluations:Summary of worldwide discard ban frame-
works. Quantitative data sourced from: Arnason (2014); Bailey et al.
(2010); Bellido et al. (2011); Condie et al. (2013); Gezelius (2008); Johnsen
and Eliassen (2011); Khalilian et al. (2010); MRAG (2007); Sanchirico et al.
(2006).
Country Discard ratio afterban(%) Compliance Enforcement
Full ban
NOR 2-10 medium low
FRO NA medium, discardingdoes occur
medium not always
enforced
ISL 1-3 medium high quite effective
Ban on quota species
NZL <10 low low
NAM <10 low
low, observer
programme being
subverted
Ban on some species
CANNSG low NA
CANBCG 0.1-13 high NA
USAALG 0.5-6
high, although some
discards are observed
when the fishery is
closed
NA
Ban to be implemented
CHL ? ? ?
EU ? ? ?
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3.1 Abstract
The selective properties of a bottom trawl fitted with a 70 mm diamond
mesh codend and a 100 mm top square mesh panel (SMP) for hake
(Merluccius merluccius), pouting (Trisopterus luscus and Trisopterus
minutus) and red mullet (Mullus surmulletus) were investigated over
the period 2011-2013. The experiments were carried out over three sep-
arate cruises aboard two commercial Basque bottom otter trawlers in
the Bay of Biscay area. "Fall-through" experiments were also under-
taken to estimate the potential size selection of 100 mm square mesh
for the same species. Results from the “Fall-through” experiments and
the at-sea selectivity cruises demonstrated that a 100 mm SMP has
the potential to enable undersized and immature individuals to escape
through the meshes. However, the selectivity cruises demonstrated that
in practice, the SMP was largely ineffective at releasing undersized indi-
viduals as only a small fraction of the fish entering the trawl attempted
to escape through the SMP during their drift towards the codend. The
fraction attempting to escape was quantified by the "SMP contact prob-
ability" and was less than 4% for hake and red mullet and less than
15% for pouting. Furthermore, for each species, the release potential for
the diamond mesh codend was found to be significantly lower than the
length-at-maturity and the legal minimum conservation reference size.
On average, the proportions of the total catch of undersized individuals
of each species retained by the gear, were 52%, 17% and 45% for hake,
pouting and red mullet respectively. Based on our findings, we conclude
that the gear currently deployed by the Basque bottom otter trawl fleet
operating in the Bay of Biscay is largely ineffective at releasing under-
sized hake, pouting and red mullet. The introduction of the obligation
to land all catches, under the 2013 reform of the EU Common Fish-
eries policy will create new challenges for the Basque bottom otter trawl
fleet and thereby an incentive to improve selectivity to avoid unwanted
catches of undersized individuals.
Keywords:
Bottom trawl, Landing obligation,
Square mesh panel (SMP), Contact probability,
Selectivity, Bay of Biscay.
Discards,
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3.2 Introduction
Over the past 30 years, numerous technical regulations and associated
amendments have been introduced in almost all developed fisheries world-
wide in an attempt to improve fishing gear selectivity, reduce discards
and enhance the status of fish stocks (Feekings et al., 2012; Madsen,
2007; McClanahan, 2010; Santurtún et al., 2014). Despite such mea-
sures, discarding in some European fisheries remains high (Uhlmann
et al., 2013). The capture and discarding of small immature fish reduces
the potential biomass of the exploitable stock and affects subsequent re-
cruitment (Graham et al., 2003). While discarding is a widely recognized
problem in many fisheries, it is particularly acute in multi-species trawl
fisheries (Daan, 1997). The Basque bottom otter trawl fishery in the Bay
of Biscay (ICES Divisions, VIII a, b, d) is one such fishery. Currently,
the fleet comprises 7 vessels, ranging from 37-42 m overall length. The
fleet deploys trawls that have a low headline, typically below 2 meters
vertical opening, wingspreads between 22 m and 26 m, and footropes be-
tween 80 m - 100 m in length. Trawling is carried out at a towing speed
of 4 knots at depths ranging from 30 m to 200 m. Trip duration varies
from 5 to 7 days. The main target species are megrim (Lepidorhombus
whiffiagonis), anglerfish (Lophius spp.), hake (Merluccius merluccius)
although squids (Loligo spp.), red mullet (Mullus surmulletus), pouting
(Trisopterus minutus and T. luscus), sole (Solea solea), horse mackerel
(Trachurus trachurus) and mackerel (Scomber scombrus) also comprise
target species depending on the fishing ground, season and quota avail-
ability (Iriondo et al., 2008, 2010). Discarding of both target and bycatch
species in the fishery can be substantial. In 2013, on average, estimated
discards represented about 52 - 65% by weight of the total estimated
catch (8532 t) of the fleet (Rochet et al., 2014). Discarding occurs for
a variety of reasons including capture of individuals below minimum le-
gal landing size, lack of quota, the absence of a market, damaged or
degraded individuals in the catch, and high-grading.
In 2002, a recovery plan was introduced for the northern stock of Eu-
ropean hake, in an attempt to allow the stock to recover from its then
depleted state (EC, 2002). The recovery plan prescribed inter alia, an
increase in the minimum codend mesh size for trawls from 70 mm to 100
mm in the Bay of Biscay (EC, 2002). However, since 2006 the provisions
of Annex III, Appendix 3 of EC (2006) were introduced to provide an
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optional alternative to the mandatory use of bottom otter trawls with
a 100 mm codend mesh size. Such provisions permit the deployment
of otter trawls with a minimum codend mesh size of 70 mm provided
that a 100 mm square mesh panel (SMP) is inserted into the middle
of the top panel of the rear tapered section of the trawl just in front
of the untapered section constituted by the extension piece and the co-
dend; a configuration intended to improve the selectivity for undersized
hake.
Square mesh panels are known to have great potential for improving
selectivity in trawls; e.g. Broadhurst et al. (2002); Fonteyne and Polet
(2002); Madsen et al. (2002); Tschernij et al. (2002), by increasing the
probability to release both undersized individuals and non-target species
entering the trawl (Catchpole and Revill, 2008). However, their effec-
tiveness varies for different species and several studies have shown that
they are largely ineffective at releasing certain demersal species (Briggs,
1992; Frandsen et al., 2009; Rosen et al., 2012). The efficiency of such
selective devices depends not only on the gear characteristics such as the
dimensions of the panel itself, the size of the meshes and the position
of the panel in the trawl (Herrmann et al., 2015), but also on the reac-
tions of the fish in the trawl during the fishing operation. Such factors
determine whether fish are able to come into contact with the panel and
escape through the meshes (Glass and Wardle, 1995; Herrmann et al.,
2015; Zuur et al., 2001).
Despite the adoption of the 70 mm + SMP provisions by the majority
of the vessels that comprise the Basque trawl fleet, to date, the effec-
tiveness of the 100 mm SMP has not been investigated and quantified.
Furthermore, the average discards of hake over the period 2011-2013 are
estimated to be approximately 50% of the total catch in weight of hake,
97% or which comprised individuals less than the minimum conservation
reference size (MCRS) (Rochet et al., 2014).
Today, most policy frameworks for the marine environment aim to pro-
gressively implement an ecosystem approach (Garcia and Cochrane (2005);
Hering et al. (2010); Article 2(3) of EU (2013)). In an ecosystem ap-
proach to fisheries management, one of the basic tenets is that harvesting
should be conducted with minimal impact on juvenile fish and that dis-
cards should be reduced (Bellido et al. (2011); Graham et al. (2007);
Article 2(5a) of EU (2013)). Under the provisions of Article 15 of the
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2013 reform of the CFP (the landing obligation; EU (2013)), by 2019,
discards of most species will no longer be permitted and fishers from
EU Member States will be required to land all catches of quota species
from the northeast Atlantic and all species subject to a MCRS from the
Mediterranean and Black Seas. The rationale for the landing obligation
is that it should create economic incentives for the industry to develop
measures to improve selectivity to reduce or avoid the capture of juvenile
fish, unwanted catches of bycatch species and any potential over-quota
catches.
Hence, the question remains whether the provisions of Annex III, Ap-
pendix 3 of EC (2006) are sufficient to meet the objective of releasing
undersized hake, whether they allow the Basque fleet to avoid undersized
catches of hake and mitigate the potential impacts of the obligation to
land all catches. The aim of the present study is therefore to evaluate
the selective properties of bottom otter trawl gear deployed by the ma-
jority of the Basque fleet and especially the effectiveness of the 100 mm
SMP at releasing immature and undersized fish.
3.3 Material and methods
Sea trials and data collection
Selectivity cruises were performed at sea on board two Basque commer-
cial trawlers “Gure Gaskuña” (39 m overall length (LOA), 590 hp) and
“J. Kalamendi” (40 m LOA, 1190 hp). Three cruises were performed
between November 2011 and July 2013 (Table 3.1). The cruises were
conducted in the Bay of Biscay on fishing grounds with depths that
varied between 26 m and 267 m (Fig. 3.1).
All three cruises were conducted using trawls with codends of 70 mm
diamond netting attached to an extension of 90 mm diamond mesh con-
structed using 2.5 mm single polyamide (PA) -twine. The wings and the
top panel were PA with a nominal mesh size of 100 mm, 2.5 mm single-
twine. In each cruise, the SMP was made from 100 mm (nominal, knot
to knot) meshes extended into the middle of the upper section of the
extension, positioned 12 meshes in front of the codend. The SMP was
one-fourth of the full width of the extension section, where the mean in-
ternal vertical opening of the gear was around 1.5 m (240 meshes round).
The specifications for the gears used on each cruise varied with respect
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Table 3.1: General information about the three cruises. Mean depth, mean towing
duration and speed, and ranges (in parentheses).
Cruise 1 Cruise 2 Cruise 3
Date November-December 2011 July 2012 June-July 2013
Gear setup 100 mm top SMP13 m from the codline
100 mm top SMP
7 m from the codline
100 mm top SMP
7 m from the codline
Depth (m) 61.3 (31 - 144) 103.3 (28 -1 82) 125.2 (26 - 267)
Towing time (min) 170 (40 - 215) 15 15
Towing speed (knots) 3.9 ( 3.9 - 4.0) 3.6 (2.6 - 4.1) 3.6 (2.9 - 4.0)
No. of hauls 15 27 26
Figure 3.1:
The Bay of Biscay, show-
ing 100 m, 200 m and 1000
m depth isobaths and fish-
ing position for all hauls
during the three cruises be-
tween November 2011 and
July 2013. Key: X (total se-
lectivity estimation; SMP +
C) and ∆ (selection proper-
ties of the SMP alone; SMP
+ CL).
to length of headline and footrope, codend length and panel position in
relation to the codline and are summarised in Table 3.2.
During the first cruise carried out aboard FV “Gure Gaskuña” between
November and December 2011, a single otter trawl with a stretched
circumference of 61.4 m was operated under commercial conditions on its
usual fishing grounds. The codend (CO) was 12 m long, in consequence
the SMP was positioned 13 m from the codline. Size selectivity data
were collected using a three compartment setup, based on the design
described by Sistiaga et al. (2010). The codend cover (CC) was installed
on the aft of the trawl and mounted with two rigid rings to minimize
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Table 3.2: Specifications of the gears used during the three cruises.(*) Measured with
an OMEGA gauge (Fonteyne et al., 2007) according to the guidelines de-
scribed in regulation (EC No. 517/2008).
Cruise 1 Cruise 2 Cruise 3
Trawl
type Otter trawl Otter trawl Otter trawl
Nominal mesh size 90 mm 90 mm 90 mm
Foot rope 100 m 80 m 90 m
Head line 81 m 65 m 74 m
Codend (CO)
twine material double braided PE double braided PE double braided PE
thickness 4 mm 4 mm 4 mm
mesh size * 75.8 mm 74.6 mm 74.1 mm
length 12.0 m 6.0 m 6.0 m
circumference 240 meshes 240 meshes 240 meshes
Codend cover (CC)
twine material single braided PA single braided PA single braided PA
thickness 1.3 mm 1.3 mm 1.3 mm
position outer inner inner
mesh size * 17.3 mm 24.7 mm 28.5 mm
length 13.0 m 5.0 m 5.0 m
circumference 400 meshes 250 meshes 250 meshes
SMP
twine material single braided PA single braided PA single braided PA
thickness 3 mm 3 mm 3 mm
mesh size * 106.6 mm 103.4 mm 104.2 mm
horizontal mesh 36 meshes 36 meshes 36 meshes
vertical mesh 18 meshes 18 meshes 18 meshes
SMPC
twine material single braided PA single braided PA single braided PA
thickness 1.3 mm 1.3 mm 1.3 mm
mesh size * 27.2 mm 26.4 mm 25.4 mm
length 3.6 m 10.0 m 10.0 m
circumference 410 meshes 410 meshes 410 meshes
any potential masking effect (Wileman et al., 1996). The square mesh
panel cover (SMPC) installed over the SMP was the same design as that
used by Larsen and Isaksen (1993) and then fitted with three rings and
floats (Fig. 3.2a).
For the second and third cruises (July 2012 and June-July 2013, respec-
tively), modified versions of the single otter trawl normally deployed by
FV “J. Kalamendi” were used. These cruises were carried out during
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Figure 3.2: Gear setup for selectivity cruises. Setup a) Total selectivity setup (SMP
+ CO) with the SMPC and the CC used onboard the F/V Gure Gaskuña
in 2011. Setup b) SMP properties setup (SMP + CL) with the SMPC
used onboard the F/V J. Kalamendi for the 2012-2013 surveys. Key:
SMPC (square mesh panel cover), CO (codend), CC (codend cover) and
CL (codend liner).
research surveys designed to estimate fish abundance and the gears used
were those prescribed for the abundance surveys and incorporated small
mesh codend liners (see below). In both cruises the codend was 6 m
long with the SMP positioned 7 m from the codline. To investigate the
selection properties of the SMP, a two-compartment setup was used; a
codend incorporating a small mesh liner (CL, lining the full width of the
codend and almost the 85% of the length) and a SMPC over the SMP
(Fig. 3.2b).
After each haul, the catch was sorted by species. Only hauls with at
least 10 individuals of the same species in the same haul were included in
the analysis. Size selection data was collected for hake, pouting and red
mullet. These species were available in sufficient numbers in the catch
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to enable the evaluation of gear performance. Moreover, individuals
of these species are potential discard species due to quota restrictions,
market demand and minimum size regulations (i.e. hake with MCRS
of 27 cm, pouting and red mullet with MCRSs corresponding to min-
imum landing weights of 50 g and 40 g respectively; EC (1996)). All
individuals of each species or a representative sub-sample from each net
compartment (CO, CC and SMPC or CL and SMPC, see Figure 3.2)
were measured to the nearest centimetre below. Sub-sample numbers
were raised to total catch number by the ratio sample weight to total
weight caught.
Furthermore, a fall-through experiment (Herrmann et al., 2009), using a
similar SMP as the one fitted to the gear in all experiments, was carried
out on board to assess the potential size selectivity of the 100 mm square
mesh. Around 150 fish of each of the selected species were tested. Total
length for each fish was measured and its ability to physically pass head-
first through the 100 mm square mesh under by the force of gravity only
was determined. The individuals were non-randomly selected from the
catch in order to cover the widest possible size range.
In addition, underwater observations were recorded to observe fish be-
haviour in the trawl during the fishing operation and to analyse the es-
cape mechanisms of those individuals that escaped from the gear, either
through the SMP or elsewhere. Recordings were made using a Konsberg
Simrad OE 1324 camera connected to a self-contained recorder unit with
a DVR and two GoPro cameras. All cameras were placed inside the net,
ahead of the SMP facing the codend.
Data analyses
We assessed the basic size selective potential for the 100 mm square
mesh by fitting a logit size selection model with parameters L50 (length
at which a fish has 50% chance of being retained) and SR (selection
range, L25 -L75 ) (Wileman et al., 1996) to the fall through data species
by species. The purpose of this exercise was to assist the evaluation
of the size selectivity of the square mesh panel in the sea trials. Fall
through results can help solving potential confounding problems in data
analysis from sea trials regarding contact probability with the panel
and contact selectivity in terms of L50SMP . Specifically, we used the
requirement (constraint) that estimated L50SMP should be at least 50%
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of the assessed fall through L50.
To analyse the size selection data from the cruise using the three com-
partment setup (Fig. 3.2a), species by species, we used the dual selection
model first described by Zuur et al. (2001) and later applied by O’Neill
et al. (2006). This model quantifies both the size selection in the SMP
and in preceding codend. For the SMP the size selection is described
by three parameters: CSMP , L50SMP and SRSMP . CSMP quantifies
the assumed length independent probability for a fish to make contact
with the SMP during its drift towards the codend. A CSMP value of
1.0 would mean that every fish came into contact with the SMP and
attempted to escape through it, while a value of 0.3 for example would
mean that only 30% of the fish did contact the SMP and attempted to
escape through it. L50SMP and SRSMP are the L50 and SR values for
the fraction of fish that make contact with the SMP based on a logit
size selection model. The size selection in the codend was described by
a traditional logit model with the parameters L50CO and SRCO. Thus,
it was assumed that every fish entering the codend would make contact
with its meshes and have a size dependent probability of being released.
By using the definition of L50 and SR, we could estimate the overall
selectivity parameters of the combined system consisting of the SMP
and the codend (L50dual and SRdual). This combined selectivity is then
defined as the dual selection and it can be estimated based on the val-
ues of the five parameters (CSMP , L50SMP , SRSMP , L50CO and SRCO).
This estimation procedure is thoroughly described in Sistiaga (2010) for
a dual selection system with an escapement grid followed by a size selec-
tive codend. The model has an identical model structure as for the SMP
+ codend system applied here. The hauls belonging to the cruise with
the three-compartment setup were used to define a group of hauls. For
each species separately, we fitted the dual selection model to the pooled
data for the group of hauls using the maximum likelihood method based
on the procedure described in Sistiaga (2010). This estimation method
includes a double bootstrap procedure to account for uncertainty in es-
timation both due to within- and between haul-variation in the selection
processes in the gear. Further the method accounts for additional un-
certainty due to sub-sampling of data, based on the procedure described
in Eigaard et al. (2012). We applied 1000 bootstrap repetitions for the
analysis.
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To analyse the size selection data from the sea trials using the two-
compartment setup (Fig. 3.2b) species by species, we used the same
procedure as described above for the three-compartment setup with the
exception that the analysis only involved the estimation of the size selec-
tion in the SMP. By quantifying the CSMP , L50SMP , SRSMP parameters
lead to a size selection model which is similar to the one applied for a
"grid only size selection" described by Herrmann et al. (2013).
The selectivity data were analysed using the analysis tool SELNET (SE-
Lection in trawl NETting; Herrmann et al. (2012)). Evaluating the
ability of the model to describe the data sufficiently well was based on
inspecting the fit statistics, i.e., the p-value and the model deviance ver-
sus the degrees of freedom (DOF), following the procedures described
by Wileman et al. (1996). The p-value expresses the likelihood to obtain
at least as big a discrepancy between the fitted model and the observed
experimental data by coincidence. In case of a poor fit statistics (p-value
being <0.05; deviance being >>DOF), the residuals were inspected to
determine whether the poor result was due to structural problems when
describing the experimental data using the model or if it was due to
over-dispersion in the data (Wileman et al., 1996).
In addition to the evaluation based on the selection parameters, we also
calculated the length-averaged retention probability of undersized indi-
viduals in the gear based on the three-compartment trials and the length
averaged escapement through the SMP of undersized individuals based
on all sea trials. This estimation which was also conducted in the anal-
ysis tool SELNET follows the estimation method described in (Özbilgin
et al., 2015; Sala et al., 2015; Wienbeck et al., 2014). To estimate the
length-averaged retention and escapement of the undersized individuals,
the minimum landing weight for pouting and red mullet was converted
to length using the species-specific length-weight relationship given in
Dorel (1986). The MCRSs for pouting (50 g) and red mullet (40 g)
equate to lengths of approximately 16 cm and 15 cm respectively.
3.4 Results
Fall-through experiment
The results of the fall through experiments are summarised in Table
3.3 and the length distributions of the fish and the fitted curves and
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95% confidence intervals for the potential size selection properties of
the 100 mm square mesh are shown in Figure 3.3. The p-value and
model deviance compared to number of DOF indicate that the model
describes the data adequately (Table 3.3). Using the values from the
fitted selection curve, the lengths at which the potential probability for
each species to escape through the 100 mm square mesh is 95% (Lfall)
are estimated at 50.41 cm, 23.79 cm and 31.36 cm for hake, pouting and
red mullet respectively. In the case of L50fall, the values are estimated at
51.01 cm, 26.10 cm and 31.49 cm respectively. Since both the Lfall and
the L50fall estimates are above the MCRS and the length-at-maturity
(Lmat) for all species the SMP has the potential to release undersized
and immature individuals.
Table 3.3: Results of fall-through experiments: Fitted selectivity parameters, 95% CI
(in brackets) and fit statistics for each species.
Hake Pouting Red mullet
L50fall (cm) 51.05 (50.50-52.03) 26.10 (25.58-26.50) 31.49 (31.02-31.52)
SRfall (cm) 0.10 (0.10-0.10) 1.72 (0.10-2.43) 0.10 (0.10-0.10)
Lfall (cm) 50.41 (49.39-52.61) 23.79 (22.73-26.37) 31.36 (30.39-31.39)
deviance <0.01 1.08 <0.01
DOF 6 6 6
p-value >0.99 0.98 >0.99
Selectivity experiments
A total of 68 hauls were carried out during the three cruises (Table 1).
Hauls in which fewer than 10 individuals of each species of hake, pouting
and red mullet were present were excluded from the selectivity analysis.
The results in terms of valid hauls, numbers and size ranges of fish
retained by the codend and covers are summarised separately by cruise
and species in Table 3.4. For those hauls where sub-sampling took place
the raised catch was used for the analysis. Over all three cruises, the
length ranges of each species caught were 6-62 cm, 7-36 cm and 9-41 cm,
for hake, pouting and red mullet respectively. From the total catch of
each species, the proportions of fish below the average Lmat were 73.7%,
12.6% and 56% for hake, pouting and red mullet respectively. Similarly,
the proportion of fish below MCRS were 60%, 1.7% and 27.5% for hake,
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Figure 3.3: Relative catch size-frequency distributions for the fall-through experiment
and the fitted escapement curves (black) indicating potential SMP escape-
ment probability with the 95% confidence intervals (grey area). Length-
at-maturity (Lmat) for pouting, hake and red mullet is 19.2 cm, 29 cm
and 16.5 cm on average respectively (Alonso-Fernández et al., 2008; El
Habouz et al., 2011; Mahé et al., 2005). For hake the minimum conser-
vation reference size (MCRS) is 27 cm and for pouting and red mullet
the minimum landing weights of 50g and 40g equate to 16 cm and 15 cm
respectively.
pouting and red mullet respectively. The catch of most individuals of
all species studied were retained in the codend.
Dual selection estimation (CO + SMP); Cruise 1
A total of 15 hauls were carried out during the first cruise designed to
investigate the selective properties of the trawl gear configuration cur-
rently used by the Basque otter trawl fleet in the Bay of Biscay (Fig.
3.2a). For hake, pouting and red mullet, 8, 10 and 11 of the 15 hauls
respectively were considered valid. The relative proportions by length
retained by the CO, CC, and SMPC for hake, pouting and red mullet
are shown in Figure 3.4 together with the fitted selection curves and
95% confidence intervals obtained for the SMP escapement, codend es-
capement and dual retention (combined retention of the codend and the
SMP). The results are summarized in Table 3.5. The p-value and model
deviance compared to number of DOF indicate that generally the model
describes the data adequately. In contrast to the results for hake and
pouting, the p-value for modelling the selectivity data for red mullet was
below 0.05 and the model deviance was far above the DOF. Such a result
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Table 3.4: Summary statistics by species for all valid hauls used for the selectivity
analysis. No. retained by net compartment and No. <MCRS (sub-sample
number in parentheses) and length range of all individuals caught.
Hake
MCRS (27 cm)
Pouting
MCRS (16 cm)
Red mullet
MCRS (15 cm)
Cruise 1
No. of valid hauls 8 10 11
Length range (cm) 12- 62 7- 36 9- 33
Total No. in CO 766 (766) 2079 (1118) 4498 (1157)
No. in CO <MCRS 356 (356) 7 (5) 932 (287)
Total No. in CC 354 (354) 324 (324) 2931 (1292)
No. in CC <MCRS 324 (324) 30 (30) 1112 (550)
Total No. in SMPC 8 (8) 13 (13) 67 (67)
No. in SMPC <MCRS 5 (5) 5 (5) 18 (18)
Cruise 2
No. of valid hauls 22 4 7
Length range (cm) 9- 60 12- 33 14- 39
Total No. in CL 6267 (3513) 522 (522) 311 (311)
No. in CL <MCRS 5449 (2955) 294 (294) 1 (1)
Total No. in SMPC 281 (281) 0 (0) 2 (2)
No. in SMPC <MCRS 233 (233) 0 (0) 0 (0)
Cruise 3
No. of valid hauls 22 5 6
Length range (cm) 6- 60 18- 35 14- 41
Total No. in CL 5321 (3783) 211 (211) 235 (235)
No. in CL <MCRS 4566 (3187) 0 (0) 3(3)
Total No. in SMPC 251 (251) 0 (0) 1 (1)
No. in SMPC<MCRS 232 (232) 0 (0) 0 (0)
could indicate problems with using the dual selection model to describe
the experimental selectivity data for red mullet. However, inspection of
the deviations between the observed and modelled size selectivity does
not reveal any clear pattern (Fig. 3.4). Therefore, we consider that
the low p-value for red mullet is likely to be due to over-dispersion in
the experimental data, and are therefore confident in applying the dual
selection model to describe the selectivity curve for red mullet. The
L50SMP values are estimated at 37.56 cm, 13.05 cm and 20.52 cm for
hake, pouting and red mullet respectively. For all the species studied,
the average L50SMP is estimated to be below Lfall, but above the MCRS
for the hake and red mullet. The estimates of CSMP are 0.01 for hake
and red mullet, and 0.15 for pouting, meaning that only a low propor-
tion (1% and 15%, respectively) of these species came into contact with
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the SMP during their drift towards the codend.
Figure 3.4: Relative catch size-frequency distributions of fish retained in the codend
(CO), codend cover (CC) and SMP cover (SMPC) and the mean escape-
ment curves (black) for the SMP escapement, codend escapement and
dual retention curves (combined effect of the codend and the SMP) and
95% confidence intervals (grey area) during the first cruise.
The L50CO values are estimated at 20.29 cm, 18.08 cm and 13.36 cm for
hake, pouting and red mullet respectively. For the combination of the
SMP and the codend, the L50dual is estimated to be 20.34 cm, 18.15
cm and 13.47 cm for hake, pouting and red mullet respectively. The
differences between the estimates for L50CO and L50dual, and SRCO
and SRdual are small and not significant, which reflects that the SMP is
not making an important contribution to the combined selectivity (see
Table 3.5 and Figure 3.4). Most of the individuals of the species studied
that escaped from the gear did so through the codend.
Regarding catches of under-sized (<27cm) hake, the estimated propor-
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Table 3.5: Selectivity results from cruise 1 (3-compartment experiment): Fitted se-
lectivity parameters, average retention/ escapement probability for under-
sized individuals, 95% CI (in brackets) and fit statistics for each species
and gear compartment.
Hake Pouting Red mullet
L50 (cm)
SMP 37.56 (25.50 - 37.62) 13.05 (13.05 - 27.52) 20.52 (16.01 - 20.56)
CO 20.29 (17.64 - 24.08) 18.08 (16.31 - 19.47) 13.36 (4.89 – 18.68)
Dual 20.34 (17.81 - 24.13) 18.15 (16.45 - 19.50) 13.47 (5.56 - 18.77)
SR (cm)
SMP 0.10 (0.10 - 100.0) 5.51 (0.10 - 21.34) 0.10 (0.10 - 5.91)
CO 8.40 (5.59 - 11.73) 4.45 (3.73 - 5.29) 13.04 (6.31 - 32.80)
Dual 8.47 (5.66 - 11.73) 4.41 (3.73 - 5.18) 13.19 (6.28 - 33.33)
CSMP 0.01 (0.00 - 0.03) 0.15 (0.01 - 0.70) 0.01 (0.01 - 0.02)
SMP escapement <MCRS (%) 0.73 (0.00 - 2.70) 11.90 (0.00-34.78) 0.87 (0.39 - 1.57)
CO escapement <MCRS (%) 47.30 (27.47 - 75.84) 71.43 (35.08-90.24) 53.93 (35.41 - 82.07)
Dual retention <MCRS (%) 51.97 (23.77 - 70.82) 16.67 (0.00-41.34) 45.20 (16.83 - 63.51)
deviance 0.01 48.03 74.35
DOF 63 49 41
p- value 0.99 0.51 0.01
tion retained in the codend was 51.97%, while the proportions that es-
caped through the codend and SMP were 47.30% and 0.73% respectively.
For pouting, 16.67% of under-sized individuals were retained by the co-
dend and 71.43% and 11.90% escaped through the codend and the SMP
and for red mullet, 45.20% of the under-sized individuals were retained
by the codend and 53.93% and 0.87% escaped through the codend and
the SMP (Table 3.5 and Figure 3.4).
The above results demonstrate that the majority of undersized individ-
uals of all species that escaped the gear did so through the codend.
However, approximately half of the catch of undersized hake and red
mullet and about 17% of undersized pouting was retained by the gear.
It is clear that the SMP does not improve the selectivity for under-
sized hake and red mullet much because less than 1% of all undersized
individuals escaped through the SMP. For pouting, only a marginal im-
provement in selectivity was attributable to the SMP (12% of undersized
escapees).
80
Results
C
ha
pt
er
3
Selection properties of the SMP alone;
Cruises 2 and 3
A total of 27 and 26 hauls were carried out during the second and third
cruises respectively (years 2012 and 2013), designed to investigate the
selective properties of the 100 mm SMP. The numbers of valid hauls for
hake, pouting and red mullet during the second cruise were 22, 4 and 7,
while during the third cruise were 22, 5 and 6 respectively (tab:hauls).
The specification of the gear used in both cruises is illustrated in Figure
3.2b. The relative size-frequency distribution of individuals retained by
the SMPC and the CL for the different species based on the total number
of fish caught from all valid hauls is shown in Figure 3.5. As observed
in the three-compartment experiment described above, escapement of
hake, pouting and red mullet through the SMP was low in both cruises
2 and 3. The total catches of hake, pouting and red mullet were 11950,
733 and 549 individuals respectively, but only 452 hake, 3 red mullet
and not a single pouting passed through SMP into the SMPC.
Figure 3.5 shows the fitted selection curves for the SMP by species for the
second and third set of trials (years 2012 and 2013). Table 3.6 summaries
the results for modelling the size selection for the SMP. Similar to the
results from the dual selection modelling for red mullet, inspection of
the p-values and the model deviance compared with the DOF for hake
could indicate problems with the modelling. However, although the p-
value for hake was below 0.05 and the model deviance was far above the
DOF we could also attribute this to over-dispersion in the experimental
data (Fig. 3.5). Using the same rationale as for red mullet we consider
that it is appropriate to use the applied selection model to describe
the selectivity curve for hake. For pouting the L50SMP could not be
estimated since no fish escaped through the SMP (Table 3.6). For hake
and red mullet, while the average estimates for L50SMP differed between
the second and third cruises, the differences were not significant since
the confidence intervals overlap (Fig. 3.5 and Table 3.6). As for cruise
1, L50SMP for hake and red mullet in cruises 2 and 3 are estimated
to be below Lfall, but significantly above the MCRS and Lmat, which
means that the SMP has the potential to allow undersized fish to escape.
However, the estimated contact probabilities (CSMP ) were very low (zero
in the case of pouting and about 5% and 1% for hake and red mullet
respectively; Table 3.6). The estimates of CSMP and the associated
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Figure 3.5: Relative catch size-frequency distribution for hake, pouting and red mullet
for the codend liner (CL) and square mesh panel cover (SMPC) during
cruises 2 and 3 (2012 and 2013). Fitted escapement curves (solid black
line) and 95% confidence intervals (grey area) are also shown.
95% confidence intervals for all the species studied were similar for both
years, and in in line with those obtained from the three-compartment
experiment (Table 3.6).
It is clear that the SMP does not improve the selectivity for undersized
hake because less than 5% of hake undersized individuals (4.10% and
4.83% for the second and third trial respectively) escaped through the
SMP. For pouting and red mullet, the SMP was wholly ineffective at
releasing undersized fish as not a single under-sized individual escaped
through the SMP (Table 3.6 and Figure 3.5).
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Table 3.6: Selectivity results from cruises 2 and 3 (2-compartment experiments): Fit-
ted selectivity parameters, average escapement probability for undersized
individuals, 95% CI (in brackets) and fit statistics for each species.
Hake Pouting Red mullet
L50SMP (cm)
cruise 2 49.51 (40.47- 49.98) * 29.56 (15.75 - 31.49)
cruise 3 39.64 (26.47- 46.56) * 26.59 (15.75 - 31.49)
SRSMP (cm)
cruise 2 0.10 (0.10 - 6.36) * 0.10 (0.10 - 11.7)
cruise 3 7.80 (0.10 - 20.05) * 0.10 (0.10 - 100.0)
CSMP
cruise 2 0.04 (0.03 - 0.07) 0.00 0.01 (0.00 - 0.02)
cruise 3 0.05 (0.03 - 0.09) 0.00 0.01 (0.00 - 0.06)
SMP escapement <MCRS (%)
cruise 2 4.10 (2.29 - 6.83) 0.00 (0.00) 0.00 (0.00)
cruise 3 4.84 (2.95 – 8.27) 0.00 (0.00) 0.00 (0.00)
deviance
cruise 2 65.14 <0.01 10.08
cruise 3 76.89 <0.01 8.23
DOF
cruise 2 46 18 17
cruise 3 52 14 19
p-value
cruise 2 0.03 >0.99 0.90
cruise 3 0.01 >0.99 0.98
* No estimation since no fish escaped through the SMP.
Underwater observations
Underwater observations confirmed that the SMP meshes remained wide
open during fishing (Fig. 3.6). However, none of the species studied
seemed to react to the SMP open meshes. In the vicinity of the SMP
hake individuals were observed to be passively drifting towards the co-
dend with no apparent active escapement behaviour in relation to the
SMP. Video observations showed that ground contact of the footrope
constantly dislodged sand particles and sludge that created turbidity
inside the trawl. Consequently, there was reduced visibility (Fig. 3.6),
which together with the apparent affinity of pouting and red mullet to
remain close to the lower panel of the trawl may explain why the SMP
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was not effective at releasing these species. Some pelagic species such
as anchovy (Engraulis encrasicolus), horse mackerel and blue whiting
(Micromesistius poutassou) were observed escaping through the SMP
or swimming underneath the SMP for long periods until they became
exhausted.
Figure 3.6:
Snapshot from an un-
derwater video show-
ing the presence of tur-
bidity in the lower sec-
tion of the net in the
vicinity of the SMP.
3.5 Discussion
The experimental cruises undertaken in the present study aimed to in-
vestigate the selective properties of the fishing gears used by Basque
otter trawlers operating in the Bay of Biscay (ICES Divisions VIII a,
b and d). The gears used are bottom otter trawls with a codend mesh
size of 70 mm, incorporating a 100 mm SMP in the extension ahead of
the codend as prescribed in Council Regulation (EC) 51/2006. These
provisions were introduced as an optional alternative to the mandatory
use of bottom otter trawls with a 100 mm codend mesh size prescribed
in (EC, 2002) and were intended primarily to improve selectivity for
juvenile hake. The cruises provide an opportunity to investigate the
selective properties of the SMP for hake, but also for pouting and red
mullet, which are also caught in the Basque otter trawl fishery.
Results from the fall-through experiments revealed that the size-selective
properties of the 100 mm SMP would potentially enable immature and
undersized fish of all the species studied to escape through the SMP
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meshes (Table 3.3). The selection curves obtained from the at sea selec-
tivity cruises also demonstrate that the value for L50SMP is higher than
the MCRS for hake and red mullet (Tables 3.5 and 3.6). Therefore,
undersized individuals of the species studied could potentially escape
through the SMP. However, they show only a low probability to en-
counter the SMP (contact probabilities are only 1- 4% for hake, between
0- 15% for pouting, and 1% for red mullet) and hence the effectiveness
of the SMP in releasing undersized individuals is very low. This is sup-
ported by the results of underwater observations made during the cruises
which demonstrated that hake, pouting and red mullet did not display
any active escapement behaviour in the region of the SMP and fish were
simply observed to drift past the SMP towards the codend during the
fishing operation. The ineffectiveness of the SMP is confirmed by com-
paring the differences in the estimates for L50CO and L50dual, and SRCO
and SRdual, which were small and not significant (Table 3.5).
While the combination of 70 mm codend mesh size and 100 mm SMP
aims at improving the selectivity for juvenile hake, Nikolic et al. (2015)
also concluded that release of juvenile hake with SMP is inefficient in
the French Nephrops trawl fishery. The dual retention results for hake
in the present study (Table 3.5) show that approximately 52% of the
catch in number of undersized hake (< MCRS = 27 cm) was retained
by the codend of the trawl used by the Basque fleet. Furthermore, the
majority of the undersized individuals that escaped did so through the
70 mm codend meshes (47.3%) and less than 1% (0.73%) escaped via
the 100 mm SMP. Compared to a 70 mm diamond mesh codend (L50CO
20.29 cm), our findings reveal no improvement in size selection for hake
(L50dual 20.34 cm) by inserting a 100 mm SMP in the extension of the
trawl. The value of L50CO estimated for the 70 mm diamond codend is
slightly higher than that estimated by Campos et al. (2003) for a 65 mm
diamond codend (L50CO 17.0 cm), suggesting that an increase in codend
mesh size can improve the selection pattern for hake, i.e. proportionally
fewer smaller individuals are retained by the codend. Another effective
means to improve the selection pattern for hake is the insertion of sorting
grids in the extension section of trawls, as demonstrated by Fonseca et al.
(2005).
The dual selection results for pouting show that approximately 17% of
the catch in number of undersized pouting (< MCRS = 16 cm) was re-
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tained by the codend of the trawl used by the Basque fleet, and approxi-
mately 83% escaped (Table 3.5), although the majority of the undersized
individuals that escaped (71.43%), did so through the 70 mm codend
meshes. The values of L50CO (18.08 cm) and SRCO (4.45 cm) were in
the range of those estimated by Mendes et al. (2004) for a 65 mm square
mesh codend (but for Trisopterus luscus only). The observed similarity
in the results from both studies can be explained by the steepness of the
estimated selection curve for pouting (Fig. 3.4). In contrast however,
even though in our first cruise, the release potential of the SMP for un-
dersized pouting was 12%, similar to the 10% escapement observed by
Fonseca et al. (2005) using a trawl fitted with a grid with 30 mm bar
spacing and a SMP located above the grid, the contact probabilities for
pouting differed markedly in the other two cruises (Tables 3.5 and 3.6).
Hence we are unable to conclude that the SMP is equally effective at
releasing pouting as the grid-SMP combination used by Fonseca et al.
(2005).
For red mullet, the dual selection results show that approximately 45%
of the catch in number of undersized individuals (< MCRS = 15 cm)
were retained by the codend, and less than 1% of the juvenile red mullet
escaped through the 100 mm SMP. In contrast, Metin et al. (2005)
found that compared to a 40 mm diamond mesh codend, selectivity
experiments using a 40 mm diamond mesh codend incorporating a 40
mm SMP positioned in the forward part of the top panel of the codend
significantly increased the release of juvenile red mullet. Our study
estimated a similar value of L50dual to Metin et al. (2005) (13.47 cm vs.
12.55 cm) but a much bigger value of SRdual (13.19 cm vs. 2.27 cm). The
observed differences may be explained by differences in both the panel
location and the length range sampled. However, and as found for hake,
our estimates for L50CO, both for pouting and red mullet, are similar
to our estimates for L50dual. Therefore, the combined selectivity of the
gear is mainly attributable to the escapement of individuals through the
codend.
The low escapement of these demersal species through the SMP can
be attributed to the fact that they did not display any active escape
behaviour in the region of the SMP, as confirmed by our underwater ob-
servations. These observations are also in line with the findings of Briggs
(1992); Frandsen et al. (2009); Rosen et al. (2012) for cod. Furthermore,
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Fonseca et al. (2005) demonstrated that compared to pelagic species, the
escape behaviour of demersal species was much less active in the area of
the SMP. However, previous studies have shown that other factors, such
as the location if the SMP can also affect escapement through the SMP
of species that exhibit less active escape behaviour. For example, in
selectivity trials undertaken by Graham and Kynoch (2001), no signif-
icant differences in the L50 s for haddock (Melanogrammus aeglefinus),
whiting (Merlangius merlangus) and cod (Gadus morhua) were found
between trials using trawls fitted with a 100 mm diamond mesh codend,
and trawls with a 3 m long, 80 mm SMP inserted in the extension section
ahead of a 100 mm diamond mesh codend. However, when the 80 mm
SMP was inserted in the codend, it significantly improved the selectivity
of the gear. Furthermore, other studies also on haddock, whiting and
cod have proved that when SMPs are positioned in the codend, closer to
the catch accumulation zone, both the selectivity for small fish and the
survival of escapees is improved (Bullough et al., 2007; Graham et al.,
2003, 2004; Grimaldo et al., 2007; Herrmann et al., 2015; Madsen and
Stæhr, 2005).
Glass and Wardle (1995) found that the selectivity and survival of the
escapees of demersal fish can be dramatically affected by using visual
stimuli to raise their vertical position in the trawl. In their study, the
proportion of haddock and whiting escaping through the SMP increased
from 20 to 60% with addition of a black tunnel in the extension sec-
tion of the trawl behind the SMP. Fish appeared reluctant to enter the
tunnel and preferred to escape through the open meshes that the SMP
offered. However, underwater observations made during trawling in the
present study, demonstrated that even though the SMP may have offered
enhanced light penetration compared to the adjacent, almost closed di-
amond meshes; hake, pouting and red mullet rarely exhibited active
escape behaviour inside the gear and tended to remain closer to the
bottom panel of the trawl. Furthermore, bottom otter trawling by the
Basque fleet is carried out at a relatively high speed of about 4 knots,
which creates conditions of reduced visibility due to the presence of high
densities of particulate matter in suspension. Such conditions may have
influenced the ability of the fish to locate the SMP, thereby inhibiting
their ability to escape the open meshes.
Currently the Basque bottom otter trawl fleet in the Bay of Biscay is
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complying with existing regulations by adopting the 70 mm diamond
codend with the 100 mm SMP rather than opting for the alternative
permissible configuration of 100 mm diamond mesh codend. Whatever
the reasons for choosing the 70 mm codend plus SMP configuration,
our results demonstrate that incorporation of the SMP, positioned in
the extension section of the trawl, does not result in any significant im-
provement in the selectivity for small hake over and above that achieved
by the 70 mm codend. Consequently, we conclude that this gear config-
uration does not effectively achieve the intended objective of releasing
undersized hake and ideally its ability to do so should have been assessed
before the measures were implemented. Hence we agree with Suuronen
and Sarda (2007) that before implementation, gear-specific regulations
should be carefully thought through and thoroughly tested in all the
fisheries to which they are to apply.
We have demonstrated that under normal fishing operations, the se-
lective properties of the trawls deployed by the Basque bottom otter
trawl fleet in the Bay of Biscay, retains approximately half of undersized
hake and red mullet that enter the trawl and approximately 17% of un-
dersized pouting. To comply with current minimum size regulations,
catches of undersized individuals must be discarded and the vast major-
ity will be returned to the sea dead. However, with the implementation
of the landing obligation (Article 15 of the CFP; EU (2013)), discarding
of undersized quota species (hake in this case study) will no longer be
permitted. Such catches will have to be retained on board and landed,
will be counted against quota and shall be restricted to purposes other
than direct human consumption. Whether they are discarded or landed,
they are unwanted catches that reduce future potential yield and spawn-
ing stock biomass. A potential solution to avoid unwanted catches is to
improve the selective properties of the fishing gear so that undersized
individuals can escape. The conservation benefits of escapement of juve-
nile individuals depends on the survival rate. In absence of information
on the survival rates of hake, pouting or red mullet following escape-
ment from trawls the conservation benefits cannot be predicted with
any certainty. If the long-term survival rate is 100%, juveniles escaping
from fishing gears have the potential to make a significant contribution
to the future spawning potential of the stock. However, if the survival
rate is close to 0%, then the future conservation benefits will be minor.
In either of these cases, there is a double incentive for skippers to avoid
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catching undersized individuals, both from the potential conservation
benefits that might accrue to the stock and to avoid having to land
undersized individuals under the landing obligation.
The introduction of the landing obligation shifts the emphasis from pre-
scribing the fishing gears that are permissible, to a results-based system
where the onus is on the fishers to develop gears that will avoid un-
wanted catches. Such a shift to a results-based system, presents both
a challenge and an opportunity to the Basque trawl fleet to develop
alternative more-selective gears in the Bay of Biscay fishery to avoid un-
wanted catches of undersized hake and other species. Reverting to using
a 100 mm diamond mesh codend in the Basque bottom otter trawl fish-
ery may provide a partial solution to mitigate the potential impact of
the landing obligation. However, such a measure may also lead to losses
in marketable catch and reductions in revenue that make the fishery
unviable in the short-term and perhaps in the long-term. Should adop-
tion of a 100 mm codend prove to be economically unviable or fail to
reduce unwanted catches, fishers will be incentivised to develop alterna-
tive gears or adapt their fishing behaviour to mitigate the full impact of
the landing obligation.
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4.1 Abstract
We modelled fleet dynamics and the economic impact of three imple-
mentations of the EU landing obligation for fisheries, and contrasted
the results with those obtained under a scenario of no landing obliga-
tion. Simulations were performed using a dynamic state variable model
of effort allocation for the Basque trawl fleet, assuming that the landing
obligation had been implemented in 2012. The three implementations of
the landing obligation involved different policy arrangements: (i) quota
increases; (ii) international swapping of quotas; and (iii) inter-species
quota flexibility. All three scenarios resulted in changes to fishing pat-
terns caused by choke species and improved selectivity of harvest, but
also resulted in a negative short-term impact on the economic perfor-
mance of the fleet. We report average reductions in net revenue of
up to 60% when compared with results obtained under a no landing
obligation scenario. Our model results suggested that these negative
short-term impacts could be alleviated by incorporation of inter-species
quota flexibility in the implementation of the landing obligation. Our
results indicate that there will be a strong incentive to use this policy
arrangement to alleviate the choke effect problem where species with
limiting quotas constrain the fishery.
Keywords:
Discards,
Landing obligation,
Fleeet dynamics,
Effort allocation,
Bay of Biscay,
Basque trawl mixed fishery.
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4.2 Introduction
All current European policy frameworks for the marine environment are
aimed at the progressive implementation of an ecosystem approach to
fisheries, to ensure a stable, secure, and healthy food supply for EU cit-
izens. An important component of the new EU fisheries policy is the
introduction of a landing obligation (also known as a discard ban) pro-
hibiting the at-sea disposal of commercially valuable species (Article 15
in EU, 2013; Borges, 2015). Since 2015 all catches of quota-regulated
species must be recorded and limited by species-specific total allowable
catches (TACs). Furthermore, fishing vessels must have adequate quo-
tas for all species they are likely to catch during the course of their
operations. Once a quota for any stock is exhausted, the fisheries are
either restricted or closed, even if quotas are still available for other
species.
The purpose of the landing obligation is twofold: to create economic
incentives for the industry to reduce the capture of unwanted species
and undersized individuals through improvements in selectivity (Kindt-
Larsen et al., 2011; Mangi and Catchpole, 2014) and to improve accuracy
in recording catches (FAO, 1996). However, in mixed fisheries, there is
a potential mismatch between allocated TACs for different species and
their catch distribution (Kraak et al., 2013; Poos et al., 2010). While the
ecological and economic effects of the landing obligation are unknown
for many mixed fisheries, it is likely that fishing fleets will respond adap-
tively to the new policy, and will attempt to sustain viable fisheries under
the new policy constraints (Alzorriz et al., 2016; Batsleer et al., 2016).
This will likely occur via the development and adoption of selective de-
vices (Alzorriz et al., 2016; Catchpole and Gray, 2010; Kindt-Larsen
et al., 2011) or adjustments in fishing behaviour (Batsleer et al., 2016;
Condie et al., 2014; Prellezo et al., 2016b; Simons et al., 2015).
A total discard ban may compromise the profitability of some discard-
intensive fisheries (at least in the short term) because retaining, ma-
nipulating and landing size categories or species that were previously
discarded will reduce income-per-unit-effort (Condie et al., 2014). How-
ever, Article 15 of the Common fisheries Policy (CFP) states that the
following flexibilities and exemptions to the landing obligation will be
accommodated: de-minimis exemption of up to 5% of the total annual
quota to be discarded under certain circumstances (and up to 7% and
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6% in the first two years respectively), quota swaps between EU mem-
ber states, banking and borrowing (year-to-year transfer) of quotas, and
inter-species quota flexibility allowing up to 9% of the quota for one
species to be used for landing another species (EU, 2013).
The Spanish trawl fleet operating in the Bay of Biscay, and particularly
that of the Basque country, comprises vessels using either bottom otter
trawl (OTB) or high vertical opening pair bottom trawl (PTB; Iriondo
et al. (2008)). The trawlers using OTB fishing gear are able to exploit
a mix of species, with the main target species being anglerfish (Lophius
budegassa and Lophius piscatorius), megrim (Lepidorhombus whiffiago-
nis), and hake (Merluccius merluccius). Depending on the season and
quota availability, this fleet also targets red mullet (Mullus surmule-
tus), squids (Loligo spp.), pouting (Trisopterus spp.), sole (Solea solea),
horse mackerel (Trachurus trachurus) and mackerel (Scomber scombrus;
(Iriondo et al., 2008)). The fleet using PTB mainly targets hake (80-
85% of total catch). In these fleets, discarding of target and bycatch
species can be substantial. For example, in 2012, discards represented
about 60% and 15% by weight of the total estimated catch of OTB
and PTB, respectively (12,991 t and 6,622 t, respectively; Rochet et
al., 2014). Around 80% of the discards are discarded to adhere to fish-
ing regulations. Vessels in this fishery discard catch when there is a
lack of quota for certain species (mackerel), when captured individuals
are smaller than the minimum landing size (hake), or in the absence
of a market (horse mackerel and blue whiting whiting (Micromesistius
poutassou) (Rochet et al., 2014). These activities typify multi-species
fisheries: species with restrictive quotas are discarded to maximize the
quota use for species with ample quotas (Batsleer et al., 2015). The in-
troduction of the landing obligation is thus expected to negatively affect
the fishery as it will reduce the short-term economic flexibility provided
by discarding as a means of accommodating several quota species for
which single-species quotas are set.
Here we use a dynamic state variable model (Clark and Mangel, 2000)
and data on the fishing activities of Basque trawlers in the Bay of Biscay
from 2003 to 2012, to project the likely effects of a landing obligation
in this multispecies, quota-regulated, fishery. Using ecological and eco-
nomic indicators, we compare the response of the fleets under a scenario
that permits discards (the existing policy, Scenario I) to three landing
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obligation scenarios, involving a complete discard ban with quota in-
creases (Scenario II), international quota swaps (Scenario III), or use of
inter-species quota flexibility (Scenario IV).
4.3 Methods
The Basque trawl fishery
Data for Basque trawlers for the period 2003 to 2012 were collected un-
der the EC Data Collection Framework (EC, 2008). Trawlers averaged
37 m in length, with an average engine power of 465 kW. As described
above, trawlers used two gear types (OTB and PTB) and fished in one of
three fishing areas (Figure 4.1; ICES sub-areas 6, 7 and 8 [divisions 8a,
8b, and 8d, which we refer to as sub-area 8 for simplicity]). Vessels with
OTB fishing gear fished in all sub-areas, while those with PTB fishing
gear fished in sub-area 8 only. We compiled data for four stocks (north-
ern hake, megrim, northeast Atlantic mackerel, western horse mackerel)
that are likely to be affected by a landing obligation policy because they
are managed under TAC constraints, and in some cases show evidence
of high discard rates. We compiled data on catches of other fish species
(e.g. anglerfish, red mullet, squids, pouting, sole, conger (Conger con-
ger), blue whiting, haddock, skates and nephrops) as a single group
(which we refer to as “others”). Catches of the four stocks amounted
to 95% of the total landings of these fleets and 98% of gross revenue.
Catches of the “others” group contributed to the gross revenue of the
fleet, but did not constrain their fishing opportunities. These data were
used to estimate seasonal size-structured landings, discards, and fish-
ing effort. Catches were size structured using the regulatory Minimum
Conservation Reference Size (MCRS; EC, 1998), apart from the “oth-
ers” group that was simply categorized as either discards or landings.
MCRS for hake, megrim, mackerel and horse mackerel were 27 cm, 20
cm, 20 cm and 15 cm respectively.
From 2003 to 2012, 8,669 trips were undertaken by the fleet (Table 4.1).
Trips generally lasted 6 – 7 days. Average catch was 19,000 tonnes per
year. Average weight of discards was approximately 6,800 tonnes, 13%
of which was discarded because individuals were below MCRS guidelines
(Table 4.1). Catches of different species and size classes varied with
season, fishing gear and fishing area. The fishing effort per vessel and
per season varied with the type of fishing gear used and the fishing area
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Figure 4.1:
Study area in the Bay of Biscay show-
ing the fishing areas where the Basque
trawler fleet operates.
(Table 4.2).
Table 4.1: Summary statistics describing fishing activities for the Basque trawl vessels
from 2003 to 2012. Shown are annual average values and their standard
deviations (in brackets), aggregated by fishing area (sub-area 8: divisions
8a, 8b, and 8d) and type of fishing gear used (OTB: bottom otter trawl,
PTB: high vertical opening pair bottom trawl). “n” gives the number of
trips).
variables
OTB
VI
(n=724)
OTB
VII
(n=578)
OTB
VIIIabd
(n=4574)
PTB
VIIIabd
(n=2793)
Total
(n=8669)
Trip characteristics
number of trips 69 (5) 58 (19) 434 (28) 557 (48) 1110 (88)
number of vessel 3 (1) 5 (5) 13 (3) 13 (6) 15 (4)
number of fishing days (days) 443 (46) 405 (131) 2164 (126) 2499 (349) 5511 (605)
Catch composition
total catch (t) 874 (52) 1225 (332) 10192 (565) 7140 (340) 19290 (663)
landings (t) 806 (50) 754 (192) 4567 (264) 6406 (385) 12492 (423)
discards(t) 85 (18) 624 (165) 5628 (555) 734 (96) 6798 (520)
<MCRS* (%) 1 (1) 3 (1) 14 (2) 13 (2) 13 (2)
* Minimum Conservation Reference Size
Information about the cost structure of Basque trawlers was obtained
from accounting data (Prellezo et al., 2016a). The variable costs repre-
sented around 86% of the total costs, and included fuel costs (∼ 40%),
crew share (∼ 35%), gear mantainance (∼ 4%), and landing costs (∼
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Table 4.2:
Fishing effort in the four study areas and four
seasons.
season
1 2 3 4
Fishing effort (days)
VI OTB 59 65 26 39
VII OTB 38 47 28 28
VIIIabd OTB 64 54 22 58
VIIIabd PTB 62 61 40 62
5%), including cost associated with handling, transport, boxes and ice.
Fuel costs depended on gear used, trip effort and fuel price. Fuel costs
were estimated to be approximately 1,240 €day-1 (Prellezo et al., 2016a).
Gear maintenance costs were assumed proportional to fishing effort,
landing costs proportional to the total weight landed, and crew share
variable costs proportional to the landings income. The price of the
marketable catch of each species was calculated from the 2012 sales slip
data. In the model, prices were assumed to be constant over time and
independent of supply (Table 4.3).
Table 4.3:
Economic parameter values used in the
state-dependent dynamic model.
Variable costs
fuel costs (€day-1) 1,240
gear maintenance (€day-1) 287
crew share 35%
landing costs (€t-1) 121
Market value (€kg-1) season
1 2 3 4
hake 2.5 2.9 1.9 2.4
megrim 5.3 4.6 4.9 5.0
mackerel 0.7 1.9 0.7 0.7
horse mackerel 0.7 1.0 1.3 1.7
“others” 3.0 2.3 2.8 3.3
Catch quota calculations
The Basque trawl fleet was managed through total allowable landings
(TALs) and total allowable effort (TAE), as well as other technical and
physical measures (Iriondo et al., 2013). During the study period, fish-
ing effort was not constraining by the TAE due to historical reductions
in the fleet size (Iriondo et al., 2008; Prellezo et al., 2016a). The EU
allocates landing quota TALs across Member States are based on the
principle of relative stability (Table 4.4 for 2012) (EU, 2013). Quotas,
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or parts of, could be swapped between Member States, to accommodate
annual fishing opportunities distinct from those provided by the relative
stability principle. Spanish quotas (B in Table 4.4)) were divided over
vessels based on fixed individual shares (BOE, 2012). Summing the in-
dividual shares of the Basque vessels resulted in the Basque fleet TALs
(C in Table 4.4). The TALs did not consider discards since there were
no penalties for discarding over-quota fish. Within Spain, quotas could
also be swapped among vessels. The average and variance of the Spanish
quota swaps during the period 2009 to 2012 were estimated from Fishery
Data Exchange System (FIDES; D in Table 4.4). The inter-annual vari-
ation of Spanish quota swapping during this period was lower than the
average for hake, but higher than the average for other species. Spanish
international quota swaps thus play an important role in defining fishing
opportunities for the Basque trawl fleets (G in Table 4.4).
Table 4.4: Quota estimation for the four selected stocks (in 1000s of tonnes, ‘000
t). The capital letter in the calculation column refer to the letters in
the indicator column. Quotas for the “others” group is not estimated
because it consists of multiple fish stocks which do not necessarily have
Total Allowable Catch (TAC) limitations.
2012 indicator calculation hake megrim mackerel horsemackerel
Stauts quo quota (‘000 t)
Europe TAL* A 51.5 19.1 259.1 158.0
Spanish TAL B 62.3 21.7 265.1 163.2
Basque TAL C 4.6 1.1 5.0x10-3 4.9
International quota swaps (%)
Spanish quota swaps D 30±1 4±8 8±11 -79±10
ICES Stock assessment data (‘000 t)*
Total landings E 85.6 12.7 186.8 169.9
Total catches F 100.5 15.7 197.3 173.1
Total discards G 14.9 3.0 10.5 3.2
Quota scenarios for Basque trawlers (‘000 t)
TAL after int swaps H (C*(1+D/100)) 5.9 0.9 7.0x10-3 1.6
TAC without swaps I (C+(0.75*(C/A)*G) 5.6 1.2 5.0x10-3 5.1
TAC after int swaps J (H+(0.75*(H/A)*G) 7.3 1.2 6.0x10-3 1.7
TAC after int-sp swaps K (I±0.1*I) 5.6 1.1 0.5(incl. 10% hom) 4.6
Basque trawlers catches 2012 (‘000 t)
landings L 5.9 0.1 7.3x10-2 0.2
catches M 6.2 0.1 1.9 2.3
* Total allowable landings
Under the reform of the CFP, total allowable catch quotas (TACs) re-
place the existing TALs. Depending on the landing obligation imple-
mentation calendar, TACs will increase to account for the catch of pre-
viously discarded fish. The quota increases for the four selected stocks
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were limited to 75% of the estimated discards by stock, to account for
uncertainty in discard estimates, following Condie et al. (2014). Con-
sequently, the Basque fleet TACs were set by increasing landing quotas
by 75% of the stock-specific discards from 2009 to 2012. These discards
were estimated from ICES (ICES (2013a,b); see stock-specific average
landings and catches, E and F in Table 4.4).
The dynamic-state variable model
A dynamic state variable model (Clark and Mangel, 2000; Houston
and McNamara, 1999) was used to model fishing choices, extending the
model structure in Batsleer et al. (2015). To accommodate the range of
quota flexibility and exemptions proposed (EU, 2013), the model incor-
porated annual fines for exceeding landings or catch quota as in Batsleer
et al. (2015, 2016). Each individual vessel in the model had a set of
choices. The choices included whether or not to go fishing in one of the
three areas, which fishing gear to use, and whether to discard one or
more species and size-class combinations. In order to calculate state-
dependent choices during the year, we started by defining the annual
fines for exceeding landings or catch quotas at the end of the year:
Φ(Ci, Qi, Fi) = −
∑
i
(max(0, (Ci −Qi)) ∗ Fi), . . . . . (4.1)
where Ci was the cumulative annual landings or catches for species i
for an individual vessel. These cumulative landings defined the state
of the individual. Qi was the annual individual quota for landings or
catches for the quota species. Individual quotas were not transferable.
To reduce computation time, we set quotas only for two species. Fi was
the fine per unit weight for exceeding individual landings or catch quotas
was set to 1x106 €day-1. These high fines combined with an assumed
100% detection of exceeding quotas resulted in model results in which
fishers comply with quota regulations.
The maximum expected utility between current time t and the end of the
year was V (Ci, Qi, Fi, t), and the model started by setting V (Ci, Qi, Fi, t) =
Φ(Ci, Qi, Fi). For preceding times, the expected utility depended on in-
dividual choices, and at each time step individuals chose to visit fishing
area a (including area 0: “staying in port”), with gear g, and to keep or
discard any combination of the size classes caught of the quota species.
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Discarding was defined by a matrix, d, whose size was defined by the
number of species under quota constraints and the number of size classes.
Each element could take the value 0 (discard) or 1 (keep on board and
land). The expected utility for each state and each time step t was
calculated backward using stochastic dynamic programming (Clark and
Mangel, 2000):
V (Ci, Qi, Fi, t) = maxa,g,d(R(a, g, d, t)−G(a, g)− C(a, g) + Ea,g,d[V (C ′i, Qi, Fi, t+ 1])), (4.2)
where R(a, g, d, t) was the expected immediate contribution of the gross
revenue from the sales of fish in a season resulting from choices a, g,
and d. Gross revenues resulted from multiplying catches by size class of
hake, megrim, mackerel, horse mackerel, and “others” by their prices.
G(a, g) represented the incurred fuel costs per season for fishing area
a with gear g, while C(a, g) represented the variable operating costs
(crew share, gear maintenance and landing costs), which in turn de-
pended on the change in cumulative landings and fish prices. The term
Ea,g,d[V (C ′i, Qi, Fi, t+ 1] denoted the expected future utility taken over
all possible states resulting from choices a, g, and d. The transition
of these states was based on normal distributions of catch rates, using
means and variances for the species, as explained in the model condi-
tioning section, following Poos et al. (2010).
Rather than assume that each individual always made the optimal choice,
we assigned a probability to each choice proportional to its expected util-
ity, following Dowling et al. (2012). The expected utility for any choice
was
U(Ci, Qi, Fi, t) = R(a, g, d, t)−G(a, g)− C(a, g) + Ea,g,d[V (C ′i, Qi, Fi, t+ 1]), (4.3)
If U∗ was the expected utility at the optimal choice for a given t, we
set
∆a,g,d(Ci, Qi, Fi, t) = U∗(Ci, Qi, Fi, t)− U(Ci, Qi, Fi, t), . (4.4)
and then defined the probability of a choice for a given area and dis-
carding as
Pa,g,d(Ci, Qi, Fi, t) =
e−∆a,g,d(Ci,Qi,Fi,t)/σ∑
a
∑
g
∑
d e
−∆a,g,d(Ci,Qi,Fi,t)/σ , . . . (4.5)
where σ was a tuning parameter that measured how important it was to
be near the optimal choice. A large σ resulted in uniform probabilities
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of choices, with vessels being distributed uniformly across the different
fishing areas. In contrast, a small σ forces vessels to concentrate in the
optimal location (but note that σ should be > 0). For computations, we
used σ = 1.1x105. This value was chosen based on outcomes of initial
runs, so that the distribution of the fishing area choices reflected the
observed distribution.
The dynamic state variable model was solved by iterating backwards in
time, while finding the probability distribution choice in terms of loca-
tion and discarding behaviour for all possible states, and combining the
net revenue obtained from the sale of fish and the costs of a fishing trip
and the effect of the annual fines when exceeding annual quota. Fur-
ther details for this procedure can be found in Batsleer et al. (2016) and
Dowling et al. (2012). Once the backward calculations were finished, we
performed a Monte Carlo simulation where the probabilities of choices
were sampled randomly using Eq. 4.5. This was done for 1,500 individ-
ual vessels. When necessary, for example, in the case of estimating the
modelled seasonal effort in 2012, 15 out of the full set of 1,500 vessels
were randomly selected to characterise the fleet in that year.
Model conditioning and validation
Averages and variances of catch rates per vessel in 2012 were used to
validate the model. Those values were estimated for the two gear types
and three areas based on time series of landings and discards. Two size
classes were distinguished for the four stocks: individuals smaller than
MCRS guidelines and those equal to or larger than MCRS guidelines.
The fishing effort per vessel and season depended on the gear used and
fishing area, and was estimated from the 2012 effort data for each fleet.
Validation of the effort distribution using dynamic effort allocation was
obtained by comparing the predicted effort allocation with the observed
allocation in 2012. The model fit to the data was evaluated using the
Pearson product-moment correlation coefficient between the observed
and predicted effort allocation by gear and area across all seasons.
For the comparison among implementation scenarios, quarterly averages
and variances of catch rates per vessel from the entire 10-year study
period were entered into the model (estimated for the two fleets as de-
scribed above; Fig. 4.2). We chose this larger time-span for the com-
parison of scenarios because the 2012 data used for model validation
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were not fully representative of Basque fishing opportunities (due to the
absence of fishing activities in sub-area 7). Fishing effort per vessel and
season depended on the gear used and fishing area, and was estimated
from the fleets’ effort time series (Table 4.2).
The price for undersized fish was set to 0 €kg-1 when discarding was
allowed. Under the landing obligation, this fraction of the catch must
be landed and will be used for non-human consumption (e.g. fish-meal
production). As such, the value of fish smaller than MCRS guidelines
was set to 0.2 €kg-1 when discarding is prohibited, which was similar
to values used by Batsleer et al. (2016), but substantially lower than
the current prices for marketable fish in this fishery (Prellezo et al.,
2016b).
Discard scenarios and potential limiting species approach
Four scenarios based on the quota estimates in Table 4.4 were examined
in the model. A ratio indicator between quotas and landings or catches
indicated potentially limiting species in each of these scenarios (Table
4.5). Ratios >1 indicated that the quota was not sufficient to account
for the landings or catches, potentially constraining the fishery. For each
scenario the two most constraining species were selected to limit fishing
opportunities.
Table 4.5: Ratios of the landings and catch to the final quota allocation for each of the
landing obligation implementations (scenarios I to IV). Quotas and catches
from 2012 are used as the reference. Capital letters in indicators column
refer to indicators in Table 4. Ratios above 1 are in bold and indicate
that the final catch quota would not have been sufficient to account for
the Basque trawlers catches.
Scenarios Ratio based on indicators hake megrim mackerel horsemackerel
I Basque landingsTAL after int swaps (L/H) 1.00 0.14 10.43 0.14
II Basque catchesTAC (M/I) 1.12 0.11 364.13 0.45
III Basque catchesTAC after int swaps (M/J) 0.86 0.11 298.47 1.35
IV Basque catchesTAC after int-sp swaps (M/K) 1.12 0.12 3.64 0.49
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Figure 4.2: Seasonal variation in the catch per unit of effort (CPUE t/vessel) of the
two size categories of hake, megrim, mackerel, horse mackerel and other
species (“others”) for the Bay of Biscay fishing areas. Size categories are
equal to or greater than the Minimum Conservation Reference Size guide-
lines (>MCRS; solid lines) and smaller than MCRS guidelines (<MCRS;
dashed lines). Landings (solid lines) and discards (dashed lines) are shown
for the “others” group. Black lines reflect the mean CPUE inserted in the
model.
The baseline scenario (scenario I) mimicked the current management
situation, in which there are no penalties for discarding over-quota fish
and landings were counted against final TALs after international swaps
(H in Table 4.4). In this scenario hake and mackerel were the limit-
ing species (Table 4.5). Scenarios II to IV explored the effects of the
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landing obligation policy using quota flexibilities that could be applied
to mitigate its short term economic effects (either international quota
swaps or inter-species quota swaps). Because discarding was not allowed
in scenarios II to IV, all elements in the discarding matrix d of the dy-
namic state variable model were set to 1. In scenario II, the landing
obligation was examined in the absence of international swaps. There-
fore, no swaps were considered, and the fleets TAC quotas were set as
the initial TAL quota, increased by 75% of the estimated stock discards
I in Table 4.4). In scenario II, as with scenario I, hake and mackerel
were the limiting species (Table 4.5).
In scenario III, the landing obligation was examined maintaining past
known international quota swaps (J in Table 4.4). Mackerel and horse
mackerel were the limiting species in this scenario (Table 4.5). In
scenario IV the landing obligation was examined by introducing inter-
species quota flexibility, where 9% of one species catch quota could be
allocated to other species as long as the receiver stocks were within safe
biological limits (with the exception of megrim all stocks selected were
in safe biological limits in 2012). Therefore, comparing stock-specific
Basque catches against TAC without international swaps, 9% of horse
mackerel catch quota was selected to increase mackerel quota (K in Table
4.4). Under this scenario, hake and mackerel were the limiting species
(Table 4.5).
4.4 Results
Spatial and temporal patterns in catch rate
Distinct seasonal and spatial patterns were observed in size-dependent
catch rates for hake, megrim, mackerel, horse mackerel and the “others”
category (Fig. 4.2). Moreover, the catch rates differed for the two
different types of fishing gear: trawlers using PTB targeted mainly hake,
while OTB catch rates were more mixed.
Catch rates of marketable hake (>= MCRS) were high in sub-area 8
for vessels using PTB gear and in sub-area 6 for vessels using OTB gear.
Catch rates of undersized hake (< MCRS) were generally lower than
catch rates for marketable hake. However, in sub-area 8 catch rates for
undersized and marketable hake were of the same order of magnitude for
vessels using OTB gear (Fig. 4.2). Catch rates of marketable megrim
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were highest in sub-area 7, and showed a seasonal peak in the first and
second quarters of the year. Catch rates of megrim < MCRS were
consistently lower than catch rates of megrim >= MCRS. In contrast,
catch rates of marketable mackerel were highest in sub-area 8 for vessels
using OTB gear and showed a clear seasonal pattern with high values
in the first and final quarters of the year (Fig. 4.2). Catch rates for
marketable mackerel in the same area of vessels using PTB, were lower
than for vessels using OTB, but followed a similar seasonal pattern.
Catch rates for undersized individuals were negligible throughout the
year for all areas. Finally, catch rates of marketable horse mackerel were
highest in sub-area 8 for vessels using OTB gear. The seasonal pattern
of catch rates in sub-area 8 was similar for the two types of fishing gear
and differed from the seasonal pattern of catch rates in the other areas.
Catch rates of undersized horse mackerel were generally lower than catch
rates for marketable catch and followed a similar seasonal pattern to that
of the marketable catch.
Catch rates of the “others” group were higher for vessels using OTB
gear, which is expected given the mixed nature of the fishery, in which
multiple species are harvested. The seasonal variation in catch rates
of “others” species varied between fishing areas (Fig. 4.2). This was
likely caused by the fact that these catch rates were composed of a large
number of species, each with their own seasonal dynamics. Landing
rates were highest in the first and final quarters of the year in sub-
area 8, whereas in sub-areas 6 and 7 they were highest in the second
quarter. The discards were generally of the same order of magnitude as
the landings.
Model validation
To validate the model, the observed effort spent in each area and sea-
son in 2012 were compared to model predictions conditioned on 2012
catch data. There were no penalties for discarding over-quota fish in the
validation run, and fishers did not avoid areas with undersized catches
because these could be discarded without affecting net revenues. Fig.
4.3 shows that when discarding was allowed the model was able to repro-
duce the distribution of fishing effort in 2012. The total effort in days at
sea for the model validation run also resembled the observed fleet effort
for 2012 (2,800 days and 3,337 days respectively). There was a positive
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linear correlation between the model validation run and the observed
distribution of fishing effort over seasons, areas and types of fishing gear
(r = 0.72, df = 10, p < 0.01). However, the model overestimated effort
allocation in sub-area 6 by vessels using OTB gear, and underestimated
effort by vessels using PTB gear (Fig. 4.3).
Figure 4.3:
Seasonal fishing effort (%)
and fishing areas observed
and modelled for 2012 as
a function of quota limita-
tions for the Basque trawlers
under a management sys-
tem where discarding was al-
lowed.
Simulated gear and location choice
There were no penalties for discarding over-quota fish in Scenario I, and
fishers were not forced to avoid areas with undersized catches because
these could be discarded without affecting net revenues. Vessels using
both OTB and PTB fishing gear concentrated the majority of their
fishing effort in sub-area 8. The proportion of effort by vessels using PTB
gear in this area was especially high in the first season when hake catch
rates and prices were also high. Vessels using OTB gear also expended
substantial effort in sub-areas 6 and 7, particularly in season 2, when
there was a switch to sub-area 6, because of high catch rates of hake and
“others” in that area (Fig. 4.4). In season 3, fishing effort overall was
reduced and dominated by vessels using PTB gear and fishing in sub-
area 8. This changed to vessels using OTB gear in the last season.
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Scenario II simulated a discard ban where there were no international
swaps, and hake and mackerel were the limiting quota species (Table
4.5). This scenario had a clear impact on the fishing effort and resulted in
the complete cessation of fishing during the first season (Fig. 4.4). Later
in the year, effort was concentrated in sub-area 6 (with OTB gear) and 8
(with PTB gear). Mackerel quota limitation caused lower fishing effort
by trawlers using PTB gear and for those using OTB gear to shift effort
from sub-area 7 and 8 to sub-area 6 (Fig. 4.4). These choices reduced
undesirable catches of undersized hake and mackerel, while allowing the
opportunity to catch other valuable species. However, average revenues
by vessels were around 40% of those under scenario I (where discarding
was allowed). The relative contribution of using PTB fishing gear to the
net revenue was reduced to a greater extent than was the use of OTB
gear (Table 4.6).
Figure 4.4: Seasonal fishing effort (%) and fishing areas selected as a function of quota
limitations for the Basque trawlers under the three discard ban scenarios.
In Scenario III, the inclusion of international quota swaps did not sub-
stantially mitigate the reduction in fishing opportunities observed in
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scenario II. Mackerel and horse mackerel were the limiting quota species
in this scenario (Table 4.5). Although low quotas for horse mackerel
potentially triggered reductions in fishing effort, it was effectively the
mackerel quota that closed the fishery (as in scenario II, Fig. 4.4).
Thus, effort was allocated in the same manner as scenario II, and model
results suggested that trading quotas resulted in short-term losses that
were comparable to a situation where quotas were not swapped under
the landing obligation (Fig. 4.4 and Table 4.6).
Scenario IV revealed that reductions in fishing opportunities resulting
from the landing obligation could be alleviated by inter-species quota
flexibility. An increase in mackerel quota resulted in vessels using OTB
gear fishing in sub-areas 6 and 7, where mackerel catches were sufficient
(Figs 4.2 and 4.4). The limiting mackerel quota incentivized trawlers to
choose to use PTB gear later in the year, particularly in season 3, and
for those vessels using OTB gear to fish in sub-area 8 (Fig. 4.2). When
compared with the scenario in which discarding was allowed (scenario
I), scenario IV resulted in a 33% reduction in average revenues per vessel
(Fig. 4.4; Table 4.6). This reduction in net revenue was not propor-
tionally distributed between the two types of fishing gear: the average
reduction in net revenue for use of PTB gear was 8%, while for use of
OTB gear it was 37% (Table 4.6).
Landings and discards size composition
When discarding was allowed (scenario I), landings for all species con-
sisted of marketable fish. Discards consisted of undersized fish and, when
quotas were constrained, marketable fish (Fig. 4.5 and 4.6). Landings
per unit effort were higher for trawlers using OTB gear, except for hake
(which is the main target species of vessels using PTB gear; Fig. 4.5).
Discards mainly comprised individuals smaller than MCRS guidelines,
except for hake and mackerel, where many individuals >=MCRS guide-
lines were discarded (Fig. 4.6). For mackerel, discards of individuals
≥MCRS guidelines exceeded the landings of that size class.
Under the discard ban scenarios (scenarios II, III, IV), fishers avoided
areas and seasons in which there was a significant fraction of undesirable
catches (undersized specimens, <MCRS guidelines), as a result of the
fines they would face for discarding those individuals (Fig. 4.2 and 4.4).
Therefore, in these scenarios fishing effort was reallocated to areas and
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Table 4.6: Average annual revenues under the four landing obligation implementa-
tions (Scenario I, where discarding is allowed and scenarios II, III, and IV,
where discarding is limited). Shown are the average gross revenues, costs,
and net revenues by vessel type (with 5th and 95th percentiles shown in
brackets). Values are relative to the average of scenario I for the 1500
Basque vessel simulations.
Scenario I Scenario II Scenario III Scenario IV
Gross revenue by vessel (th€)
mean gross revenue 100 (64-132) 46 (10-72) 44 (10-71) 68 (34-96)
OTB gross revenue 100 (43-162) 60 (17-9) 59 (17-91) 67 (19-123)
PTB gross revenue 100 (34-187) 45 (31-57) 44 (31-56) 89 (37-135)
Costs by vessel (th€))
mean fuel costs 100 (84-115) 51 (13-74) 50 (13-74) 69 (34-96)
OTB fuel costs 100 (49-145) 63 (28-95) 62 (28-95) 72 (20-124)
OTB fuel costs 100( 56-173) 56 (56-56) 56 (56-56) 72 (56-141)
Net revenue by vessel (th€))
mean net revenue 100 (41-154) 41 (5-71 ) 40 (5-70) 67 (27-105)
OTB net revenue 100 (26-183) 59 (10-96) 57 (9-95) 63 (15-123)
OTB net revenue 100 (8-191) 38 (18-58) 38 (18-57) 92 (27-147)
gears where the discarded fraction was almost non-existent (Fig. 4.4 and
4.6). For trawlers constrained by a discard ban without the option of
quota swaps or with quota swaps included based on the historical rate
of international swaps, hake and “others” were the dominant species in
the landings (Fig. 4.5). When mackerel quota increased due to inter-
species quota flexibility in scenario IV (Table t:TAC), the quantity of
marketable sized landings of all species increased (Fig. 4.5). Because all
catches had to be landed, discards were absent for all species apart from
the “others” group, where discarding of specimens smaller than MCRS
guidelines occurred (Fig. 4.6). In general, the large confidence bands
around the average modelled landings and discards in scenarios I and
IV (Fig. 4.5 and 4.6) indicated differences in catch compositions since
these scenarios implied greater choice of fishing areas than did scenarios
II and III (Fig. 4.4).
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Figure 4.5: Modelled landings (t/season) of OTB and PTB trawlers across the year
under the scenario that allows discarding (scenario I) and discard ban
scenarios: no quota swaps allowed (scenario II), international historical
swaps allowed (scenario III) and inter-species quota flexibility applied
(scenario IV) with 95% confidence interval shaded. Landings smaller
than Minimum Conservation Reference Size guidelines MCRS (circles,
red: OTB and black: PTB), landings greater than the MCRS (triangles,
red: OTB and black: PTB).
4.5 Discussion
Using a state-dependent decision-making model for the Basque trawl
fleet we examined the potential consequences of three implementations
of a landing obligation under different policy arrangements (quota in-
creases, international quota swaps, and inter-species flexibility). Our
model included temporal and spatial segregation of different size classes
of the main target species, as well as differences in the selectivity of two
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Figure 4.6: Modelled discards (t/season) of an OTB and PTB trawlers across the
year under the scenario that allows discarding (scenario I) and discard
ban scenarios: no quota swaps allowed (scenario II), international historic
swaps allowed (scenario III) and inter-species quota flexibility applied
(scenario IV) with 95% confidence interval shaded. Discards smaller than
the MCRS (circles, green: OTB and black: PTB), discards larger than
the MCRS (triangles, green: OTB and black: PTB).
types of trawl fishing gear, and seasonally-varying prices and variable
costs. The analysis extended earlier approaches (e.g. Batsleer et al.
(2016); Gillis et al. (1995)) by including errors in decision-making (fol-
lowing Dowling et al. (2012)) rather than assuming that individuals
always make optimal decisions. The use of errors in decision-making is
a technically simple way to encapsulate more complex dynamics that
govern decision-making (Dowling et al., 2012). Meanwhile, our analy-
sis made several assumptions: that there was perfect knowledge of the
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stochastic nature of catch rates, full compliance of fishers with the dis-
carding policy, lack of transferability of individual quotas, and lack of
interference competition among fishers (Batsleer et al., 2016). Also, we
used seasonal time steps in the model to keep computation time low,
while the time scale at which fishing trips occur may be much smaller
(Iriondo et al., 2008). Finally, we did not include the existence of the
de-minimis exception that allows 7% of the quota to be discarded under
certain circumstances (CFP Article 15). We may thus have underes-
timated the flexibility of the fishery to respond to quota limitations
imposed under the landing obligation. Despite these assumptions, a
preliminary model validation allowed us to simulate the dynamics of the
Basque trawl fleet and examine fishing effort allocations in space.
When discarding was allowed, fishers did not avoid areas where catching
undersized specimens was likely because there was no incentive to do so.
Under all three implementations (scenarios) of the landing obligation,
however, our model showed that the Basque trawling fleet was likely to
move to areas with lower catch rates of quota species to avoid exceeding
quota limitations. We showed that in the short term the landing obliga-
tion would likely result in a loss in profitability for the fleet. This loss in
profitability was driven by the “choke” effect for species such as mack-
erel (scenario II and III), which was triggered by reductions in effort as
a result of rapid quota exhaustion and by greater costs associated with
fishing further from home ports (scenario IV).
Our results suggest that the Basque fleet is limited by hake, horse mack-
erel and mackerel quota. In scenarios II and III, the choke effect of
mackerel is so strong that the effect of other species limits (hake un-
der scenario II, horse mackerel under scenario III) is negligible. Conse-
quently, under both these scenarios our model predicts that the fleet will
avoid using OTB gear and will reduce fishing effort in sub-area 7 and 8
because of their high mackerel catch rates (Fig. 4.3). Thus, fishers will
likely visit sub-area 6 and 8 (using PTB gear). Revenues under these
two scenarios are predicted to result in a loss of profitability (60% less
than the status quo; Table 4.6). These findings indicate that trading
quotas (at rates undertaken in the past) does not alleviate the choking
effect of the landing obligation. Therefore, new ways of swapping quotas
would be needed under the landing obligation to alleviate the choke ef-
fect of any of the quota limiting species. Fleets with high discards rates
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of certain species will be likely to have larger incentives to increase their
quotas for those species than fleets with low discard rates.
In scenario IV, the addition of inter-species quota-swapping flexibility
to the landing obligation (e.g. 9% of the horse mackerel catch quota
could go to increase mackerel quota) substantially decreased the mack-
erel choke effect and increased both fishing opportunities and net rev-
enues, when compared to scenarios II and III. Under this scenario, rev-
enue was 30% lower than when discarding was allowed (scenario I).
Our results suggest that reductions in fishing opportunities under a land-
ing obligation that are caused by choke species could be alleviated by
the use of inter-species quota flexibility, and that there will be strong
incentives to use this flexibility. Management bodies should ensure that
the use of different flexibilities will constrain catches to comply with
the MSY objective in Article 2(2) of the CFP Basic Regulation. Use of
inter-species quota flexibility could cause serious impacts to stock abun-
dance when quota from a high volume/low value species is transferred
to a low volume/high value stock. Achieving a balance between quota
flexibility, over-exploitation risk, and administrative simplicity is critical
for the profitability and sustainability of multi-species fisheries.
The success of any new regulation also depends on achieving a balance
between the costs and benefits of measures that promote voluntary com-
pliance and those that punish non-compliance. With poor enforcement
the economic benefits of non-compliance outweigh the risks of detection
(Batsleer et al., 2013; Catchpole et al., 2005). In our model, detec-
tion rates were assumed to be 100% and fines were set sufficiently high
so that no discarding occurred, reflecting full compliance with regula-
tions. However, if detection rates are low and the short–term benefits of
non-compliance are high (as our results suggest) then non-compliance is
likely to be a substantial problem in the absence of measures promoting
voluntary compliance.
The landing obligation was implemented to incentivise individual busi-
nesses to improve selectivity and avoid unwanted catches. The landing
obligation shifts the emphasis from prescribing the fishing gears that
are permissible, to a results-based system where the onus is on the fish-
ers to use fishing gear that will avoid unwanted catches. Therefore,
fishers should be incentivised to develop alternative gear or adapt their
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fishing behaviour to mitigate the full impact of the landing obligation
(Alzorriz et al., 2016). Discard ban policies may not necessarily reduce
harvest rates but will change the underlying selectivity patterns of har-
vests (Borges et al., 2016). Our results reflect the short-term effects
of a discard ban on selectivity patterns and net revenues implemented
under three scenarios. If the landing obligation changes selectivity pat-
terns as we predict, then we would also expect longer term changes in
both fish populations and the economy of the fishery. Such analyses
are the domain of bio-economic management strategy evaluations where
the feedback between fleet and stock dynamics are modelled explicitly
(Andersen et al., 2010; Prellezo et al., 2016a; Punt et al., 2016). In such
models, effects of the changing selectivity of the fishing fleets on the
reference points for sustainable exploitation can be evaluated.
4.6 Conclusions
We have shown that the landing obligation proposed by the EU CFP, un-
der the assumption of full compliance, is likely to change the distribution
of fishing effort of the Basque trawler fleet. Currently, with discarding al-
lowed, marketable mackerel is caught and discarded. Our model predicts
that when discarding is prevented under a landing obligation, the mack-
erel quota will constrain the Basque trawler fleet, resulting in a change
to fishing effort allocation and a substantial reduction to short-term net
profits. Our model also showed that inter-species quota flexibility could
alleviate the choke effect of mackerel (by transfers to horse mackerel
quota) and lessen the negative short-term reduction in net profits pro-
duced by the landing obligation. These results suggest that there will
be a large incentive for the Basque fleet to use this quota flexibility: a
finding that is likely transferable to other fleets and fisheries.
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5.1 Abstract
The EU common fisheries policy (CFP), designed for the long-term en-
vironmental, economic, and social sustainability of fishing and aquacul-
ture activities, includes making use of the maximum sustainable yield
(MSY) reference points as targets for exploiting commercially important
fish stocks. To incentivise individual business to improve selectivity and
avoid unwanted catches, it also introduced a landing obligation. Achiev-
ing these complex objectives may not necessarily reduce harvest rates,
but will change the underlying selectivity patterns of harvests. The im-
pact of exploiting at MSY and no discarding allowance on the optimal
effort allocation between fleets is analysed. We contrast two manage-
ment plans to achieve MSY from two stocks and compare their effective-
ness based on a management strategy evaluation that uses a dynamic
state variable model including errors in decision-making in its operating
model. The results show that when accounting for quota on one species
and for quotas on both species, MSY landings in the short-term are 30%
to 50% lower than when compared to an unmanaged situation simula-
tions. Some years after the implementation, MSY landings are similar
or 25% to 50% higher than the pre-manage situation. Optimal effort at
MSY generates effort reductions of 37% to 62% over the mid-term, thus
there would be some vessels that could benefit up to 1.4 times larger
profits than before the CFP implementation. The results show that for
both species, any of the two management plans would be beneficial to
both the stock and part of the fleets over the mid-term compared with
the projections over the short-term.
Keywords:
management strategy evaluation,
dynamics state variable model,
errors in decision-making,
landing obligation,
maximum sustainable yield,
common fisheries policy.
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5.2 Introduction
Management strategy evaluation (MSE; (Bunnefeld et al., 2011; Sains-
bury, 2000; Smith, 1994)) seeks to study the implications of manage-
ment strategies using simulations (Punt et al., 2016). Such simulations
should include all important processes of a fishery. Any fishery is inher-
ently a socio-ecological system, with coupled dynamics of fishing fleets,
exploited stocks, and their governance (Punt et al., 2016; Rademeyer
et al., 2007). Given the complexity of a socio-ecological system the
uncertainty about the dynamics and feedbacks are considerable. As a
result, the probability of success of implementing a management mea-
sure to achieve a certain goal may thus be small compared to system
stochasticity, or worse, be counteracted by unintended consequences of
the management strategy. The robustness of management strategies to
the uncertainty in the processes that govern fisheries systems thus need
to be accounted for (Andersen et al., 2010; Kell et al., 2007; Prellezo
et al., 2016a; Punt et al., 2016).
The adaptive response of fishers to their environment is one of the key
uncertainties requiring attention in MSE (Fulton et al., 2007). Simu-
lation tools for such a response are available, borrowing methodology
from state-dependent foraging decisions in ecological systems (Clark
and Mangel, 2000; Houston and McNamara, 1999). State-dependent
behaviour of individual fishing vessels, aggregated into fleet dynamics,
have been developed using stochastic dynamic programming (Alzorriz
et al., 2018; Batsleer et al., 2015; Dowling et al., 2011; Gillis et al., 1995;
Poos et al., 2010). These models generally predict short term (within
a fishing trip, or a quota year) effects of changes in management or the
environment by determining which choices yields the best chance of in-
creasing utility, while keeping track of the state of each individual. The
effect of a choice on utility depends on the state of the individual, the
economic environment, such as fuel prices, and the biological environ-
ment, such as the spatial distribution of resources.
Using dynamic variable state models, effects of e.g. relocation costs
of marine protected areas have been modelled (Dowling et al., 2011).
Dynamic state variables have also been used to describe discarding be-
haviour (Alzorriz et al., 2018; Batsleer et al., 2013, 2015; Gillis et al.,
1995). Some of these studies have tried to shed light on the potential
outcomes of the European fisheries management reform of 2013. That
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reform added the gradual introduction of a landings obligation (LO)
to the management system of Total Allowable Catches set according to
the maximum sustainable yield (MSY) (EU, 2013). Using spatial and
temporal distributions of catch rates within a single year, dynamic state
variable models forecasted high costs in mixed fisheries in the short term
as a result of the LO (Alzorriz et al., 2018; Batsleer et al., 2013, 2015).
These costs result from removing the choice to discard part of the catch
and in doing so adapt landings to quota (Alzorriz et al., 2018). This will
result in fishing effort reallocation and early closures of fisheries once
quota have been reached.
Meanwhile, the LO potentially improves selectivity of fisheries by pro-
viding incentives to move away from areas with high levels of unwanted
catch and the use of more selective gears (Alzorriz et al., 2016, 2018).
The improved selectivity should lead to higher long term catches. These
long term benefits to fisheries that could result from improved selectivity
under the LO are ignored in previous studies on the adaptive response
of fisheries (Alzorriz et al., 2018; Batsleer et al., 2013, 2015). Ignoring
the potential for improved selectivity leaves out a key element in the
perceived benefit of the LO. In mixed fisheries, however, optimizing sin-
gle species selectivity and achieving MSY while landing all commercial
catches is challenging because of trade-offs in the catches of different
species and size-classes (Batsleer et al., 2013; Ulrich et al., 2017). Fore-
casting whether any management will be effective requires understand-
ing the response of fishers constrained by these trade-offs and the effects
of the response on the development of fish populations (Venables et al.,
2009). If the fleet dynamic model results in a short term movement of
vessels to allocate effort both spatially and temporally, we also expect
longer term changes to occur in fish populations and the economy of the
fishery (Alzorriz et al., 2018).
We present an MSE framework that couples forecasts from a state-
dependent behaviour model to a biological dynamic model that forecasts
population effects resulting from the collective fishers behaviour. The
model includes the (real or perceived) local biomass of two populations,
governed by growth, mortality, and migration. These populations are
size-structured, and are modelled in a spatially heterogeneous environ-
ment. The populations are harvested by a single fleet that has annual
fishing rights for both populations, consisting of individuals who make
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monthly choices on fishing locations. These choices depend on the per-
ceived spatial distributions of biomasses, but also on various costs, prin-
cipally that of fuel. The constraints on the fleet includes management-
imposed constraints such as fish quotas. In the framework, these quotas
are decided by a management body that observes the total biomass of
the two stocks and with the goal of constraining fishing mortality so that
maximum sustainable yields are achieved.
The MSE framework is used to understand the fleet dynamics in a spa-
tially and temporally heterogeneous mixed quota-regulated fishery when
reducing from unmanaged (unconstrained catch quota) to MSY man-
aged combined with the LO where discards are not allowed, and to com-
pare it in order to assess on the biological and economic consequences.
Although there will be an incentive to continue discarding if LO and
catch quotas are not fully enforced; we assumed full compliance to un-
derstand if the likely adaptive change in fishing patterns will lead to a
better balance between quotas and catches.
5.3 Methods
The management strategy evaluation framework was used to forecast the
dynamics of a hypothetical mixed fishery on two species. In the fishery,
there are three essential elements: (i) a collection of size structured fish
stocks, whose dynamics are governed by annual reproduction, growth,
migration, and mortality; (ii) a management body that evaluates the
fishing pressure and aims to set annual quotas in accordance with fish-
ing mortalities dictated by Hmax reference points (harvest at maximum
sustainable yield); and (iii) a fleet of individual fishers who aim to make
the best use of their annual quota. Within this mixed fishery, individ-
ual vessels make adaptive choices about fishing location and discarding
that depend on the distribution of the resources, and their quota share.
Each of these elements is discussed in more detail below. The essential
elements of the framework are summarized in Figure 5.1 and 5.2.
The framework consists of an operating model (OM) and a management
procedure (MP). The OM captures the key processes in the dynamics of
the fish populations, the fisheries, and the management body, and can be
thought of as a minimum realistic model (Punt and Butterworth, 1995).
The OM thus includes individual harvester decision-making (including
error) and the consequent biomass of fish stocks, including the essential
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elements for calculating the individual harvester economic performance
(Fig. 5.2). The management body used the MP to make its decision
on how to respond to the state of the resource. This MP thus includes
the data collection from the fishery, how these are interpreted, and the
harvest control rule (HCR) that dictates the limits that are set to the
fishery.
Figure 5.1: Conceptual overview of the MSE approach, including the OM and the
MP components of the framework.
Population dynamics
To allow the fishery to make spatial and temporal choices, the model
needed to be seasonally and spatially explicit. The dynamics of the fish
stocks were modelled using an age-structured model that was spatially
explicit, with seasonal time steps. In each seasonal time step, fish grow,
migrate, and die. The number of fish of stock i of age a at year y, in
season s, and area p was written as Ni(a, y, s, p). The ages in the model
range between age 0 and age A, the maximum age in the model. Once
the fish reach their maximum age, the following year, they are not taken
into account in the calculations (no plus group), they die. The seasons
range between season 1 and season S, the last season within each year.
Individuals were born at age 0, at the start of each year y, in season 1.
The number of recruits Ri(p) in the model was a function of the area
128
Methods
C
ha
pt
er
5
Figure 5.2: The OM component, including the key processes in the dynamics of the
fish populations.
p and independent of the size of the adult population. The population
numbers at age 0 are thus
Ni(0, y, 1, p) = Ri(p). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . (5.1)
Mortality in the model resulted from fishery catches and natural causes
such as predation, diseases, and senescence. The decrease in population
numbers was thus the result of the catches (Ci(a, y, s, p)) and a natu-
ral mortality constant Mi that described natural mortality as a fixed
fraction of the population. These mortalities reduced the population
numbers among a cohort of fish. Because the model was seasonally
structured, the population numbers for seasons 2 to S were dependent
on the previous season,
Ni(a, y, s+1, p) = Ni(a, y, s, p)−Ci(a, y, s, p)−MiNi(a, y, s, p).(5.2)
Likewise, the population numbers in season 1 depended on the numbers
in season S of the previous year,
Ni(a+1, y, 1, p) = Ni(a, y, S, p)−Ci(a, y, S, p)−MiNi(a, y, s, p).(5.3)
Migration for each species was defined by an array Di(a, s, em, im) that
defined immigration and emigration on a given stock relative to the stock
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sizes. The size of that array was defined by the number of age classes,
seasons and number of areas. emigrants leave area em and move to
area im. The emigrated part of the population is then subtracted from
each of the areas, so that that population numbers per year and season
remain unaffected by migration.
Individual body growth was modelled by a von Bertalanffy growth equa-
tion to convert numbers to lengths, and an allometric equation to convert
length to weight. The weights for individuals in the stock and in the
catches are thus calculated as
wi(a, s) = α ∗ (L∞i ∗ (1− exp(−K∗(a+(s/S)))))β. . . . . . (5.4)
The realized catches are the sum of all individual catches resulting from
the dynamic state variable model. The model inputs consist of the ex-
pected individual catch rates, which are random variables. These ran-
dom variables were normally distributed, with means cˆi(a, y, s, p) being
a function of population size, catchability qi in any year, season, and
area,
cˆi(a, y, s, p) = Ni(a, y, s, p) ∗ qi ∗ wi(a, s). . . . . . . . . (5.5)
The standard deviations Σi(a, y, s, p) of the catch distributions were con-
stant fraction their means, using a ratio η.
Fleet dynamics
A dynamic state variable model was used to simulate a fleet of individual
fishing vessels (Alzorriz et al., 2018; Batsleer et al., 2015; Clark and
Mangel, 2000; Dowling et al., 2011; Houston and McNamara, 1999; Poos
et al., 2010). The model structure was equal to (Alzorriz et al., 2018).
Each individual vessels had a set of choices, which include the choice to
go fishing in a season, location choice within that season. No discarding
was allowed in the model. The model had annual fines for exceeding
landings quota as in (Alzorriz et al., 2018). In order to calculate state
dependent choices during the year, we started by defining the annual
fines for exceeding landings quotas at the end of the year:
Φ(Ci, Qi, Fi) = −
∑
i
(max(0, (Ci −Qi)) ∗ Fi), . . . . . (5.6)
where Ci was the cumulative annual catches for species i for an individual
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vessel. These cumulative catches defined the state of the individual. Qi
was the annual individual quota for catches for the different species.
Individual quotas were not transferable. Fi was the fine per unit weight
for exceeding individual catches quota.
The maximum expected utility between current season s and the end of
the year was V (Ci, Qi, Fi, s), and the model started by setting
V (Ci, Qi, Fi, S) = Φ(Ci, Qi, Fi). For preceding seasons, the expected
utility depended on individual choices, and each time step individuals
chose to visit fishing area p, or to stay in port. While fishing, any
combination of the age classes caught of the quota species had to be
landed. The expected utility for each state and each time step s was
calculated backward using stochastic dynamic programming (Clark and
Mangel, 2000):
V (Ci, Qi, Fi, s) = maxp(R(p, s)−G(p)− C(p) + Ep[V (C ′i, Qi, Fi, s+ 1)]), (5.7)
where R(p, s) was the expected immediate contribution of the gross rev-
enue from the sales of fish in a season resulting from choices p (gross rev-
enues resulted from multiplying catches different age classes of species 1,
species 2 and prices). Prices of fish were assumed to be dependent over
fish age (subsection size dependent pricing). G(p) represented the in-
curred fuel costs per season from the choice of fishing area p, while C(p)
represented the variable operating costs (crew share, gear maintenance
and landing costs, Table 5.1), which in turn depended on the change in
cumulative catches and fish prices. The term Ep[V (C ′i, Qi, Fi, s+ 1] de-
noted the expected future utility taken over all possible states resulting
from choices p. The transitions of these states were based on normal dis-
tributions of catch rates, using the means and variances for the species,
as explained in the model conditioning section, following (Poos et al.,
2010).
Rather than assuming that each individual always made the optimal
choice, we assigned a probability to each choice proportional to its ex-
pected utility, following (Dowling et al., 2011). The expected utility for
any choice was
U(Ci, Qi, Fi, s) = R(p, s)−G(p)−C(p)+Ep[V (C ′i, Qi, Fi, s+1)].(5.8)
If U∗ was the expected utility at the optimal choice for a given t, we
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set
∆p(Ci, Qi, Fi, s) = U∗(Ci, Qi, Fi, s)− U(Ci, Qi, Fi, s), . . (5.9)
and then defined the probability of a choice for a given area and dis-
carding as
Pp(Ci, Qi, Fi, s) =
e−∆p(Ci,Qi,Fi,s)/σ∑
p e
−∆p(Ci,Qi,Fi,s)/σ , . . . . . . . . (5.10)
where σ was a tuning parameter that measured how important it was to
be near the optimal choice. A large σ resulted in uniform probabilities
of choices, with vessels being distributed uniformly across the different
fishing areas. In contrast, a small σ forces vessels to concentrate in the
optimal location (but note that σ should be > 0). For computations, we
used σ = 65000 (Table 5.1).
The dynamic state variable model was solved for each year by iterating
backwards in time, while finding the probability distribution choice in
terms of location for all possible states, combining the net revenue ob-
tained from the sale of fish and costs of a fishing trip and the effect of
the annual fines when exceeding annual quota. Further details for this
procedure can be found in (Alzorriz et al., 2018; Batsleer et al., 2016)
and (Dowling et al., 2011).
Once the backward calculations were finished, the forward part is a
Monte Carlo simulation where the probabilities of choices were sampled
randomly using the probabilities in 5.10. For each year, these forward
Monte Carlo simulations determine the fishing effort in each season and
area E(y, s, p), and the catches Ci(a, y, s, p) for each age in each sea-
son and area. The effort allocation component of the operating model
provides the link between the management decisions and the biological
component of the operating model.
Size dependent pricing
Prices of fish were assumed to be fixed over time but influenced by the
body weight of the individuals in the catch, as is commonly observed
(Zimmermann and Heino, 2013; Zimmermann et al., 2011). Following
(Zimmermann et al., 2011), the relationship between fish price and body
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Table 5.1: Model parameters.
Population dynamics
number of recruits Ri(p) 500
maximum age A 6
number of areas p 2
number of months S 12
natural mortality Mi 1×10−4
Asymptotic length L∞i 50
Growth rate Ki 0.6
Length-weight conversion factor αi 2×10−4
Length-weight isomorphy factor βi 3
Migration Di 2.5×10−2
Fleet dynamics
Number of vessels 8000
Fuel costs (Euro fishing month-1) 2000
Gear maintenance (Euro fishing season-1) 0
Crew share 0%
Landing costs (Euro t-1) 0
Optimal choice error σ 65000
Fishery
Intial quota (kg vessel-1) 200
catchability qi 2.5×10−5
effort (p,s) 1
Price of species at mean weight (Euro kg-1) p¯i 30
Slope of species price γi 15
Fine for overshooting quota (Euro kg-1) Fi 3000
Ratio of standard deviations to catch means η 0.08
weight was modelled as:
pi(a, s) = p¯i + γi × wi(a, s)− w¯i
w¯i
, . . . . . . . . . . . (5.11)
where pi(a, s) is the price of species i at age a and season s. The price
was a linear function of the weight of individuals of species i at age a
and season s. p¯i is the price of the species at the mean weight over the
age range. The mean weight over the age range is w¯i. γi gave the price
increase when individual mass was increased by w¯i.
Case study parametrization
To mimic spatially heterogeneous fish populations in a mixed fishery
where fishers make sequential choices on fishing areas, the model was
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divided into a ’north’ and ’south’ area, and twelve fishing seasons per
year (Table 5.1 and Fig. 5.3). There were two fish species in the model,
both of which are caught by the fishery. The annual number of recruits
was equal for the two species, and arbitrarily set to 500 per year (Table
5.1). The species differed with respect to their nursery grounds: all indi-
viduals of species 1 were born in the northern area, while all individuals
of species 2 were born in the southern area (Fig. 5.3). The maximum
age that any individual can reach was 6 years old. During their life,
individuals grew in length towards the asymptotic length, which was 50
cm for both species (Table 5.1). Conversion from length to weight was
also equal for the two species (Fig. 5.4). Migration was parameterized
so that a gradual diffusion occurred between the two areas, equal to 2.5
percent of the difference in abundance (Table 5.1). For the unfished
situation this led to a clear segregation of the younger ages over the two
areas, while the older ages were equally distributed over the two areas
(Fig. 5.3). Mortality from natural causes such as predation, diseases,
and senescence was assumed to be negligible, and Mi set to 0.0001.
Although such absence of natural mortality is impossible in reality, one
could argue that the model produced simpler results while only involving
a different scaling.
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Figure 5.3: Biomass distribution in numbers over the areas as a function of age when
stocks are in virgin stock status for species 1 (a) and species 2 (b). For
species 1 nursery ground occurs in the northern area, while species 2 in
the southern area (high biomass in white). Over the two areas, initial
biomass distribution shows a clear segregation of the younger ages (high
and low fish biomass, in white and black respectively), while the older
ages show similar distributions (grey colours).
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Catchability linked the population biomasses to the catches in the fish-
ery, and was thus one of the crucial parameters determining the inter-
action between the two. In the case study, catchability qi was assumed
independent of age a, and equal for the two species (Table 5.1).
The mean prices for the two species were set to 30 euro per kg, ranging
between 17.3 euro per kg for the youngest age and 36.5 euro per kg
for the oldest age (Table 5.1 and Fig. 5.4). The fines for overshooting
the quota was set to 3,000 euro per kg (Table 5.1). These high fines
combined with an assumed 100% detection of exceeding quotas resulted
in model results in which fishers comply with quota regulations.
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Figure 5.4: Lengths and prices of the two species.
Management procedure
The management model encompassed the harvest control rules. The
HCRs referenced to biological reference points (Hmax) to produce man-
agement actions in the form of a harvest or effort level: changes in
selectivity or spatial and temporal reallocations or restrictions of fish-
ing effort. The input to the fisheries model consisted of the expected
catch rates and the individual quota that were set for each individual in
the fleet. These individual quotas were set in a management procedure,
which mimicked the decisions of a management body. This manage-
ment body made observations on the state of the resources, and the
exploitation characteristics of the fishery. In the model, the manage-
ment body was assumed to collect annual observations of the biomass of
the stocks, including the distribution of the biomass over the different
ages. These observations stem from fisheries independent observations,
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such as surveys with known catchabilities. In addition, the manage-
ment body made annual observations of the catches, including their age
distribution.
The observed biomass and catches allowed for estimation of the annual
harvest rates (Hi), and the estimation of a yield per recruit curve, that
was dependent on fish growth and mortality. The yield curve was dome
shaped, with a maximum that is called Hi,max. Fishing at a harvest
rate that is equal to Hi,max should lead to maximum sustainable yields.
The yield per recruit curve omitted the potential effect of the feedback
between adult biomass and recruitment, which anyway was absent in the
population dynamics, that assumed a constant recruitment. The HCR
used by the management body resulted in annual quotas such that the
harvest rate in a year corresponded to Hi,max. These quotas were then
divided equally over the individual vessels in the simulations.
Qi,y+1 =
∑
([
Hi,max(a,y,s)
¯Hi(a,s)
×Hi(a,s)×sum(Ni(a,y,s,p))]×wi(a,s))
number of vessels . (5.12)
5.3.1 Scenarios
The model was set up in three consecutive time windows. The first win-
dow of 10 years was enough to get to stable populations. During this first
period, new young individuals entered the population in the absence of
fishing. This resulted in a virgin stock status. The consecutive 15 years,
the fleet of 8000 vessels started fishing in the absence of any fisheries
regulations. During this time window, the fishery was unmanaged, with
unlimited quota for both species (pre-manage period). During the last
15 years of projections, the management procedure was introduced, the
fishery was constrained by setting MSY targets while discarding was not
allowed (post-manage period).
Two management scenarios were examined in the model. The two sce-
narios differ in the number of stocks under quota. In the "single-species
catch quota" scenario quota on species 1 was controlled by the HCR. In
the "both-species catch quota" quotas on both species were controlled by
HCRs. The comparison among these scenarios allowed the evaluation
of costs and benefits, both economic and in terms of risks to both stock
and livelihoods, that resulted from the response of individual effort al-
location to meet the objectives of the landing obligation regarding the
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objectives of the CFP, specially the MSY. To be able to analyse the
results of this complex actions of implementing the MSY and the LO,
we simulated the effects of implementing the LO without any exceptions
or flexibility. When necessary, for example, in the case of estimating the
modelled monthly mean of harvest rates, 5 years windows were selected
to characterise the fleet in that pre- and post-manage period for both
species (grey and green areas in Fig. 5.5, respectively).
5.4 Results
Stochastic simulations were carried out for the management scenarios
contemplated where one or both species were managed at MSY and
discarding was not allowed (LO).
Figure 5.5 shows the expected catch of the two target species and the
impact of the management scenarios on simulated catch. When the
fishery was unmanaged, both stocks were overexploited with a harvest
rate of 4 ton per species, a value that exceeded the catch that can be
harvested sustainably (Hmax). In both scenarios, the introduction of MP
caused an immediate reduction in catches of target species in the short-
term. However, after this reduction in the initial years, the stock biomass
increased in the mid-term (after a transition of <5 years), and therefore
mid-term TACs and catches were higher than before the implementation
of the MP (Fig. 5.5, c and d). The most notable differences in catch
between the different scenarios lied in the absence of a regulatory quota
for species 2. In the case where the fishery was limited only by HCR for
species 1; higher catches for species 1 were observed in the mid-term,
while the catch of species 2 remained at the reduced level similar to the
unmanaged situation. As there was no quota restriction on species 2,
catches of species 1 were adjusted to the estimated TAC in the HCR (Fig.
5.5, a and b). When the fishery that was governed by quotas for both
species, differences between catches and quotas were more noticeable
due to the choke effect. As the mature stages of both species overlap in
their spatial distribution and the young stages differed in their spatial
distribution (Fig. 5.3), some fishing opportunities would always be lost
under the LO. The choke effect reduced the effort and made the fleet
incapable of fishing up their quota share.
Modelling results indicated that the age composition of the harvest dur-
ing the post-manage period was different than during the pre-manage
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Figure 5.5: Modelled total annual catches (tonnes) for all vessels and both species:
species 1 (a,c) and species 2 (b,d) in relation to the available individual
quota (red line). In the top panels only species 1 quota constrained the
fishery (a,b), while in the bottom panels both species quota constrained
the fishery (c,d). MP year reflects the year where the management plan
was introduced. Grey and green areas reflect the pre- and post-manage
5-year period, respectively.
period (Fig. 5.6). In the pre-manage period harvesting above the Hmax
(with values around 0.03, Fig. 5.5) caused instability in both popula-
tions. Overharvesting was caused by more significant harvesting juvenile
specimens than adults, as reflected in the downward slope of the harvest
rate curves with fish age (rather than selectively targeting older fish with
higher price; Fig. 5.6). Average harvest rates was 0.06 (Fig. 5.6 and 5.7,
black lines). Harvests and population biomass remained stable over time
due to the constant annual recruitment. On the other hand, after the
implementation of the MP there was an immediate decrease in harvest
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rates with values equal to or below Hmax. After a few years (mid-term),
2 to 6-year old fish were harvested at the same, while yearling fish (age
class 1) was harvested at lower rates (Fig. 5.6 and 5.7, grey lines).
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Figure 5.6: Modelled changes in harvest rates for both species in relation to the catch
decision options made based in the available individual quota: species 1
(a,c) and species 2 (b,d). In top panels only species 1 quota constrained
the fishery (a,b), while in bottom panels both species quota constrained
the fishery (c,d). Black lines: mean harvest rates during the pre-manage
period (unconstrained fishery); grey line: mean harvest rates during the
post-manage period (constrained fishery). Periods are relative to the
introduction of the management plan (grey and green areas in Fig. 5.5).
Expected yields as a function of harvest show that during the post-
manage period both species were underharvested (Fig. 5.7; grey lines
in a,c,d), except species 2 in the single-stock quota scenario which was
overharvested due to the absence of any quota restriction (Fig. 5.7;
panel b). Indeed, higher sustainable yields achieved with lower values of
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fishing mortality. When quotas were set for both species, yields were 25%
higher than in the unmanaged situation. When a quota was set for just
one species, yield for species 1 was 50% higher than the unconstrained
fishery value. These differences in scenarios could be explained due to
the choke effect. In general, the expected average yields shown similar
values than the observed catches during the pre- and post-manage period
selected (Fig. 5.7).
The fishing effort that would lead the fishery toward the biological man-
agement reference points can be seen in Figure 5.8. In an unmanaged
situation, fishing in both the northern and southern fishing grounds
would be equally profitable. Therefore, the fleet effort was equally dis-
tributed over both areas and generated a net profit of 130 thousand Eu-
ros/ year (Fig. 5.8 b and d). The vessels spend about 20% of their time
in port. Fuel costs related to fishing choices were 40% of the incurred
gross revenues (Fig. 5.8 b an d). Fishing in the northern (southern)
area, during the pre-manage period, showed annual average catches of
3.1 tonnes/ year and 1.2 tonnes/year of species 1 and 2, respectively (1.2
tonnes/year and 3.1 tonnes/ year), which in terms of activity would be
fishing around 3100 days per area and season (Fig. 5.9 and 5.10 a and
c). Some variability was apparent between patch choices in the two sce-
narios (Fig. 5.8 a and c, 5.9 and 5.10); however, gross and net revenues
at the end of each year resulted in similar values (Fig5.8 b and d).
In the management scenario with a MSY quota set for one species the
fleet generated 42% less revenue, in the short-term, and a 37% reduction
in fishing effort than when compared to the unmanaged situation (Fig.
5.8). Vessels allocated 80% (20%) of the fishing effort in the southern
(northern) fishing ground, while maintaining (reducing) both species
catches (Fig. 5.9). On the other hand, such reductions in effort and
changes in exploitation patterns led to an increase in stock biomass that
generated a completely different picture in the mid-term. Maintaining
the distribution of effort observed in the short-term, in the mid-term,
the fleet would generate an average increase revenue of 77% with respect
to the pre-managed period, while average fuel cost were reduced to 20%
of the incurred gross revenues (Fig. 5.8 b). After the initial 57 % to 32
% decline in catches of species 1 and 2 following the implementation of
the MP, fishing in the southern (northern) area, during the post-manage
period, showed on average 181% and 13% higher catch of species 1 and
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Figure 5.7: Modelled yield per recruitment curves (tonnes) for both species in re-
lation to the introduction of the management plan: species 1 (a,c) and
species 2 (b,d). In top panels only species 1 quota constrained the fishery
(a,b), while in bottom panels both species quota constrained the fishery
(c,d). Black lines: expected yield during the pre-manage period (uncon-
strained fishery); grey line: expected yield during the post-manage period
(constrained fishery). Periods are relative to the introduction of the man-
agement plan (grey and green areas in Fig. 5.5). Blue dots represent the
observed catches at the mean harvest rate for each year during the 5-year
period (filled dots: pre-manage period and empty dots: post-manage pe-
riod), while red dots are the expected yields at sustainable harvest rates.
2 than the pre-manage period, respectively (17% and 38% lower catches
of species 1 and 2)(Fig. 5.9 a and b). In terms of activity the average
number of fishing days per season dropped to 3650 days (Fig. 5.10 b).
Vessels were incentivized to allocate the highest amount of effort early
in the year (with around 1075 and 3700 fishing days in the northern and
southern fishing grounds respectively), progressively decreasing to lower
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Figure 5.8: Modelled spatial allocation of effort per year (%) and the respective eco-
nomic performance when only species 1 has quota limitations (a, b) and
both species are quota limited (c,d). Trade-offs between net revenue
(black line), gross revenue (grey line), fuel cost (blue line) and annual
fines (red line) for the fleet are shown in panels (b,d). MP years reflect
the year where the management plan was introduced. In top panels only
species 1 quota constrained the fishery (a,b), while in bottom panels both
species quota constrained the fishery (c,d).
levels over the course of the year (with around 121 and 1634 fishing days
per area; Fig. 5.10 d).
The management scenario with a MSY quota set for both species showed
a further reduction in fishing opportunities (Fig. 5.8). In the short-term,
the fleet generated 61% less revenue and a 62% reduction in fishing ef-
fort than when compared to the unmanaged situation. Vessels indis-
tinctly allocated the fishing effort in both fishing grounds (such in the
pre-manage period) due to same model conditioning for both species.
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Figure 5.9: Modelled catches (thousand tonnes/year) by area (blue line: Northern
area, red line: Southern area) for both (a,c) species 1 and (b,d) species 2
in relation to the management plan period. In panels (a,b) only species
1 quota constrained the fishery, while in (c,d) both species quota con-
strained the fishery. MP year reflects the year where the management
plan was introduced. Grey and green areas reflect the pre- and post-
manage 5-year period, respectively.
Therefore, after the initial 62 % to 65 % decline in cathes due to the
MP implementation, fishing in the northern (southern) area, during the
post-manage period, simulations showed in average 2% and 54% higher
catches of species 1 and 2 than the pre-manage period, respectively (55%
and 4%)(Fig. 5.9 c and d). The limiting species quota incentivized ves-
sels to choose to allocate the highest amount of effort early in the year
(with around 2500 fishing days per area), progressively decreasing to
lower levels over the course of the year (with around 50 fishing days per
area; Fig. 5.10 d). In the mid-term, the fleet would generate an average
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increase revenue of 107% with respect to the pre-managed period.
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Figure 5.10: Modelled average spatial allocation of effort (days/month) during the
pre-manage (a,c) and post-manage periods (b,d). Periods are relative to
the introduction of the management plan (grey and green areas in Fig.
5.9).
Modelling results suggested that moving from an unmanaged period to a
sustainable stock situation, where one or both species were regulated by
quotas and forced to keep fishing mortality below the MSY while it was
not possible to discard, moderate and high reductions of fishing effort are
expected (Fig. 5.8, b and d). Thus, moderate to high reductions in the
number of vessels modelled are expected too (effort cost per vessel 1 day;
Fig. 5.10, b and d). The relative annual contribution by vessel to the
gross revenue was around 28 Euros, reduced to 17 Euros of net revenues
due to the costs associated to fuel during the unmanaged situation (Fig.
5.11). This implies that, in the short-term, revenues under the two
scenarios are predicted to result in a loss of profitability (52% when
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accounting in one species MSY quota and 34% when accounting in both
MSY quota; Fig. 5.11). However, in the mid-term, when compared to
the pre-manage period, accounting in one species MSY quota resulted
in a 1.32 times larger gross revenues per vessel; while accounting in two
species MSY quotas was 1.37 times larger benefits (Fig. 5.11).
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Figure 5.11: Modelled main economics by vessel (euro/ year): median annual net rev-
enues (a,c) and median gross revenues (b,d) with the upper and lower
limits of the box being the third and first quartile1 (75th and 25th per-
centile) respectively. MP year reflects the year where the management
plan was introduced.
5.5 Discussion
Our results suggest that in mixed fisheries, constraining quota for a
single-species can bring risk of eroding the production potential of other
unconstrained species. The only prerequisite for this to happen is a
difference in the spatial in distribution between the species of the juvenile
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and adult stages. In our study species differed only in the location of
their nursery habitat, while growth, recruitment numbers, mortality, and
price were the same for both species. Changes in quota constraints led to
a spatial redistribution of the fishery and as a result of this redistribution
the age-dependent exploitation for both species changed. The quota set
for one species resulted in a shift of fishing pressure towards younger ages
of the unconstrained species. This in turn decreased the production
of the unmanaged stock, as can be seen from the yield curves (Fig.
5.6).
Meanwhile, when constraining both species, the production potential
of both stocks was maintained, that is to say the yield curves were un-
changed. The quota constraints were met by a reduction in fishing effort
(Fig. 5.8). as predicted in general terms by (Ulrich et al., 2017). This
led to a reduction in fishing cost and an increase in net revenue over the
mid-term because biomasses and yields increased. However, individual
quota combined with the stochastic fisheries catches resulted in lower
than intended exploitation rates. The TACs were set so that the total
TACs corresponded to the harvest rate that resulted in maximum sus-
tainable yields. The TACs were divided in individual quotas for each
fishing vessel. The lower than intended harvest rates were caused by the
fact that despite their planning, fishers often exhausted one of the quo-
tas before the other. If discarding is not allowed, individual fishers must
stop fishing. This resulted in overall catches below the TACs. Although
the lack of achieving MSY in mixed fisheries with multiple single-species
quota has been described elsewhere (Hilborn et al., 2015; Kempf et al.,
2016; Rindorf et al., 2017), it is generally attributed to differences in life-
histories among fished species. In this study, the discrepancy between
the intended annual quotas at MSY and realized catches is caused only
by stochasticity in the system. This stochasticity in catch rates is ob-
served in most fisheries (Bernasconi et al., 2015; Sampson, 1988; Smith,
1980; Van Oostenbrugge et al., 2004). It is caused by the complex migra-
tion biology and the effects of environmental factors on fish behaviour. A
well-functioning quota market would allow vessels to swap excess quota
for constraining and thus bring realized catches closer to quotas.
In the case study explored here, setting quotas based on MSY for all
species resulted in mixed fisheries that were economically more viable
in the long run compared to the unconstrained case. It should be noted
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that this particular result may not hold true for mixed fisheries with
unavoidable catches or bycatches of very low productive species. Fishing
those species at their MSY levels would probably constrain effort to such
an extent that the net revenue will be reduced in the long-term (Prellezo
et al., 2016b; Rindorf et al., 2017).
The model aimed to evaluate the biological and economic effects of
adopting a major policy change such as the CFP (EU, 2013). Start-
ing from an overfished mixed fishery under open access conditions but
with a landing obligation, the response of individual effort allocation
and the interannual population dynamics are explicitly modelled, while
adopting MSY objectives. The analysis extended earlier approaches that
used short-term state-dependent decision-making models (e.g. (Alzor-
riz et al., 2018; Batsleer et al., 2016; Poos et al., 2010)) by including
interannual population dynamics of fish stocks, and a management pro-
cedure that mimics the decisions of a management system. Such an
MSE framework was thought of as a minimum realistic model (Kell
et al., 2007; Punt and Butterworth, 1995). To keep the outcomes of
the model simple, and to show the implications of the fishing effort al-
location, the two fish populations modelled here are exactly the same
apart from their spatial distribution difference (Fig. 5.3). As a result,
if the landing obligation changes selectivity patterns in the short-term
as predicted in (Alzorriz et al., 2018; Batsleer et al., 2016), the present
MSE modelling approach allows the evaluation on the reference points
for sustainable exploitation in longer terms by explicitly modelling how
changes in exploitation rates impact fish populations and yields.
The forecasted effects of fisheries management in mixed fisheries result
from spatial heterogeneity in resources and fishers adaptive behaviour.
This emphasizes that human behaviour and decision-making are intrinsic
parts of conservation and natural resource management and the need for
incorporating detailed fishing dynamics in management strategy evalua-
tion. Historically, the focus of management strategy evaluation has been
primarily on population dynamics in single and multi-species fisheries
(Butterworth, 2007; Dichmont et al., 2006; Punt and Hobday, 2009; Punt
and Smith, 1999; Punt et al., 2016; Smith et al., 1999). Explicitly incor-
porating direct effects of human behaviour of those who harvest stocks is
equally important (Fulton et al., 2011; Link et al., 2017; Milner-Gulland,
2012), but relatively few studies have attempted this (Andersen et al.,
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2010; Ono et al., 2018; Simons et al., 2015). Our MSE that links a dy-
namic state variable model for fisher behaviour to a multi-species age
structured model provides an alternative to those approaches.
The complexity of adding fishers behaviour in a minimum realistic model
of mixed fisheries in an MSE framework requires making several simpli-
fying assumptions. The details and possible consequences of these as-
sumptions have been discussed in e.g. (Alzorriz et al., 2018), and include
full compliance of fishers with the discarding policy, absence of a quota
market, monthly choices on fishing, and a lack of interference competi-
tion among fishers. Also, the utility function only comprises of decisions
based on annual net revenues, omitting any social dynamics or tradi-
tion. These social dynamics and traditions are potentially important
(Girardin et al., 2017; Schlüter et al., 2012), and could be incorporated
in future applications. Important assumptions about the dynamics of
the population dynamics included negligible natural mortality, constant
recruitment, constant growth, and constant migration.
In the study, the fishers were not allowed to discard, complying to a
landings obligation. We did not include the use of discard flexibilities
of the LO (CFP Article 15, (EU, 2013)) or annual quota swaps as they
are currently implemented. We may thus have underestimated the flexi-
bility of the fishery to respond to quota limitations imposed under both
the landing obligation and exploiting at MSY (Prellezo et al., 2016a).
Achieving a balance between quota flexibility, over-exploitation risk, and
administrative simplicity is critical for the profitability and sustainabil-
ity of multi-species fisheries (Alzorriz et al., 2018). The success of any
new regulation also depends on achieving a balance between the costs
and benefits of measures that promote voluntary compliance and those
that punish non-compliance. With poor enforcement the economic ben-
efits of non-compliance outweigh the risks of detection (Batsleer et al.,
2013). In this MSE framework, detection rates were assumed to be 100%
and fines were set sufficiently high so that no discarding occurred, re-
flecting full compliance with regulations. However, if detection rates are
low and the short-term benefits of non-compliance are high (as our re-
sults suggest) then non-compliance is likely to be a substantial problem
in the absence of measures promoting voluntary compliance.
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5.6 Conclusions
Achieving optimal yield from mixed fisheries is a pervasive problem in
fisheries management (e.g., (Farcas and Rossberg, 2016; Prellezo et al.,
2016c; Salomon et al., 2014; Ulrich et al., 2017; Voss et al., 2014)). A
multi-species fishery MSE framework based on two populations was de-
veloped in this study to examine different management scenarios. The
results highlight pitfalls in managing mixed fisheries where erosion of
production potential can take place, or unintentional underharvesting.
We argue for the inclusion of spatial dynamics and fleet dynamics when
designing a multi-species fishery management strategy evaluation. Such
MSE should be done when adopting a major policy change such as the
CFP. Future studies aimed at building a realistic multi-species fishery
MSE with significant discard constraints, should consider expanding the
current model to include the whole suite of species exploited and man-
aged in a real mixed fishery. The results highlighted the importance
of accounting for technical interactions and their temporal dynamics in
both quota allocation and fleet dynamics to design a realistic multi-
species fishery management strategy analysis.
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6.1 General discussion
This thesis studies the effects of the landing obligation that entered
into force on 1 January 2014 aimed to reduce the discarding of un-
wanted catch. At the time that the landing obligation was decided,
little was known about the effects of the landing obligation and the re-
sponse of the fisheries to this drastic measure. Historically, discarding
was a common practice in almost all developed fisheries worldwide: dis-
cards were estimated to be as much as 33% of global marine catch in
commercial fisheries in the late 1990s and early 2000s (Alverson et al.,
1994; Kelleher, 2005). However, fisheries discard practices can be ex-
pected to vary greatly across locations, gears, species and fishing grounds
(Siguroˇardóttir et al., 2015; Uhlmann et al., 2013). Across EU fisheries,
the amount of discards varies from more than 60% of the catch (in
weight) on average in beam trawls to very low in others, such as pelagic
trawling or seine fisheries (Hedley et al., 2015). There has also long been
a great contrast between the situation in the EU waters, where discards
rates have historically been estimated to be among the highest in the
world, and the situation in the Norwegian waters where discarding has
been banned since 1983 (Ulrich, 2018).
The landing obligation intends to fully stop discarding, that was seen as
an undesirable practice: throwing fish overboard causes addition mor-
tality on fish stocks and is considered an unethical waste of food without
benefit for society. It also potentially contributes to the overexploitation
of fish stocks, and hampers scientific advice, if discards are not correctly
or fully monitored. Previously, market and regulatory forces motivated
fishers to discard catches. For example, for some species or size classes,
the market value was so low that catches would be returned to the sea.
This included damaged fish, or fish for which there was not market at all.
Regulatory forces included the exhaustion of landings quota for species
that forced fishers to discard catches. Also, catches that did not meet
a minimum landings size were legally required to be discarded (Bellido
et al., 2011; Catchpole et al., 2018).
After discarding in commercial fisheries started receiving an increasing
amount of (negative) attention, it was clear that fisheries management
so far had failed to reduce discarding in European fisheries (Batsleer,
2016; Borges, 2015). In the 2013 reform of the CFP, discard reduction
became a specific objective for European fisheries management (Regula-
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tion (EU) 1380/2013; EU (2013)) by including a step-wise introduction
of a discard ban in European waters (see chapter 1). Article 15 of this
regulation explains the circumstances under which the landing obliga-
tion becomes applicable. Details of the implementation of the landing
obligation will be included in multi-annual plans, or in specific discard
plans when no multi-annual plan is in place (chapter 1). In brief, this
ban obliges fishing vessels to retain all catches of quota-regulated species
and land them, including small size individuals, and requires all catches
to be counted against the allocated quota, whilst undersized fish cannot
be marketed for direct human consumption purposes by the year 2019.
The main stated objective of the landing obligation in the current CFP
is to create economic incentives for the industry to reduce the capture
of unwanted species and of smaller individuals. Details of the imple-
mentation by fishery of the landing obligation will have to be part of
multi-annual management plans, or in specific discard plans when no
multi-annual plan is in place (chapter 1).
The introduction of the landing obligation to land all catches represents
probably the most important paradigm shift in the history of the CFP,
and therefore, a fundamental change in the management approach to EU
fisheries, as quotas now control what is caught at sea, rather than what
is landed onshore (Catchpole and Ribeiro Santos, 2015; Cefas, 2014).
There is a general perception that the introduction of the landing obli-
gation is a positive forward step in the rationalization of fisheries in
the European Union, part of a move towards “greener” fisheries (Borges
and Penas Lado, 2019). Nevertheless, the precise implementation of the
landing obligation is not without controversy, and the direct and indi-
rect consequences of its application are open to discussion (see chapter
2).
In the reformed CFP, the landing obligation is combined with rules used
for determining annual catch quotas that seek to achieve a “maximum
sustainable yield” (Article 2.2; EU (2013)). Currently, these catch quo-
tas are calculated on a stock-by-stock basis. Under the landing obli-
gation, quotas are counted against total catches rather than landings,
so vessels must ideally have adequate quotas for all species included in
the ban that they are likely to catch during the course of their opera-
tions. Failing that, an early exhaustion of quota may cause the fishery to
“choke” (i.e. a full stop of fishing activities) regardless of the availability
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of sufficient quota for other species (Borges, 2015; Ulrich, 2018). Hence,
species for which a fleet has insufficient quota to cover the catches taken
in their normal operations are referred to as choke species. There is not
a general rule to alleviate choke problems, and actions need to be taken
considering each stock and fleet combination. It is relevant and nec-
essary to identify those stocks acting as choke, and explore, if possible,
any management action that could prevent or at least reduce the impact
of this issue on the activity of fleets exploiting mixed fisheries(Prellezo
et al., 2018).
In short, the application of the new CFP, with the inclusion of the
landing obligation, is expected to substantially change many fisheries in
Europe in the short and medium term. The knowledge base for under-
standing and anticipating these changes is currently being built rapidly
(see e.g. Arnason (2014); Catchpole and Ribeiro Santos (2015); Prellezo
et al. (2018); STECF (2013, 2014a,b,c, 2015, 2017a, 2018); Uhlmann
et al. (2019); Ulrich (2018)). Importantly, the landing obligation requires
behavioural adaptations in many fisheries. In turn, these behavioural
adaptations will have intended and unintended effects on both commer-
cial fish stocks and bycatch species, with a further round of feedback to
the fisheries. In addition, governing bodies setting policies for fisheries
will have to deal with the exact implementation of the landing obliga-
tion, which has to be co-ordinated with in the whole range of objectives
of the CFP, not only biological, but also economic and social.
The focus of my PhD-thesis is to study the implementation of the landing
obligation in mixed fisheries by exploring the effects of fisheries manage-
ment plans for discard reductions on the population dynamics of fish
stocks and on the economics of mixed fisheries. This question entails
four aspects, discussed below: (1) the ability of fishers to adapt when
facing these new regulations (2) changing regulations in support of the
implementation of the landing obligation; (3) the importance of fish-
ers compliance inherent to the landing obligation implementation; and
(4) using MSE to evaluate the uncertainties induced by the change in
management such as the implementation of the CFP.
6.2 Fishers adaptation
When discarding is allowed, fishing is partly characterised by maximis-
ing the value of the fraction of the catch that can be landed. Under the
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landing obligation, the fishing industry is expected to reduce the capture
of unwanted species and small individuals. Hence, a change in fishing
practices is expected where catchability for those catches are reduced.
Catchability changes due to the vulnerability and availability of fish and
reflect the efficiency of a particular fishery. A number of factors might
cause variations in the catchability coefficient including various aspects
of the fishery, such as individual and population biology, characteristics
of the fishing gear, amount of fishing, fishing strategies, and environ-
mental fluctuation, among others (Beverton and Holt, 1957; Gulland,
1969; Marchal et al., 2003; Pascoe et al., 2001).
An important component of many discard reduction strategies is the
use of more selective fishing gears which may also be associated with
temporal and spatial closures (Bellido et al., 2019; O’Neill et al., 2019;
Reid et al., 2019) or by changing the time and location of fishing to
reduce unwanted catch (Kindt-Larsen et al., 2011).
6.2.1 Improving gear selectivity
The landing obligation is expected to stimulate fishers to improve the
selectivity of their gear. Changes in selectivity might make it possible
to reduce catches of small, low value size classes and the most quota-
restricted species to increase profits from available quota. While histor-
ically, the risks of losing marketable catches when using more selective
gears may have dissuaded fishers, this must now also be viewed in the
context of lost fishing opportunities if quota becomes exhausted and the
ability to convert previously discarded catches into quota for marketable
fish. The introduction of the landing obligation shifts the emphasis from
prescribing the fishing gears that are permissible, to a results-based sys-
tem where the onus is on the fishers to develop and deploy gears that
will avoid unwanted catches (Reid et al., 2019).
Technical conservation measures have a long history. Documented scien-
tific trials with escape windows to reduce catches of young fish in trawls
started over 100 years ago (G., 1915), and many documented selectivity
experiments have been carried out (Broadhurst et al., 2002; Fonteyne
and Polet, 2002; Graham et al., 2007; Herrmann, 2005; Madsen, 2007;
Madsen et al., 2002, 2013; Tschernij et al., 2002). Improving the yield by
increasing size selectivity (length of first capture) and reducing discards
have been a management strategy for decades (Valentinsson et al., 2019).
159
Synthesis
C
ha
pt
er
6
A series of scientific experiments have followed with the aim of devel-
oping and identifying new concepts to improve selectivity in the trawl
fishery. As such, the L50 (50% retention length) in a traditional diamond
mesh codend can be increased by increasing the mesh size (Herrmann,
2005). The selectivity in traditional diamond mesh codends is normally
reduced with increased catch weight due to closure of the mesh open-
ing (Tschernij and Holst, 1999). A common solution to improve trawl
selectivity is to fit the net with an escape window (i.e. square mesh
panel). The efficiency of such selective devices depends not only on the
gear characteristics such as the dimensions of the panel itself, the size of
the meshes and the position of the panel in the trawl (Herrmann et al.,
2015), but also on the reactions of the fish in the trawl during the fish-
ing operation. The remaining part of the trawl is most often made of
traditional diamond mesh netting. An advantage of the window is that
it can be mounted directly in the existing trawl at low cost.
While it would be rational to move towards more selective gears, the
development of technical modifications can be a challenge in mixed fish-
eries, since improving selectivity for a given species or size class would
result in considerable losses or additional retention of other species (Gra-
ham et al., 2007). Chapter 3 showed that a window selective device
used by the Basque mixed trawl fishery is quite ineffective in reducing
unwanted catches of undersized species. Also, recent results from the
MENDES project, for the same fishery, showed that increasing selec-
tivity by increasing mesh size (from 70 mm to 100 mm) will result in
considerable reductions in unwanted catch, but also in high losses of
the main commercial species (Azti, 2019). Another example of this can
be found in the beam trawl fishery for sole (S. solea) in the North Sea,
where there is considerable evidence to suggest that increasing mesh size
will result in high losses in the catch of sole with only marginal gains in
terms of reduction in undersized catches (Bayse and Polet, 2015; STECF,
2015). Therefore, the likely loss of marketable catches and thus the loss
of economic profitability of the fishery, together with the existence of
other tools under the CFP which offer quota flexibilities if changes in
selectivity are shown to involve disproportionate costs (see below Regu-
lations in support of the implementation of the EU landing obligation),
is of particular concern, as it may deter fishers from using modified or
alternative fishing gear to resolve the discard problems. The specific
challenges posed by the landing obligation will depend on conditions
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such as the catching performance of the fishing gears, the total allow-
able catches and the size profile and spatial distribution of the stocks
(Uhlmann et al., 2019; Ulrich, 2018). These conditions will vary from
year to year, from fishery to fishery, and may even vary from trip to
trip (O’Neill et al., 2019). Hence, although default requirements can be
established at an European level, the most practicable way forward is
one where there is a possibility to override gear requirements at regional
and fishery level. In that case each fisher is in a position to adjust the
specific selective performance of the fishery (chapter 3). In this regard,
fishers need to have the flexibility to modify the selective performance of
their fishing gear in response to what they observe on the fishing grounds
and to what they bring on board.
In addition to technical adaptations, selectivity can be improved by
adapting fishing behaviour. The adaptations concern mainly the spa-
tial and temporal reallocation of fishing activities to protect juveniles,
spawning fish, and protected species, thus helping to reduce bycatch
discards (see also Space and time options below). Implementing gear
restrictions, closures of specific areas or depth range may help to reduce
discards by encouraging a reduction in the capture of unwanted catch
and moving to areas where the catch composition is likely to be more
appropriate (Bailey et al., 2010; MRAG, 2007). Norway, the Faroe Is-
lands, Iceland, New Zealand, Canada, and the US have implemented
temporary real-time closures to protect juveniles, spawning fish, and
protected species, thus helping to reduce bycatch discards (Bailey et al.,
2010; Condie et al., 2014a; Hopkins et al., 2013).To date, the EU does
not have a centrally managed system to lead closures when a high re-
tention of undersized fish is taken by a specific fishery (Bailey et al.,
2010). In chapter 2, several of the case studies, where discard re-
duction policies have been implemented, mention spatial and temporal
closures as possible mitigation strategies (see also Reid et al. (2019)).
The space and time distribution of a fishing fleet is commensurate with
the high-density areas of its target species, and therefore the orientation
behaviour is reflected in the spatial distribution of the fleet relative to
that of the fish (Quirijns et al., 2008). However, management measures
may not always result in expected outcomes, as demonstrated when
spatial measures implemented to protect spawning or nursery areas fail
because of changes in the spatial and temporal fish distributions (Beare
et al., 2013; Rijnsdorp et al., 2001). Also, management measures aimed
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at improving the sustainability of one component on the ecosystem can
have negative ecosystem impacts elsewhere, such as when area closures
lead to effort displacement to previously unfished areas (Dinmore et al.,
2003).
Generally, developing mitigation measures, both improving gear selec-
tivity and temporal and spatial closures, without taking account of the
context in which the problem occurs could have unexpected and un-
wanted consequences (Batsleer, 2016). Thus, fishers are best placed
to identify the challenges envisioned by the landing obligation, and in
collaboration with gear makers, fishing gear technologists and fish be-
haviourists, are most likely to find solutions that are both acceptable
and effective (O’Neill et al., 2019). This includes understanding the
mechanistic aspects of their gear’s performance, but also an awareness
of the behavioural responses of the species caught (Diaz Pauli and Sih,
2017; O’Neill et al., 2019). In recent years, most industry-science collab-
orations in Europe have taken such a bottom-up approach (Armstrong
et al., 2013; Mortensen et al., 2017), and a number of gears such as
the netting grids in the Scottish Nephrops fishery (Drewery et al., 2012;
Kynoch et al., 2012) have been successfully introduced. Likewise, fish-
ers’ local ecological knowledge together with scientifically based mapping
programs of areas with high presence of juveniles (Reid et al., 2019)
is equally necessary for the development of spatial and temporal clo-
sure management systems and to design sustainable strategies on where,
when and how to fish (Dunn et al., 2011; Rijnsdorp et al., 2012).
There is scope to develop a Europe-wide regulation setting out basic re-
quirements to change the fishing ground when the fishing operation be-
gins to contravene the regulations, for example whenever bycatch limits
or the permitted inter mixture of undersized fish have been exceeded.
At the same time, regional planning and regional schemes could be de-
veloped which determine the practical modalities of the scheme and cre-
ate information sharing platforms that would enable move-on decisions
to be made and communicated quickly (Catchpole and Ribeiro Santos,
2015).
6.2.2 Choices on space and time
In mixed fisheries, the catchabilities for different species and size classes
have to be adjusted to the productivity of the different species in the
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catch under the landing obligation. The catchability of a fishing fleet for
different species and size classes depends not only on the characteristics
of the fishing gear, but also on the spatial and temporal overlap between
the fishery and the fish stocks. The changes in catchability that are
potentially needed in mixed fisheries to stay within catch quota for a
range of species can also be brought about by changes in the spatio-
temporal fishing patterns (Quirijns et al., 2008).Such changes in the
spatial distributions under changing quota regimes have historically been
observed in an ITQ system (Poos et al., 2010), and are expected in fleets
where the costs of choke species under unchanged behaviour are high.
Thus, it is expected that fisheries could also reduce unwanted catches
by actively reallocating fishing activities in relation to the spatial and
temporal distribution of certain species, size or age classes under the
landing obligation (Simons et al., 2015).
To maximise the benefits of their catches, fishers have to acquire knowl-
edge of the distribution of marketable fish (Catchpole et al., 2005). Un-
der the landing obligation, we expect that fishers will improve their
knowledge on the distribution of by-catch species or species with a high
concentration of juveniles. The broad scale patterns in these distribu-
tions are related to the annual migrations between spawning and feeding
grounds of their target species and the recruitment of young fish to the
fishing grounds (Poos and Rijnsdorp, 2007). Predicting the location of
short-term patches, such as fish aggregation in response to food, is much
more difficult and fishers have to gain the knowledge from the field. In
order to avoid and relocate fishing activities, knowledge and information
on areas with high catch rates of juvenile or non-target species will need
to be acquired an exchange among fishers (i.e. providing information
about high concentration of juveniles in an area) (Eliasen et al., 2014).
Indeed, there is also the possibility of making tactical changes to poten-
tially reduce the amount of bycatch such as the number of hauls, their
duration and timetables.
The integration of all scientific data held by fisheries institutions (data
from studies, landings and observers) can also be valuable in helping
fishers to decide where and when to fish in order to avoid unwanted
catches and maximize opportunities to catch their quotas (Reid et al.,
2019). These include observer data with the detailed catch (landings and
discards) by commercial vessels, landings and vessel monitoring system
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data showing where and when catches are made, research vessel studies
showing the distribution of abundance, and fully documented fisheries
pilot studies showing all details of complete fishing operations (Reid
et al., 2019). In recent years, scientific emphasis has been placed on the
development of decision support tools to be able to advise on where and
when they could fish to reduce and avoid unwanted catches (i.e. the use
of scientific data to illustrate the spatial and temporal distribution of
fish, catches and discards; Cefas (2014); Quirijns and Pastoors (2014);
Reid et al. (2019); Rochet et al. (2014)) largely supported by fine-scale
and georeferenced data becoming increasingly available (e.g., Bastardie
et al. (2010); Hintzen et al. (2012)). However, for such tools to work in
real-time, close collaborations and exchange of data between industry-
science communities would be necessary. Real-time, spatial management
is based on the cooperation with fishers to transfer information, and
increases the responsability of fishers (results-based management, e.g.
Nielsen et al. (2015)).
As fishers adaptations remains uncertain and difficult to validate un-
der a new management measure such as the landing obligation, while
the technical descriptions of gears and fishing behaviour was limited, a
framework is needed to describe the underlying behavioural processes
in a fishery. The Dynamic State Variable model (Clark and Mangel,
2000; Houston and McNamara, 1999) used in this thesis was developed
from the model used in Poos et al. (2010) to evaluate fleet responses
to opportunity costs and explore the consequences of a number of new
management scenarios (chapters 4 and 5). These types of models
generally predict the effect in the short term (within a fishing trip or
a quota year) by optimising a utility function and determining which
choices yield the best chance of increasing utility, while monitoring the
state of each individual. The effect of a choice on the utility depends
on the economic environment (profit maximization), such as the home
port of the vessel and the distance to fishing grounds, and the biological
environment, such as the spatial distribution of the resources (Batsleer
et al., 2016).
The model used in this thesis extends the model structure in Batsleer
et al. (2015) to accommodate the range of quota flexibility and exemp-
tions proposed (see next section; Regulations in support of the imple-
mentation of the EU landing obligation EU (2013)). The model incor-
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porates size-structured fish populations with seasonal changes in their
distribution as well as seasonal variation in the ex-vessel price of the
different species and size classes and annual fines for exceeding landings
or catch quota provisions as in Batsleer et al. (2015, 2016), and ex-
tends earlier approaches by including errors in decision-making (follow-
ing Dowling et al. (2011)) rather than assuming that individuals always
make optimal choices. Extending the dynamic state variable model con-
tributes to developing a generic model to explore more complex dynam-
ics that govern decision-making (and errors in decision-making) such as
gear choice and the spatial and temporal distribution of effort (and the
socio-economic consequences thereof) and evaluate the consequences of
implementing a wider range of the landing obligation management mea-
sures of demersal fisheries. Therefore, following Dowling et al. (2011),
we introduced the sigma parameter to assume that fishers make errors
in decision making (e.g. related to the assumption that they are utility
maximizers). Although our modelling approach does not provide in-
formation on the actual cognitive processes underlying human dynamic
decision-making (e.g. a thorough understanding of the mechanisms in-
herent in fishers’ behaviour), it enables us to predict human behaviour
and show roughly the same performance effects that can be found in
empirical data reflecting decision-making, e.g., response rates (chapter
4).
Even more importantly, we aim at developing a general model of dy-
namic decision making. For the model to be general (e.g., not fit ex-
clusively to one specific experimental setting or dataset), it needs to be
simple (Punt and Butterworth, 1995). As a result, the modelling ap-
proach is capable to predict the short term fishers behaviour when har-
vesting choke species and the impossibility to discard unwanted quota
fish, as the decision of when, where and how to harvest in the year taking
into account the potential benefits of doing so elsewhere, in another way
or at another time of the year. Including error in individual harvester
decision-making particularly allowed for incorporating the short term
dynamics forecasts into the consequent biomass of fish stocks and, there-
fore, explore the potential long-term interactions and feedbacks within
the system in MSEs (see section Management Strategy Evaluation).
Therefore, the thesis introduces a framework for a multi-species fish-
ery MSE by accounting for fleet dynamics, multi-species fishery quota
allocation, and the new dynamics of technical interactions (e.g. new
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quota provisions) in support of the EU (2013).
6.3 Regulations in support of the implementation of the EU landing
obligation
As described in the previous section, fishers are expected to adapt their
fishing practices to avoid discards (Simons et al., 2015), so that they
exploit all stock in their catch according to the maximum sustainable
yield objectives while not discarding any stocks for which there are quo-
tas. The costs associated with this shift make fishing less profitable in
the short-term (Condie et al., 2014a; Hoff et al., 2019; Prellezo et al.,
2016a, 2018). Even in the scenario where fishers have sufficient quota
to land their catches, a landing obligation makes fishing more costly
as well as reduces the value of their catches (more work for the crew,
more infrastructures needed, less valuable catches on board) because re-
taining, manipulating and landing size categories or species that were
previously discarded and of low market value will reduce income per-
unit-effort (Condie et al., 2014a). Also in the long run, the flexibility of
fishers in mixed fisheries to alter their selectivity may be limited. As a
result, choke species may substantially compromise the profitability of
some discard-intensive fisheries (at least in the short-term, Condie et al.
(2014a); Hoff et al. (2019); Prellezo et al. (2016a, 2018)) since catch of
some species will be constrained once catch of another species reaches
its total quota leading to underutilisation of some of the quotas (Condie
et al., 2014a). The scale of these short-term losses is case-specific.
For all these potential short-term negative economic repercussions for
the industry of the implementation of the landing obligation, the CFP
allows for some mechanisms for flexibility in support of the implemen-
tation (EU, 2013). Article 15 includes provisions which allow some flex-
ibility in quota setting and quota use to alleviate an early cessation of
fishing activities due to potential choke species (Table 6.1). Those provi-
sions can be split in several categories. Some provisions are management
regulations that existed prior to the landing obligation, such as quota
swaps and quota year transfers such as borrowing and banking. Other
provisions are regulations that were created within the landing obliga-
tion. These include the "high survivability" and "de-minimis" exemptions
along with "inter-species quota" flexibility, and other tools that may arise
from the identification of the problems and solutions (e.g. quota adjust-
166
Regulations in support of the implementation
C
ha
pt
er
6
ments such as bycatch quotas, combined TACs and zero TACS among
others) (Uhlmann et al., 2019).
When it comes the managerial procedures, the insertion of new man-
agement measures (e.g. new quota provisions, explained in chapter 1
and summarized in Table 6.1) must always guarantee the principle of
relative stability (Sobrino and Sobrido, 2017). The challenge to guaran-
tee the principle of relative stability is great, especially in certain mixed
fisheries where the discard rate is very high. Fleets with high discards
rates of certain species will be likely to have larger incentives to increase
their quotas for those species than fleets with low discard rates. Ex-
actly to what extent the relative stability is affected will depend on how
the regulation’s mechanisms are implemented and whether any further
corrective action is taken (Sobrino and Sobrido, 2017).
Table 6.1: Overview over the possible provisions in quota introduced by the CFP.
provisions description
exemptions:
high survivability species with scientific evidence of high survival rates after being discarded can have an exemption from
the obligation
de-minimis a maximum of 5% after a transitional period starting at 7% of the total catch of species may be discarded
in cases “where scientific evidence indicates that increases in selectivity are very difficult to achieve” or “to
avoid disproportionate costs of handling unwanted catches, for those fishing gears where unwanted catches
per fishing gear do not represent more than a certain percentage, to be established in a plan, of total annual
catch of that gear”
flexibilities:
year transfer allowing member states to bank or borrow up to 10% of the quota of a species (inter-annual quota flexibility)
quota movement (swaps) quota trades among member states that aim to align fishing opportunities of the fleets within the member
states to the member states quotas
quota adjustment proper documentation and landing unwanted catches was also the underlying assumption for increased
quotas, as landing quotas would be turned into catch quotas, based on historical discard estimates
inter-species quota allowing to deduct up to 9% of the TAC of a certain stock could be counted against another stock; (a) that
the stocks from which the catches are attributed to other stocks would be inside safe biological limits – to
prevent the mechanism to result in higher catches of weak stocks and (b) that the real catches by species
would be recorded, to avoid catch data being misleading.
Relative stability will continue to be the distribution key, where swaps
(quota trades) among member states, that previously got rid of certain
quotas, will now need to align fishing opportunities of the fleets within
the member state to the member state’s quotas to prevent that other
species strangle the catches of its target species (Sobrino and Sobrido,
2017). Potentially, new ways of swapping quotas would be needed under
the landing obligation to alleviate the choke effect of any of the quota
limiting species (see chapter 4). The real challenges lie in certain mixed
fisheries, especially those involving demersal species. Swaps are playing
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and will further play a key role while redistributing fishing companies’
or producer organisations’ quotas in a way that ensures a reasonable
balance between fishing opportunities and usual catch composition is
achieved. However, some limits to swaps can be predicted. Although
we are still at the beginning of the full implementation of the landing
obligation, the experience with pelagic species quota owners suggested
that member states or fishers seem to retain their quota to prevent their
fleets or own company to be restricted in their fishing activities rather
than increase swapping (EC, 2016). Therefore, enhancing quota swaps
through increasing transparency, and providing the European industry
with a better knowledge of the swapping opportunities available in other
member states, will both be needed.
In addition, the new regulation provides opportunities for flexibility in
dealing with quotas through inter-annual quota transfers (by allowing
member states to bank or borrow up to 10% of the quota of a species)
and inter-species flexibilities (deduct up to 9% of quota of target species
to cover catches of species exceeding their quota or for which no quota
are owned) (Table 6.1). This inter-species flexibility mechanism was es-
tablished in recognition that under relative stability, the shares of quota
allocated to member states could, in some cases, make it extremely diffi-
cult to comply with the landing obligation (Sobrino and Sobrido, 2017).
Use of inter-species quota flexibility could cause serious impacts to stock
abundance when quota from a high volume/low value species is trans-
ferred to a low volume/high value stock (see chapter 4). This is not yet
the case, in particular the use of inter-species quota flexibility with the
inter-species cross-reporting mechanism, barely used so far (Hoff et al.,
2019; STECF, 2018). However, when used, it should be related not
only to the precautionary limits but also to the management target, i.e.
the size of the stock and fishing mortality should be at a level prevent-
ing the stock from impaired recruitment (Blim and Flim) (Borges and
Penas Lado, 2019).
The stepwise introduction of the landing obligation mean that for several
fisheries all catches should be brought to shore and landed. To accom-
modate the predicted increase in landed catch from such fisheries, the
relevant 2015, 2016 and 2017 TACs were increased in accordance with
the estimated catch that formerly would have been discarded (Borges,
2018; Stockhausen, 2019). Meanwhile the increase in TAC or the de-
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minimis allowance should not jeopardise the MSY objectives or increase
fishing mortality (Borges and Penas Lado, 2019; EC, 2018).
For some stocks, TAC management has been removed completely (i.e.
the suppression of the combined TAC for dab and flounder in the North
Sea as long as they remain largely bycatch species (EC, 2017; ICES,
2017). This was done to remove by-catch stocks from the TAC regime
when TAC is not acting as a conservation mechanism. With the suppres-
sion of the TAC, dab and flounder stocks were removed from the LO and
no longer constitute a risk for premature closure of the target fisheries
for plaice and sole where they are bycaught. However, they continue
to be discarded in high numbers, likely to have between 10% and 30%
survival after discarding and low commercial value, but continue to be
caught in fisheries that no longer have the incentive to improve selectiv-
ity (Borges and Penas Lado, 2019). Defining what constitutes a bycatch
species is difficult as it may be a bycatch for one member state but a
target species for another. A list of clearly identified prohibited species
is provided for each sea basin and does not require any further reflection
(species listed in the Convention on International Trade in Endangered
Species of Wild Fauna and Flora (CITES) Appendix I are included on
the prohibited list). For a number of species and stocks which pose a
specific issue with the implementation of the landing obligation, TACs
could be set to 0 and add them to the prohibited species list. They
must therefore not be landed and means discarding can continue, and
in absence of a high post-release survival, this measure adds little to
the sustainability of the stock (Borges and Penas Lado, 2019). As the
catches of non-target stocks are not necessarily accounted for in their
respective TACs, there is a risk of overexploitation of those non-target
stocks. Therefore, introducing bycatch quotas for stocks where some
member states have zero quotas and where they cannot manage to ob-
tain small quotas through swaps could alleviate this problem (Hoff et al.,
2019). Although this option may be seen by many as a breach of relative
stability, the annual fishing opportunities regulation already contain a
number of such bycatch quotas (Borges and Penas Lado, 2019).
All new flexibilities are likely to alter the economics of fishing (STECF,
2013; Uhlmann et al., 2019). They can provide flexibility in the system
to better adjust catch compositions to resemble fishing opportunities
and increase both ecological and economic sustainability. Achieving a
169
Synthesis
C
ha
pt
er
6
balance between quota flexibility, over- exploitation risk, and admin-
istrative simplicity is critical for the profitability and sustainability of
multi-species fisheries. However, because these provisions could also be
used to legally increase catches well above desired or intended levels,
they will require careful consideration if negative and unintended con-
sequences are to be avoided (STECF, 2013).
Additionally, there are two other possible exceptions to this obliga-
tion. First, the regulation allows for fishing operators to continue to
discard species that, according to the best available scientific advice,
have a high survival rate when released into the sea. Second, to cater
for unwanted catches that are unavoidable even when all measures for
their reduction are taken, certain de-minimis exemptions from the land-
ing obligation may be established. In addition to these two possible
exemptions, which are to be determined in the corresponding discard
plan, fishing operators must discard catches of prohibited species (e.g.
basking shark) and, since 2015, also predator-damaged fish. It should
also be noted that the interpretation of the high survivability and de-
minimis exemptions is not always straightforward and therefore resulted
in very loose provisions which have ample room for interpretation (Ta-
ble 6.1). Those provisions provided in Article 15 are associated with
great uncertainty, not only because the wording leaves room for sub-
jective interpretation (Batsleer et al., 2016) (e.g. ‘scientific evidence
demonstrating high survival rates’, ‘increases in selectivity are very dif-
ficult to achieve’, ‘to avoid disproportionate costs’) but also because
definition of what threshold levels may be considered were not given. If
de-minimis exemption is applied to a species in which the choke effect
would not be mitigated, this approach would also to some extent negate
the purpose of the landing obligation, which is to encourage more selec-
tive fishing by creating incentives to avoid catching species with lower
quotas. Between October 2014 and beginning of 2018, the Commission
adopted 15 discard plans in which the details of the high survival ex-
emptions and the de-minimis are specified in preparation of the landing
obligation (/https://ec.europa.eu/fisheries/cfp/fishing_rules/
discards_en#Discard-plans).
Chapter 4 analyses the economic outcome under the landing obliga-
tion, relative to the expected outcome if the landing obligation had not
been introduced, and the landing obligation mitigation scenarios bench-
170
Regulations in support of the implementation
C
ha
pt
er
6
marked against the landing obligation with no exemptions or other miti-
gation strategies included. Some of the above mentioned mitigation mea-
sures have been modelled in order to assess the possible consequences
on fishers adaptation in the short term. Similar comparison for seven
different case studies can be found in Hoff et al. (2019), but only the
long-term results are shown. Generally, both for the Basque trawl fishery
in chapter 4 and for the ones analysed in Hoff et al. (2019), mitigation
strategies such as selectivity changes, de minimis exemptions and quota
adjustments equal to previous discarded quantities could enable fishing
businesses to increase profits with the implementation of the landing
obligation, but the profits are generally lower than or equal to profit
with no landing obligation. Our results indicate that trading quotas (at
rates undertaken in the past) does not alleviate the choking effect of the
landing obligation for the Basque trawl fishery case study. In particular,
under the landing obligation the transition from landing quota to catch
quota was adjusted to include only the 80% of the formerly discards, to
avoid any possible increase of fishing mortality and thus; jeopardising
sustainable management. Our results suggest that reductions in fish-
ing opportunities under a landing obligation that are caused by choke
species (mackerel) could be alleviated by the use of inter-species quota
flexibility (by transfers to horse mackerel quota), and lessen the negative
short-term reduction in net profits produced by the landing obligation.
These results suggest that there will be a large incentive for the Basque
fleet to use this quota flexibility: a finding that is likely transferable
to other fleets and fisheries. However, due to the lack of quota trans-
ferability in our model, the outcomes from chapter 4 may not fully
correspond to actual observations.
At this point in time it is difficult to predict the future evolution of the
application of all these provisions. The effects of the landing obligation
as established cannot be assessed ex ante because these effects depend
to a large extent on whether member states will make full use of the
existing flexibility mechanisms (Borges and Penas Lado, 2019). Hence,
it is difficult to predict how quota trading will develop under the landing
obligation. Including quota transfer into the model will make it more
operational for practical use, however, this would require a more detailed
knowledge on the actual implementation of the management regulations.
Generally, for the successfully implementation of all these exemptions
and flexibilities, management bodies should ensure that the full use of
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tools will constrain catches to comply with the MSY objective in Article
2(2) of the CFP Basic Regulation (EU, 2013) and that fishing businesses
have incentives to comply with the landing obligation.
Monitoring and enforcement are generally considered to be currently
insufficient to motivate compliance. In this regard, if there is some
evidence of weak implementation of the landing obligation, discarding
in contravention of the landing obligation will still occur at some level.
This would have potential consequences for catch data quality that feeds
into the evaluation of stock status and the harvest strategy, as well as
for confidence in the fishery compliance.
6.4 Compliance issues
Poor enforcement in European fisheries has often been identified as a
factor that contributes to a situation where the potential economic ben-
efits for fishers of noncompliance often outweigh the risks of detection
(Catchpole et al., 2005) and the cost of sanctions (Batsleer et al., 2013).
Indeed, one of the key questions inherent to the landing obligation en-
forcement is fishers compliance: given the potential for short-term and
long-term negative impacts on economic performance, fishers may try
to circumvent management rules (Rihan et al., 2019).When it is ille-
gal to discard fish while incentives to discard remain, monitoring and
control must be effectively invoked to offset incentives to discard (Hoff
et al., 2019; Nuevo et al., 2019; Sutinen and Andersen, 1985). Therefore,
moving to managing catches instead of landings also requires new forms
of monitoring (Catchpole and Ribeiro Santos, 2015; James et al., 2019;
Nuevo et al., 2019) and it is partly through this monitoring that the
incentive for compliance with the landing obligation and the motivation
to avoid unwanted catches can be generated (Borges and Penas Lado,
2019; Kraak and Hart, 2019). Also, social norms, trust and cooperation
play a role (Kraak and Hart, 2019; Sutinen and Kuperan, 1999).
Discard management regimes experiences from fisheries around the world
(see chapter 2) have shown that choosing the right technical measures
when facing a discard restriction is not a simple process. In most cases,
management authorities need to simultaneously implement complemen-
tary measures which will support implementation and encourage com-
pliance with discarding rules. Measures to support discard reduction,
already discussed in previous sections, can include both incentive mea-
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sures (e.g. access to a certain area and / or at certain times will only
be granted to those using specific approved gears, or that those us-
ing approved gears benefit from additional quota or effort allocations),
disincentive measures (e.g. a requirement to keep rejected fish aboard
and stowed separately), or technical measures either at the gear level,
through enhanced selectivity, or by spatial and temporal restrictions
(Catchpole and Ribeiro Santos, 2015). The challenge in European fish-
eries is to monitor all implemented measures because vessel operators
may decide not to comply with regulations if monitoring at sea is prob-
lematic (Condie et al., 2014a; Hoff et al., 2019). Therefore, monitoring
and evaluation of the flexibility elements introduced into the Basic Reg-
ulation (EU, 2013) is challenging task.
It is recognized that the introduction of the landing obligation necessi-
tates a review of certain aspects of the CFP regulatory framework, and
that the challenges of a successful implementation require new fishing
practices, methods, enforcement systems and technologies to control the
new regulatory approach (Catchpole et al., 2018; Uhlmann et al., 2019).
The most prominent regulatory challenge is frequently cited to be en-
forcement, in particular as the focus of monitoring and control shifts
from landing to activities at sea. Typically fisheries control and enforce-
ment is quite costly (Arnason, 2014), leading to potentially higher costs
(Catchpole and Ribeiro Santos, 2015; Condie et al., 2014b).Indeed, the
allowances on keeping or discarding legally some specimens (under high
survivability, de-minimis, prohibited species exemptions) makes control
and monitoring of this system even more difficult. Although new ap-
proaches from the European Fisheries Control Agency, based on catch
comparison, are being developed to detect vessel operators with high
risk of non-compliance (Nuevo et al., 2019), those only estimate such
a risk after an inspection has already occurred. Therefore, this shift
requires a high level of surveillance, fishing and discarding practices are
100 per cent monitored during fishing activities, in order to detect what
is caught and whether there is illegal discarding.
In general, real time monitoring (and reporting) is likely to provide a
management flexibility that could alleviate the undesired choke situa-
tions. However, it is difficult to evaluate how successful these measures
have been in achieving conservation benefits, and difficult to implement
and specially administer (Marchal et al., 2016). Currently applied Re-
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mote Electronic Monitoring (REM) and on-board monitoring methods,
including satellite monitoring, enforcement patrols and on-board ob-
server Programmes (see chapter 2), can meet the successful imple-
mentation of the landing obligation only to a limited extent (Catchpole
et al., 2018; Hedley et al., 2015; James et al., 2019). A specific strategy is
needed to permit the full use of control and monitoring tools for enforce-
ment of the landing obligation. This strategy should take into account
the development of new technologies that allow a full documentation of
all catches (Catchpole et al., 2018, 2017).If such a strategy is successful
and results in reliable monitoring of catches rather than landings, this
should be counted as an unexpected side benefit of the reformed CFP.
However, there is currently no agreed approach on how catch monitoring
will be achieved (James et al., 2019). This could lead to a deterioration
of the reliability of discard information if discard estimates come from
a small sample of fishing trips: when discarding is allowed, the role of
the scientific observer who estimate discards on board is not tainted by
compliance issues. If all discards are to be landed, one should won-
der about the representability of discard estimates when observers are
on board. Any deterioration of the discards estimates will have criti-
cal repercussions on the quality of the advice on fishing opportunities
because almost all stock assessments used for the advice depend on hav-
ing accurate catch information (Bousquet et al., 2010; Breen and Cook,
2002; Catchpole and Ribeiro Santos, 2015; Cotter et al., 2004; Walters
and Maguire, 1996).
Chapter 4 and 5 assume full compliance, and the model considers
discarding a serious infringement under the regulation. Compliance to
management was assumed by applying high sanctions for exceeding the
quota and a 100% detection rate. Hence, fishers may respond to man-
agement regulations by substantially reducing discards, changing their
distribution of fishing effort but trading-off their revenues. However, if
detection rates are low and the short-term benefits of non-compliance
are high (as our results suggest) then non-compliance is likely to be
a substantial problem in the absence of measures promoting voluntary
compliance. In theory, given the difficulty to have 100% detection rates,
by introducing a premium in the decision function of the model would
influence the outcome of our results (e.g. an increase in the price of
fish that would otherwise be discarded because of a low price). In such
a case, the vessel operator will include the benefit/penalty in their de-
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cision (invoked as a penalty placed on the estimated net benefit from
discarding while considering also the probability of being detected). If
the risk of being detected and the penalty are low, fish will probably be
discarded and vice versa.
6.5 Management Strategy Evaluation
Clearly the substantial paradigm shift in the management of European
fisheries related to the 2013 reform of the CFP will have large conse-
quences for its fisheries. This underlines the importance of ensuring
that the use of flexibility mechanisms of the landing obligation needs to
be consistent with the achievement of the Maximum Sustainable Yield
(MSY) objective of the CFP. The nature and magnitude of these conse-
quences is unknown, but as they will include both the human dimension
of the fisheries, and the biological dimension. One way of evaluating the
potential effects of changes in management such as currently under the
CFP is Management Strategy Evaluation (MSE).
Management Strategy Evaluation is a framework for the evaluation
of management strategies using simulation to evaluate the trade-offs
achieved by management strategies and to assess the potential long-term
consequences of uncertainty for achieving management goals (Kell et al.,
2007; Punt et al., 2016; Sainsbury, 2000). In most MSEs, the focus has
been on the dynamics of fish stocks, and the uncertainties therein. In the
landing obligation however, we see that the human aspect is equally im-
portant, if not more important (Fulton et al., 2011a; Garcia et al., 2013).
MSE with explicit human (social) behaviour dimension is increasingly
being used (Andersen et al., 2010; Ono et al., 2017) as additional sources
of uncertainty are taken into account. In theory this should allow identi-
fying management actions that ensure the sustainability of fisheries. In
the case of the landing obligation the behavioural response of fishers to
the landing obligation results in changes in their spatial and temporal
distributions. Meanwhile the strength of this response will depend on
the degree of compliance. In addition, the spatial and temporal distri-
bution of fishers may also be influenced by additional provisions related
to the exact implementation of the landing obligation, which are yet
unknown.
Ideally these uncertainties should be addressed, or the mechanisms that
are expected to play a role should be included in the MSE. In chapter
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5 I attempted to include a substantial part of the behavioural changes
that can be expected as reaction to the landing obligation by including
mechanistic dynamics in fishing effort allocation. These dynamics are
captured by an extended Dynamic State Variable model that includes
the consequent biomass of fish stocks and the management procedure
to make its decision on how to respond to the state of the resource
where individual skippers make intra-annual fishing choices based on
their accumulated catches, their quotas, and their expectations of future
catches. The MSE framework, was thought of as a minimum realistic
model (Kell et al., 2007; Punt and Butterworth, 1995), and included
temporal and spatial key processes in the dynamics of two fish popula-
tions, the fisheries and a re-evaluation of management targets. To keep
the model simple, the two fish populations modelled in chapter 5 were
exactly the same apart from their spatial distribution. Indeed, I did not
include the use of any discard flexibilities or exemptions of the landing
obligation, while estimated quotas were based on keeping fishing mor-
tality below the MSY while it was not possible to discard. I may thus
have underestimated the flexibility of the fishery to respond to quota
limitations imposed under both the landing obligation and MSY fish-
eries management. However, this approach underlines the importance
of ensuring that the use of flexibility mechanisms needs to be consis-
tent with the achievement of the MSY objective of the CFP (Borges
and Penas Lado, 2019). The results suggest that the landing obligation,
which now applies for all quota species, may affect the productivity of
non-quota species. In mixed fisheries, constraining quota only for a
single-species brought risk of changing exploitation patterns also for the
unconstrained stock, with younger fish being targeted for (Borges and
Penas Lado, 2019; STECF, 2013, 2017b). Moving from an unmanaged
period to a situation where one or both species were quota regulated by
implementing MSY objectives in combination with a LO management
regime (i.e. main CFP objectives: exploiting at MSY and no discarding
allowance) led to a very restrictive fishing activity (chapter 5). Fishing
effort was constrained by one or two quota stocks, as predicted in general
terms by Ulrich et al. (2017), resulting in drastic reductions of effort over
the short-term and mid-term. In addition to reconciling fishery and con-
servation objectives (such as the CFP), in agreement with Grafton et al.
(20077), setting exploitation rates below Hmax resulted in a reduction in
fishing cost and an increase in net revenue over the mid-term (chapter
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5). However, as Prellezo et al. (2016b) concluded, since effort was dras-
tically reduced to achieve the objectives of the CFP; the increase in net
revenue gains were only experienced by some vessels. Consequently, a
significant part of the fleet had to cease its activity.
While I used a mechanistic model in chapter 5, others have approached
the problem from a slightly different angle: the choices of fishers can also
be mimicked using regression techniques that estimate the likelihood of
a given choice based on historical patterns and calculates coefficients for
different covariates (Andersen et al., 2010; Holland and Sutinen, 2000;
Marchal et al., 2009; Ono et al., 2017; Tidd et al., 2011).However, this
retrospective approach, being driven by observations on historical pat-
terns is less well suited to predict behavioural adaptations in relation
to changing conditions (Dowling et al., 2011). In this context, Dynamic
State Variable models have the advantage that they lack dependency on
historical patterns to predict future choices. In addition, these models
allow individuals to cope with opportunity cost such as the decision stay
in port early in the year taking into account the potential future benefits
of fishing later in the year fetching a higher price; as the introduction
of errors in decision making (Dowling et al., 2011). These aspects make
the Dynamic State Variable model an ideal tool to evaluate the influ-
ence of new or unknown measures such as the landing obligation or a
credit system on behavioural adaptations of a fishing vessel (Batsleer,
2016).
While I modelled the intra-annual choices of individual skippers of a
given fleet size, the longert-erm dynamics of the fleet size itself was not
taken into account. This is an important aspect that is clearly missing.
One would expect that vessel owners under adverse economic circum-
stances decide to disinvest. Meanwhile, models of the entry-exit dynam-
ics do exist (see e.g. Tidd et al. (2011)) and could be incorporated. In
the long term, choke situations and displacement of vessels to other ar-
eas are expected to reduce fishing pressure, leading to biomass increases
and thus improved fishing possibilities. However, ensuing economic im-
provements will differ for individual fleet segments and vessel businesses,
depending on catch composition and on whether TACs increase propor-
tionally when biomasses increase (Hoff et al., 2019).
Despite theoretical advances in both fish stocks and fleet dynamics, an
important aspect that determines management outcomes in general, and
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in the landing obligation in particular, is the behaviour of organizations.
Some of these challenges have been present since governments began to
actively manage fisheries; while other issues have emerged much more
recently (Environment Canada, 2011). In particular, the large short
term costs that are foreseen in the implementation of the landing obli-
gation has spawned many provisions to alleviate its effects, such as the
de-minimis and the high-survival exemption, quota flexibilities and the
application of selectivity measures (EU, 2013). These provisions were
instigated by the fisheries management, and one should wonder if the dy-
namics of these managers and their response to the actions of stakehold-
ers can ever be captured in simplified dynamics. Fisheries are more likely
to be sustainable if the organizations responsible for managing them
take actions such as the ones showed in Environment Canada (2011):
(i) adopt legislation and policies that consider clearly defined social,
economic, and conservation objectives, and incorporate the ecosystem
and precautionary approaches; (ii) engage stakeholders and communities
through open and transparent processes; (iii) put in place appropriate
accountability arrangements; (iv) use a decision-making process that is
transparent, considers social and economic objectives, and respects the
biological limits; (v) use the best available scientific research and anal-
ysis; (vi) develop fishing plans that reflect the objectives for the fishery
and provide fishers with incentives to pursue fisheries in a sustainable
manner; (vii) develop and put in place appropriate monitoring, con-
trol, and surveillance; (vii) and develop an enforcement capability that
promotes and ensures compliance with legislation and supports fisheries
planning.
6.6 Outlook
Fisheries policy is increasingly influenced by civil society organizations.
The newest example of this is the formulation of the landing obliga-
tion, a regulation that should reduce the contested practice of discard-
ing unwanted fish. The landing obligation, intended to reduce discarding
of marketable fish, evolved from a generic management measure into a
complicated micro-management system to alleviate the problem of choke
species in mixed trawl fisheries. This system includes a range of poten-
tial exemptions from the discard ban when fish do not have to be landed
(art. 15(4)), where the fish are prohibited to retain for conservation rea-
sons, will be used for live bait, or if scientific evidence demonstrates
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high survival rates when discarded. However, providing the necessary
evidence for each of these cases is challenging, subjective and fishery or
stock-specific. The exemptions also appear to have different objectives,
e.g. the avoidance of waste, improve stock sustainability, or improve
financial viability. Similarly, a small amount (de minimis) of the total
catch may be discarded if, either there are disproportionate costs of han-
dling and storing the fish on board, or improving selectivity is proven to
be difficult (EU, 2013). These are relevant where discards are relatively
low.
With the implementation process of the landing obligation it becomes
clear that fishers are working on diminishing discards. However, it also
shows that for the legitimacy, and the effectiveness of policy it is not
only vital to increase the influence of civil society actors, but also the
participation of resource users. Their views, knowledge, and cooperation
are vital for a successful implementation of the regulation. Otherwise,
resistance become too high, and regulation becomes more symbolic than
a tool for change.
Dynamic state variable models allow studying how fishers may respond
to changing policies and what consequences this response may have for
the economic and social performance of the fishery. To study the pos-
sible consequences on a longer time horizon, an MSE approach can be
applied to evaluate the long term consequences of the changes in ex-
ploitation pattern on the productivity of the exploited stocks. Such an
MSE should encompass all relevant dynamics of the fisheries system as
a whole. However, fisheries systems are by their nature highly complex
and include the biological, economic, and social processes along a wide
range of actors. The models used to explore the possible response of the
fishery and its consequences are necessarily strong simplifications of the
fishery system, and so are the models used in this thesis.
Given the existing uncertainties in the precise implementation of the
discard ban, the results presented in this thesis will not precisely cor-
respond to future observed changes in the dynamics of the fleet. Our
model, however, is particularly suitable to evaluate conservation and
economic trade-offs and visualize consequences of management scenar-
ios. The model can be used to evaluate the consequences and explore
the scope of responses in fisheries behaviour under different survival, de
minimis or inter-species flexibilities scenarios. Eventually, science often
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cannot provide a single true value, but can provide insight in the po-
tential consequences of choices, leaving the decision whether something
is high, difficult or disproportionate with the fisheries managers. As a
result, not all provisions in the landing obligation could be included in
the simulations. However, it is expected that the advance of computing
power will allow for modelling the effects of policies in ever more detail.
In order to make a realistic evaluation of management strategies in a
mixed fisheries context, it is crucial to advance in the understanding of
fleet dynamics. Thus, further investigation is needed in the inclusion of
social dynamics of fisheries modelling. As shown here and previously
pointed out by others, fleet behaviour can render stock management
ineffective (Branch et al., 2006; J.E. et al., 2002; Salas and Gaertner,
2004): no matter how good a management strategy is, it will not work
if the fishers do not comply with it (Garcia et al., 2013).
In any case, the practice of discarding is increasingly considered unac-
ceptable from different points of view, including considerations about
food security. Any possible future change in the policy is likely to be
about adjustments to improve practical implementation and mitigate
possible negative results, but a CFP with high levels of discarding is un-
likely to return (Borges and Penas Lado, 2019). The actual outcomes of
the landing obligation will depend on several factors, including the man-
agement system in place, the precise application of exemptions (e.g. de
minimis allowance of discards up to 5%), the use of interannual transfers,
catch allowances of stocks without TACs, quota adjustments and quota
swaps/movements, application of selectivity measures, costs of landing
unwanted catch, prices obtained for unwanted fish and compliance of
the sector (Hoff et al., 2019). Legitimacy on fisheries management, as
demanded by the fishing industry, environmental organisations and the
general public, depends on scientific advice for management decisions
made by fisheries managers. Under the current CFP, managers need to
ensure management measures contribute to the sustainable use of natu-
ral resources, while minimizing the ecosystem impact of fishing activities
and maintaining economic resilient fisheries.
This thesis contributes to the ecosystem approach to fisheries manage-
ment as an innovative spatial explicit simulation model is developed to
deliver insights into complex socioeconomic and ecological trade-offs re-
sulting from management measures. I show adaptive behaviour of a
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fishing fleet is certainly a factor which can influence the outcome of an
important management decision, but which is easily overlooked. Hence,
fleet dynamics is an essential element to understand the effectiveness
of management measures. Fisheries advice should be extended to of-
fer predictions of stock trajectories not only under a range of possi-
ble management measures, but also for a number of realistic outcomes
in terms of compliance and enforcement of regulations (Fulton et al.,
2011b). Following these predictions, and prior to implementation, a dis-
cards management regime should be evaluated (to the extent possible)
by simulation, to ensure its robustness to prevailing uncertainties in-
cluding those related to implementation (Butterworth, 2007; Punt and
Donovan, 2007).
181
Synthesis
C
ha
pt
er
6
6.7 References
Alverson, D. L., Freeberg, M. H., Pope,
J. G., and Murawski, S. A. 1994. A
global assessment of fisheries bycatch
and discards. FAO Fisheries Technical
Paper 339, Rome. Retrieved from:,
page 233. URL http://www.fao.org/
docrep/003/t4890e/t4890e00.htm.
Andersen, B. S., Vermard, Y., Ulrich,
C., Hutton, T., and Poos, J. J. 2010.
Challenges in integrating short-term be-
haviour in a mixed-fishery Management
Strategies Evaluation frame: A case
study of the North Sea flatfish fishery.
Fisheries Research, 102(1-2):26–40.
Armstrong, M., Payne, A., Deas, B.,
and Catchpole, T. 2013. Involv-
ing stakeholders in the commissioning
and implementation of fishery science
projects: Experiences from the UK
Fisheries Science Partnership. Journal
of Fish Biology, 83:974–996.
Arnason, R. 2014. Best practice
in the use of rights-based manage-
ment to reduce discards in mixed fish-
eries. Directorate-general for interna-
tional policies, policy department B:
structural and cohesion policies. Fish-
eries. European Parliament.
Azti. Aproximación integral a la mini-
mización y manejo de la captura no de-
seada (antes descartes) de la flota es-
pañola que opera al arrastre en aguas del
Golfo de Bizkaia y del Noroeste ibérico,
2019. URL https://www.azti.es/es/
ficha/mendes. Accessed: 2019-02-07.
Bailey, N., Campbell, N., Holmes, S.,
Needle, C., and Wright, P. 2010. Real
time closures of fisheries. Directorate-
general for international policies, pol-
icy department B: structural and cohe-
sion policies. Fisheries. European Par-
liament.
Bastardie, F., Nielsen, J., Ulrich, C.,
Egekvist, J., and Degel, H. 2010.
Detailed mapping of fishing effort and
landings by coupling fishing logbooks
with satellite-recorded vessel geoloca-
tion. Fisheries Research, 106:41–53.
Batsleer, J. Fleet dynamics in a chang-
ing policy environment. PhD thesis, Wa-
geningen University, 2016.
Batsleer, J., Poos, J. J., Marchal, P.,
Vermard, Y., and Rijnsdorp, A. D. 2013.
Mixed fisheries management: Protect-
ing the weakest link. Marine Ecology
Progress Series, 479:177–190.
Batsleer, J., Hamon, K. G., van
Overzee, H. M. J., Rijnsdorp, A. D., and
Poos, J. J. 2015. High-grading and over-
quota discarding in mixed fisheries. Re-
views in Fish Biology and Fisheries, 25:
715–736.
Batsleer, J., Rijnsdorp, A. D., Hamon,
K. G., van Overzee, H. M. J., and Poos,
J. J. 2016. Mixed fisheries manage-
ment: Is the ban on discarding likely
to promote more selective and fuel ef-
ficient fishing in the Dutch flatfish fish-
ery? Fisheries Research, 174:118–128.
Bayse, S. and Polet, H. 2015. Eval-
uation of a large mesh extension in a
Belgian beam trawl to reduce the cap-
ture of sole (Solea solea). ILVO Instituut
voor landbouwen visserijonderzoek re-
port, February 2015:8. URL https:
//www.vissersbond.nl/wp-content/
uploads/2015/11/Evaluation-of-
a-Large-Mesh-Extension-in-a-
Belgian-Beam-Trawl.pdf.
Beare, D., McQuatters-Gollop, A.,
van der Hammen, T., Machiels, M.,
Teoh, S., and Hall-Spencer, J. 2013.
Long-Term Trends in Calcifying Plank-
ton and pH in the NorthSeal. PLoS
ONE, 8:e6117. doi: 10.1371/journal.
pone.0061175.
Bellido, J., Paradinas, I., Vilela, R.,
Bas, G., and Pennino, M. A ma-
182
References
C
ha
pt
er
6
rine spatial planning approach to min-
imize discards: Challenges and oppor-
tunities of the landing obligation in eu-
ropean waters. In Uhlmann, S., Ul-
rich, C., and Kennelly, S., editors, The
European Landing Obligation. Springer,
2019. URL http://doi.org/10.1007/
978-3-030-03308-8_2.
Bellido, J. M., Santos, M. B., Pennino,
M. G., Valeiras, X., and Pierce, G. J.
2011. Fishery discards and bycatch: So-
lutions for an ecosystem approach to
fisheries management? Hydrobiologia,
670(1):317–333.
Beverton, R. J. H. and Holt, S. J. On
the Dynamics of Exploited Fish Popu-
lations. MAFF Fishery Investigation-
Series II, XIX. HMSO, London, 1957.
Borges, L. 2015. The evolution of a dis-
card policy in Europe. Fish and Fish-
eries, 16:534–540.
Borges, L. 2018. Setting of total al-
lowable catches in the 2013 EU com-
mon fisheries policy reform: Possible im-
pacts. Marine Policy, 91:97–103.
Borges, L. and Penas Lado, E. Discards
in the common fisheries policy: The evo-
lution of the policy. In Uhlmann, S., Ul-
rich, C., and Kennelly, S., editors, The
European Landing Obligation. Springer,
2019. URL http://doi.org/10.1007/
978-3-030-03308-8_2.
Bousquet, N., Cadigan, N., Duchesne,
T., and Rivest, L. 2010. Detecting
and correcting underreported catches in
fish stock assessment: trial of a new
method. Canadian Journal of Fisheries
and Aquatic Sciences, 64:1247–1261.
Branch, T. A., Hilborn, R., Haynie,
A. C., Fay, G., Flynn, L., Griffiths,
J., Marshall, K. N., Randall, J. K.,
Scheuerell, J. M., Ward, E. J., and
Young, M. 2006. Fleet dynamics and
fishermen behavior: lessons for fisheries
managers. Canadian Journal of Fish-
eries and Aquatic Sciences, 63(7):1647–
1668.
Breen, M. and Cook, R. 2002. Inclu-
sion of discard and escape mortality es-
timates in stock assessment models and
its likely impact on fisheries manage-
ment. ICES CM 2002/V, 27:15 pp.
Broadhurst, M. K., Kangas, M. I.,
Damiano, C., Bickford, S. A., and Ken-
nelly, S. J. 2002. Using composite
square-mesh panels and the Nordmøre-
grid to reduce bycatch in the Shark Bay
prawn-trawl fishery, Western Australia.
Fisheries Research, 58(3):349–365.
Butterworth, D. S. 2007. Why a man-
agement procedure approach? Some
positive and negatives. ICES Journal
of Marine Science, 64(1995):613–617.
Catchpole, T. and Ribeiro Santos,
A. 2015. The landing obligation
and its implications on the control of
fisheries. European Parliament Study
IP/B/PECH/IC/2014-20.
Catchpole, T., Elliott, S., Peach, D.,
Mangi, S., and Gray, T. 2018. How
to deal with the EU landing obligation:
lessons from an English discard ban sea
trial. ICES Journal of Marine Science,
75:270–278.
Catchpole, T. L., Frid, C. L. J., and
Gray, T. S. 2005. Discards in North Sea
fisheries: causes, consequences and so-
lutions. Marine Policy, 29(5):421–430.
Catchpole, T. L., Ribeiro-Santos, A.,
Mangi, S. C., Hedley, C., and Gray, T. S.
2017. The challenges of the landing obli-
gation in EU fisheries. Marine Policy,
82:76–86.
Cefas. Discard Atlas of the North West-
ern Waters Demersal Fisheries. Techni-
cal Report December, CEFAS, 2014.
Clark, C. W. and Mangel, M. Dynamic
state variable models in ecology: meth-
183
Synthesis
C
ha
pt
er
6
ods and applications. Oxford University
Press, New York, 2000.
Condie, H. M., Catchpole, T. L., and
Grant, A. 2014a. The short-term im-
pacts of implementing catch quotas and
a discard ban on English North Sea ot-
ter trawlers. ICES Journal of Marine
Science, 71(5):1266–1276.
Condie, H. M., Grant, A., and Catch-
pole, T. L. 2014b. Incentivising selective
fishing under a policy to ban discards;
lessons from European and global fish-
eries. Marine Policy, 45:287–292.
Cotter, J., Armstrong, M., Woods,
T., Dann, J., White, P., and Keable,
J. 2004. Final Report Programme
8: Gear selectivity in the Irish Sea.
Part I: Eastern Irish Sea place fishery.
Retrieved from, pages 1–19. URL
http://citeseerx.ist.psu.edu/
viewdoc/download?doi=10.1.1.177.
4147&rep=rep1&type=pdf.
Diaz Pauli, B. and Sih, A. 2017. Be-
havioural responses to human-induced
change: Why fishing should not be ig-
nored. Evolutionary Applications, 10:
231–240.
Dinmore, T., Duplisea, D., Rackham,
B., Maxwell, D., and Jennings, S. 2003.
Impact of a large-scale area closure on
patterns of fishingdisturbance and the
consequences for benthic communities.
ICES Journal of Marine Science, 60:
371–380.
Dowling, N. A., Wilcox, C., Mangel, M.,
and Pascoe, S. 2011. Assessing op-
portunity and relocation costs of ma-
rine protected areas using a behavioural
model of longline fleet dynamics. Fish
and Fisheries, 13(2):139–157.
Drewery, J., Watt, M., Kynoch, R.,
Edridge, A., Mair, J., and O’Neill, F.
2012. Catch comparison trials of the
Flip Flap netting grid trawl. Marine
Scotland Science Report 08/12, page 17
pp. URL https://www.researchgate.
net/profile/Alex_Edridge/
publication/262932560_Catch_
Comparison_Trials_of_the_Flip_
Flap_Netting_Grid_Trawl/links/
0a85e53957f67a5983000000/Catch-
Comparison-Trials-of-the-Flip-
Flap-Netting-Grid-Trawl.pdf?
origin=publication_detail.
Dunn, D., Boustany, A., and Halpin, P.
2011. Spatio-temporal management of
fisheries to reduce by-catch and increase
fishing selectivity. Fish and Fisheries,
12:110–119.
EC. 2016. Communication from the
Commission to the European Parlia-
ment and the Council—Consultation on
the fishing opportunities for 2017 un-
der the Common Fisheries Policy. COM
(2016) 396 final, 15.06.2016:p.10.
EC. 2017. Communication from the
commission on the state of play of
the common fisheries policy and con-
sultation on the fishing opportunities
for 2018. Retrieved from, 368:. URL
http://ec.europa.eu/transparency/
regdoc/rep/1/2017/EN/COM-2017-
368-1-EN-MAIN-PART-1.PDF.
EC. 2018. Communication from the
commission to the european parliament
and the council on the state of play of
the common fisheries policy and consul-
tation of the fishing opportunities for
2019. COM (2018) 452 final, 11.6.2018:
p.14.
Eliasen, S., Papadopoulou, N., Vas-
silopoulou, V., and Catchpole, T. 2014.
Socio-economic and institutional incen-
tives influencing fishers’ behaviour in re-
lation to fishing practices and discard.
ICES Journal of Marine Science, 71:
1298–1307.
Environment Canada. 2011. A
study of managing fisheries for sustain-
ability. Report of the Commissioner
184
References
C
ha
pt
er
6
of the Environment and Sustainabil-
ity Development, Chapter 4:Retrieved
from: http://www.ec.gc.ca/doc/ed--
es/p_123/s2_eng.htm.
EU. Regulation (EU) No 1380/2013
of the European Parliament and of the
Council of 11 December 2013 on the
Common Fisheries Policy, 2013.
Fonteyne, R. and Polet, H. 2002. Reduc-
ing the benthos by-catch in flatfish beam
trawling by means of technical modifica-
tions. Fisheries Research, 55(1-3):219–
230.
Fulton, E., Smith, A., Smith, D., and
van Putten, I. 2011a. Human behaviour:
the key source of uncertainty in fisheries
management. Fish and Fisheries, 12:2–
17.
Fulton, E. A., Link, J. S., Kaplan,
I. C., Savina-Rolland, M., Johnson,
P., Ainsworth, C., Horne, P., Gorton,
R., Gamble, R. J., Smith, A. D. M.,
and Smith, D. C. 2011b. Lessons
in modelling and management of ma-
rine ecosystems: the Atlantis experi-
ence. Fish and Fisheries, 12(2):171–188.
G., R. 1915. A new construc-
tion of trawl-net intended to separate
under-sized fish. Svenska Hydrografisk-
Biologiska Kommisionens skrifter, 6:1–
21.
Garcia, D., Urtizberea, A., Díez, G.,
Gil, J., and Marchal, P. 2013. Bio-
economic management strategy evalua-
tion of deepwater stocks using the flbeia
model. Aquatic Living Resources, 26:
365–379.
Grafton, R. Q., Kompas, T., and
Hilborn, R. W. 20077. Economics
of Overexploitation Revisited. Science,
318:1601.
Graham, N., Ferro, R. S. T., Karp,
W. A., and Macmullen, P. 2007. Fishing
practice, gear design, and the ecosystem
approach - three case studies demon-
strating the effect of management strat-
egy on gear selectivity and discards.
ICES Journal of Marine Science, 64:
744–750.
Gulland, J. 1969. Manual of methods
for fish stock assess-ment. Part I. Fish
Population Analysis. FAO Manual of
Fisheries Science, 4:44.
Hedley, C., Catchpole, T., and Santos,
A. 2015. The Landing Obligation
and its Implications on the Control
of Fisheries. European Union, page
122. URL https://publications.
europa.eu/en/publication-detail/-
/publication/9ec98ef8-7644-454a-
ad61-d1cd33125ca5/language-en.
Herrmann, B. 2005. Effect of catch size
and shape on the selectivity of diamond
mesh cod-ends. Fisheries Research, 71
(1):1–13.
Herrmann, B., Wienbeck, H., Karlsen,
J. D., Stepputtis, D., Dahm, E., and
Moderhak, W. 2015. Understanding the
release efficiency of Atlantic cod (Gadus
morhua) from trawls with a square mesh
panel: effects of panel area, panel posi-
tion, and stimulation of escape response.
ICES Journal of Marine Science, 72(2):
686–696.
Hintzen, N., Bastardie, F., Beare, D.,
Piet, G., Ulrich, C., Deporte, N.,
Egekvist, J., and Degel, H. 2012. VM-
Stools: Open-source software for the
processing, analysis and visualisation of
fisheries logbook and VMS data. Fish-
eries Research, 115–116:31–43.
Hoff, A., Frost, H., Andersen, P.,
Prellezo, R., Rueda, L., Triantaphyl-
lidis, G., Argyrou, I., Tsikliras, A.,
Motova, A., Lehuta, S., Curtis, H.,
Rodríguez-Rodríguez, G., Ballesteros,
H., Valeiras, J., and Bellido, J. Poten-
tial economic consequences of the land-
ing obligation. In Uhlmann, S., Ul-
rich, C., and Kennelly, S., editors, The
185
Synthesis
C
ha
pt
er
6
European Landing Obligation. Springer,
2019. URL http://doi.org/10.1007/
978-3-030-03308-8_2.
Holland, D. and Sutinen, J. 2000. Lo-
cation choice in new england trawl fish-
eries: Old habits die hard. Land Eco-
nomics, 76:133–150.
Hopkins, C. C. E., Hegland, T. J., and
Wilson, D. C. K. 2013. ‘Maximising
yield of fisheries while balancing ecosys-
tem, economic and social concerns.’ Re-
view of the Faroe Islands fisheries gov-
ernance system: Objective setting and
implementation. EU FP7 Project No:,
289257.
Houston, A. and McNamara, J. Mod-
els of Adaptive Behaviour. Cambridge
University Press, Cambridge, 1999.
ICES. 2017. Eu request on a combined
dab and flounder tac and potential
management measures besides catch
limits. ICES Special Request Advice,
6:8 pp. URL http://citeseerx.ist.
psu.edu/viewdoc/download?doi=10.
1.1.177.4147&rep=rep1&type=pdf.
James, K., Campbell, N., Við*arsson,
J., Vilas, C., Plet-Hansen, K., Borges,
L., González, O., van Helmond, A.,
Pérez-Martín, R., Taboada Antelo, L.,
Pérez-Bouzada, J., and Ulrich, C. Tools
and technologies for the monitoring,
control and surveillance of unwanted
catches. In Uhlmann, S., Ulrich, C.,
and Kennelly, S., editors, The Eu-
ropean Landing Obligation. Springer,
2019. URL http://doi.org/10.1007/
978-3-030-03308-8_2.
J.E., W., M.D., S., D., L., and L.W.,
B. 2002. Avoiding surprises: incorpo-
rating fisherman behavior into manage-
ment models. Bulletin of Marine Sci-
ence, 70:553–575.
Kell, L. T., Mosqueira, I., Grosjean, P.,
Fromentin, J. M., Garcia, D., Hillary,
R., Jardim, E., Mardle, S., Pastoors,
M. A., Poos, J. J., Scott, F., and Scott,
R. D. 2007. FLR: an open-source frame-
work for the evaluation and develop-
ment of management strategies. ICES
Journal of Marine Science, 64:640–646.
Kelleher, K. Discards in the world’s ma-
rine fisheries An update. Technical re-
port, FAO Fish Tech Pap T470, Rome,
2005.
Kindt-Larsen, L., Kirkegaard, E., and
Dalskov, J. 2011. Fully documented
fishery: a tool to support a catch quota
management system. ICES Journal of
Marine Science, 68:1606–1610.
Kraak, S. and Hart, P. Creating a breed-
ing ground for compliance and hon-
est reporting under the landing obli-
gation: Insights from behavioural sci-
ence. In Uhlmann, S., Ulrich, C.,
and Kennelly, S., editors, The Eu-
ropean Landing Obligation. Springer,
2019. URL http://doi.org/10.1007/
978-3-030-03308-8_2.
Kynoch, R., Edridge, A., and O’Neill,
F. Catch Comparison Trials with the
Faithlie Cod Avoidance Panel (FCAP).
Scottish marine and freshwater science.
Scottish Government, 2012. ISBN
9781782561071. URL https://books.
google.es/books?id=u7JqAQAACAAJ.
Madsen, N. 2007. Selectivity of fishing
gears used in the Baltic Sea cod fishery.
Reviews in Fish Biology and Fisheries,
17:517–544.
Madsen, N., Holst, R., and Foldager, L.
2002. Escape windows to improve the
size selectivity in the Baltic cod trawl
fishery. Fisheries Research, 57(3):223–
235.
Madsen, N., Feekings, J., and Lewy, P.
2013. Discarding of plaice (Pleuronectes
platessa) in the Danish North Sea trawl
fishery. Journal of Sea Research, 75:129–
134.
186
References
C
ha
pt
er
6
Marchal, P., Ulrich, C., Korsbrekke, K.,
Pastoors, M., and Rackham, B. 2003.
Annual trends in catchability and fish
stock assessments. Scientia Marina, 67:
63–73.
Marchal, P., Lallemand, P., and Stokes,
K. 2009. The relative weight of tra-
ditions, economics, and catch plans in
New Zealand fleet dynamics. Canadian
Journal of Fisheries and Aquatic Sci-
ences, 66:291–311.
Marchal, P., Andersen, J. L., Aranda,
M., Fitzpatrick, M., Goti, L., Guyader,
O., Haraldsson, G., Hatcher, A., Heg-
land, T. J., Le Floc’h, P., Macher, C.,
Malvarosa, L., Maravelias, C. D., Mar-
dle, S., Murillas, A., Nielsen, J. R.,
Sabatella, R., Smith, A. D. M., Stokes,
K., Thoegersen, T., and Ulrich, C. 2016.
A comparative review of fisheries man-
agement experiences in the European
Union and in other countries worldwide:
Iceland, Australia, and New Zealand.
Fish and Fisheries, 17:803–824.
Mortensen, L., Ulrich, C., Olesen, H.,
Bergsson, H., Berg, C., Tzamouranis,
N., and Dalskov, J. 2017. Effective-
ness of fully documented fisheries to es-
timate discards in a participatory re-
search scheme. Fisheries Research, 187:
150–157.
MRAG. 2007. Impact assessment
of discard policy for specific fish-
eries. European Commission Studies
and Pilot Projects for Carrying out
the Common Fisheries Policy. No.
FISH/2006/17 – Lot 1, Brussels, page
289. URL http://ec.europa.eu/
fisheries/documentation/studies/
impact_assessment_discard_policy_
2007_en.pdf.
Nielsen, K., Holm, P., and Aschan, M.
2015. Results based management in fish-
eries: Delegating responsibility to re-
source users. Marine Policy, 51:442–
451.
Nuevo, M., Morgado, C., and Sala,
A. Monitoring the implementation of
the landing obligation: Last haul pro-
gramme. In Uhlmann, S., Ulrich, C.,
and Kennelly, S., editors, The Eu-
ropean Landing Obligation. Springer,
2019. URL http://doi.org/10.1007/
978-3-030-03308-8_2.
O’Neill, F., Feekings, J., Fryer, R., Fau-
connet, L., and Afonso, P. Discard
avoidance by improving fishing gear se-
lectivity: Helping the fishing indus-
try help itself. In Uhlmann, S., Ul-
rich, C., and Kennelly, S., editors, The
European Landing Obligation. Springer,
2019. URL http://doi.org/10.1007/
978-3-030-03308-8_2.
Ono, K., Haynie, A., Hollowed, A.,
Ianelli, J., McGilliard, C., and Punt,
A. 2017. Management strategy analysis
for multispecies fisheries, including tech-
nical interactions and human behavior
in modelling management decisions and
fishing. Canadian Journal of Fisheries
and Aquatic Sciences, 75:1185–1202.
Pascoe, S., Andersen, J., and de Wilde,
J. 2001. The impactof management reg-
ulation on the technical efficiency ofves-
sels in the Dutch beam trawl fleet. Euro-
pean Review ofAgricultural Economics,
28:187–206.
Poos, J. and Rijnsdorp, A. 2007. The
dynamics of small-scale patchiness of
plaice and sole as reflectedin the catch
rates of the Dutch beam trawl fleet and
itsimplications for the fleet dynamics.
Journal of Sea Research, 58:100–112.
Poos, J. J., Bogaards, J. A., Quirijns,
F. J., Gillis, D. M., and Rijnsdorp, A. D.
2010. Individual quotas, fishing effort
allocation, and over-quota discarding in
mixed fisheries. ICES Journal of Marine
Science, 67(2):323–333.
Prellezo, R., Carmona, I., and García,
D. 2016a. The bad, The good and the
187
Synthesis
C
ha
pt
er
6
very good of the landing obligation im-
plementation in the Bay of Biscay: A
case study of Basque trawlers. Fisheries
Research, 181:172–185.
Prellezo, R., I., G., and García, D.
2016b. The bad, the good and the very
good of the landing obligation imple-
mentation in the Bay of Biscay: A case
study of Basque trawlers. Fisheries Re-
search, 181:172–185.
Prellezo, R., Iriondo, A., Santurtún,
M., and Valeiras, J. 2018. Research
for PECH Committee - Landing
Obligation and Choke Species in
Multispecies and Mixed Fisheries -
The South Western Waters, Euro-
pean Parliament, Policy Department
for Structural and Cohesion Poli-
cies, Brussels. Retrieved from. URL
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/
RegData/etudes/STUD/2018/617473/
IPOL_STU(2018)617473_EN.pdf.
Punt, A. E. and Butterworth, D. S.
1995. The effects of future consumption
by the cape fur seal on catches and catch
rates of the cape hakes. 4. modelling the
biological interaction between cape fur
seals arctocephalus pusillus pusillus and
the cape hakes merluccius capensis and
m. paradoxus. South African Journal of
Marine Science, 16(1):255–285.
Punt, A. E., Butterworth, D. S.,
de Moor, C. L., De Oliveira, J. A. A.,
and Haddon, M. 2016. Management
strategy evaluation: Best practices. Fish
and Fisheries, 17:303–334.
Punt, E. and Donovan, G. P. 2007. De-
veloping management procedures that
are robust to uncertainty: lessons from
the International Whaling Commission.
ICES Journal of Marine Science, 64:
603–612.
Quirijns, F. and Pastoors, M. Discard
Atlas of North Sea fisheries. Techni-
cal report, Wageningen: IMARES Wa-
geningen UR, 2014.
Quirijns, F., Poos, J., and Rijnsdorp,
A. 2008. Standardizing commercial
CPUE data in monitoring stock dynam-
ics: Accounting for targeting behaviour
in mixed fisheries. Fisheries REsearch,
89:1–8.
Reid, D., Calderwood, J., Afonso, P.,
Fauconnet, L., Pawlowski, L., Plet-
Hansen, K., Radford, Z., Robert, M.,
Rochet, M., Rueda, L., Ulrich, C.,
and Vermard, Y. The best way
to reduce discards is by not catch-
ing them! In Uhlmann, S., Ul-
rich, C., and Kennelly, S., editors, The
European Landing Obligation. Springer,
2019. URL http://doi.org/10.1007/
978-3-030-03308-8_2.
Rihan, D., Uhlmann, S., Ulrich, C.,
Breen, M., and Catchpole, T. Re-
quirements for documentation, data
collection and scientific evaluations.
In Uhlmann, S., Ulrich, C., and
Kennelly, S., editors, The European
Landing Obligation. Springer, 2019.
URL http://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-
030-03308-8_2.
Rijnsdorp, A., Piet, G., and Poos, J.
2001. Effort allocation of the Dutch
beam trawl fleet in response to atem-
porarily closed area in the North Sea.
ICES CM, 1:17.
Rijnsdorp, A., van Overzee, H., and
Poos, J. 2012. Ecological and economic
trade-offs in the management of mixed
fisheries: a case study of spawning clo-
sures in flatfish fisheries. Marine Ecology
Progress Series, 447:179–194.
Rochet, M. J., Arregi, L., Tereza, F.,
Pereira, J., Perez, N., Ruiz Gondra,
J., and Valeiras, J. 2014. Demersal
discard atlas for the South Western
Waters. Report, page 121. URL
http://www.repositorio.ieo.es/e-
ieo/handle/10508/9074.
Sainsbury, K. 2000. Design of opera-
tional management strategies for achiev-
188
References
C
ha
pt
er
6
ing fishery ecosystem objectives. ICES
Journal of Marine Science, 57(3):731–
741.
Salas, S. and Gaertner, D. 2004. The be-
havioural dynamics of fishers: manage-
ment implications. Fish and Fisheries,
5:153–167.
Siguroˇardóttir, S., Stefánsdóttir, E. K.,
Condie, H., Margeirsson, S., Catch-
pole, T. L., Bellido, J. M., Eliasen,
S. Q., Goñi, R., Madsen, N., Palialexis,
A., Uhlmann, S. S., Vassilopoulou, V.,
Feekings, J., and Rochet, M. J. 2015.
How can discards in European fisheries
be mitigated? Strengths, weaknesses,
opportunities and threats of potential
mitigation methods. Marine Policy, 51:
366–374.
Simons, S. L., Doring, R., and Tem-
ming, A. 2015. Modellin fisher’s re-
spond to discard prevention strategies:
the case of the North Sea saithe fishery.
ICES Journal of Marine Science, 72(5):
1530–1544.
Sobrino, J. and Sobrido, M. The com-
mon fisheries policy: A difficult com-
promise between relative stability and
the discard ban. In Andreone, G., ed-
itor, The Future of the Law of the Sea.
Springer, 2017. URL http://doi.org/
10.1007/978-3-319-51274-7.
STECF. 2013. Scientific, Technical
and Economic Committee for Fisheries
(STECF). Landing obligation in EU
fisheries (STECF-13-23). Publications
Office of the European Union, Luxem-
bourg, EUR 263301 EN, JRC 86112:115
pp.
STECF. 2014a. Scientific, Techni-
cal and Economic Committee for Fish-
eries (STECF). Landing Obligation in
EU Fisheries - part II (STECF-14-
01). Publications Office of the Euro-
pean Union, Luxembourg, EUR 26551
EN, JRC 88869:67 pp.
STECF. 2014b. Scientific, Techni-
cal and Economic Committee for Fish-
eries (STECF). Landing Obligations in
EU Fisheries - part 3 (STECF-14-
06). Publications Office of the Euro-
pean Union, Luxembourg, EUR 26610
EN, JRC 89785:56 pp.
STECF. 2014c. Scientific, Techni-
cal and Economic Committee for Fish-
eries (STECF). Landing Obligations in
EU Fisheries - part 4 (STECF-14-
11). Publications Office of the Euro-
pean Union, Luxembourg, EUR 26943
EN, JRC 93045:96 pp.
STECF. 2015. Scientific, Technical
and Economic Committee for Fisheries
(STECF). Landing Obligation - part 5
(demersal species for NWW, SWW and
North Sea) (STECF-15-10). Publica-
tions Office of the European Union, Lux-
embourg, EUR 27407 EN, JRC 96949:62
pp.
STECF. 2017a. Scientific, Tech-
nical and Economic Committee for
Fisheries (STECF). Data and infor-
mation requested by the Commission
to support the preparation of propos-
als for fishing opportunities in 2018
(STECF-17-13). Publications Office
of the European Union, Luxembourg,
doi:10.2760/628725, JRC 108053:43 pp.
STECF. 2017b. 55th Plenary meet-
ing report (PLEN-17-02). Pub-
lications Office of the European
Union, Luxembourg, EUR 28359
EN. doi:10.2760/53335:.
STECF. 2018. Scientific, Techni-
cal and Economic Committee for Fish-
eries (STECF) - Evaluation of the
landing obligation joint recommenda-
tions (STECF-18-06). Publications Of-
fice of the European Union, Luxem-
bourg, doi:10.2760/999971, JRC 112740:
223 pp.
Stockhausen, B. How the implemen-
tation of the landing obligation was
189
Synthesis
C
ha
pt
er
6
weakened. In Uhlmann, S., Ulrich,
C., and Kennelly, S., editors, The
European Landing Obligation. Springer,
2019. URL http://doi.org/10.1007/
978-3-030-03308-8_2.
Sutinen, J. and Andersen, P. 1985. The
economics of fisheries law and enforce-
ment. Land Economics, 61:387–397.
Sutinen, J. and Kuperan, K. 1999.
A socio-economic theory of regulatory
compliance. International Joirnal of So-
cial Economics, 26:174–193.
Tidd, A. N., Hutton, T., Kell, L. T.,
and Padda, G. 2011. Exit and en-
try of fishing vessels: An evaluation of
factors affecting investment decisions in
the North Sea English beam trawl fleet.
ICES Journal of Marine Science, 68:
961–971.
Tschernij, V. and Holst, R. 1999. Evi-
dence of factors at vessel-level affecting
codend selectivity in Baltic cod demer-
sal trawl fishery. International Council
for the Exploration of the Sea, 02:24.
Tschernij, V., Suuronen, P., Minister-
rad, N., and Nordisk, R. 2002. Im-
proving trawl selectivity in the Baltic.
Utokning av tralselektion i Ostersjon.
TemaNord, 512:56.
Uhlmann, S., Ulrich, C., and Kennelly,
S. E. The European Landing Obligation.
Reducing Discards in Complex, Multi-
Species and Multi-Jurisdictional Fish-
eries. Springer Open, 2019.
Uhlmann, S. S., van Helmond, A. T. M.,
Kemp Stefánsdóttir, E., Siguroˇardóttir,
S., Haralabous, J., Bellido, J. M., Car-
bonell, A., Catchpole, T., Damalas, D.,
Fauconnet, L., Feekings, J., Garcia, T.,
Madsen, N., Mallold, S., Margeirsson,
S., Palialexis, A., Readdy, L., Valeiras,
J., Vassilopoulou, V., and Rochet, M. J.
2013. Discarded fish in European wa-
ters: general patterns and contrasts.
ICES Journal of Marine Science, 71(5):
1235–1245.
Ulrich, C. 2018. Research for PECH
Committee - Landing Obligation and
Choke Species in Multispecies and
Mixed Fisheries - The North Sea,
European Parliament, Policy Depart-
ment for Structural and Cohesion
Policies, Brussels. Retrieved from. URL
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/
RegData/etudes/STUD/2018/617471/
IPOL_STU(2018)617471_EN.pdf.
Ulrich, C., Vermard, Y., Dolder,
P. J., Brunel, T., Jardim, E., Holmes,
S. J., Kempf, A., Mortensen, L. O.,
Poos, J. J., Rindorf, A., and editor:
Emory Anderson, H. 2017. Achiev-
ing maximum sustainable yield in mixed
fisheries: a management approach for
the north sea demersal fisheries. ICES
Journal of Marine Science, 74(2):566–
575.
Valentinsson, D., Ringdahl, K., Storr-
Pailsen, M., and Madsen, N. The baltic
cod trawl fishery: The perfect fishery
for a successful implementation of the
lanf¡ding obligation? In Uhlmann,
S., Ulrich, C., and Kennelly, S., edi-
tors, The European Landing Obligation.
Springer, 2019. URL http://doi.org/
10.1007/978-3-030-03308-8_2.
Walters, C. and Maguire, J.-J. 1996.
Lessons for stock assessment from the
northern cod collapse. Reviews in Fish
Biology and Fisheries, 6:125–137.
190



Addendum
A
dd
de
nd
um
A
I Summary
This thesis brings a contribution to the debate, formally recognising
fishers as an integral part of the ecosystem, by investigating the impli-
cations of applying a policy of limiting discards at sea in complex mixed
fisheries that are managed under catch limits for the well-being of both
the ecosystem and humans.
Discard restrictions and discard management regimes have been imple-
mented to different extents in a number of fisheries around the world
(e.g., Chile, Norway, Faroe Islands, Iceland, New Zealand, Namibia,
Canada, and the US). The implementation, monitoring and control of
the landing obligation generates some new challenges. In particular, the
focus of monitoring and control shifts from landing to activities at sea
leading to potentially higher costs of enforcement as it might require,
for successful implementation, full observer coverage or electronic video
monitoring to validate a self-reporting system. In chapter 2, experiences
from fisheries around the world show that choosing the right measures
is not a simple process and therefore, management authorities need to
simultaneously implement complementary measures which will support
implementation and encourage compliance with discarding rules.
The need to adapt the regulatory framework does not just concern en-
forcement systems. Other measures, including adaptations to the techni-
cal measures framework, also need to be considered. Improved selectivity
of fishing gears remains a primary and important tool to avoid discards.
In chapter 3 I studied the selective properties of a bottom trawl fitted
with a 70 mm diamond mesh codend and a 100 mm top square mesh
panel (SMP) in the commercial Basque bottom otter trawlers in the
Bay of Biscay. Results suggested that a 100 mm SMP potentially en-
able undersized and immature individuals to escape through the meshes.
However, the selectivity cruises demonstrated that in practice, the SMP
was largely ineffective at releasing undersized and the release potential
for the diamond mesh codend was found to be significantly lower than
the length-at-maturity and the legal minimum conservation reference
size for hake, pouting and red mullet. The introduction of the obliga-
tion to land all catches will create new challenges for this trawl fleet and
thereby an incentive to improve selectivity to avoid unwanted catches of
undersized individuals.
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Moving to using more selective gears (bigger mesh size codend) may
provide a partial solution to mitigate the potential impact of the landing
obligation. However such a measure may also lead to losses in marketable
catch and reductions in revenue that make the fishery unviable in the
short-term and perhaps in the long-term. Hence, dynamic state variable
models allow studying how fishers may respond to changing policies and
what consequences this adaptive response may have for the economic
and social performance of the fishery. The model results suggested that
these negative short-term impacts could be alleviated by incorporation
of inter-species quota flexibility in the implementation of the landing
obligation. The results indicate that there will be a strong incentive to
use this policy arrangement to alleviate the choke effect problem where
species with limiting quotas constrain the fishery. To study the possible
consequences on a longer time horizon, an MSE approach can be applied
to evaluate the long term consequences of the changes in exploitation
pattern on the productivity of the exploited stocks. Combining the main
CFP objectives: exploiting at MSY and no discarding allowance, the
MSE showed that quota species brought risk of changing exploitation
patterns also for non quota stocks. Fishing effort was constrained by
one or two quota stocks, resulting in drastic reductions of effort over the
short-term and mid-term.
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II List of abbreviations
The following table describes the significance of various abbreviations
and acronyms used throughout the thesis.
Abbreviation Meaning
ACE Annual catch entitlements
BoB Bay of Biscay
CAN BCG Canada Brithish Columbia groundfish fishery
CAN NSG Canada Nova Scotia groundfish fishery
CCTV Closed circuit televisions
CFP Common Fisheries Policy
CHL Chile
EU European Union
FLR Fisheries Library in R
FRO Faroe Islands
GDP Gross Domestic Products
HCR Harvest Control Rules
ISL Iceland
ITQs Individual Ltransferable quotas
JRC Joint Research Centre
LO Landings Obligation
MCRS Minimum Conservation Reference Size
MLS Minimum Landing Size
MP Management Procedure
MS Member States
MSE Management Stategy Evaluation
MSY Maximum Sustainable Yield
NA Not available
NAM Namibia
NOR Norway
NZL New Zealand
OM Operating Model
OTB Bottom Otter trawls
PTB Bottom Pair trawls
RTCs Real time area closures
RPs Reference Points
SA Stock Assessment
STECF Scientific Technical and Economic Committee for Fisheries
TAC Total allowable catch
TAL Total allowable landings
USA ALG USA Alaskan groundfish fishery
VHVO Very High Vertical Opening
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So many good and bad times have had to pass before writing these words
of thanks but the much awaited moment has finally arrived. During
these years of work many people have accompanied me, either in person
or not, in this roller coaster of emotions, experiences and learning that
preparing the thesis has involved.
I could not start with anyone other than my thesis supervisors. Jan Jaap
Poos, Iago Mosquiera, Adriaan Rijnsdorp, Ernesto Jardim, thank you
for all your teaching, dedication, help, for the direction and accuracy
you have provided to this work. I have learnt different things from each
one of you, thank you very much, because it was a pleasure to grow both
professionally as well as personally in your company.
I would also like to thank the European Commission for hiring me to
prepare this thesis. Working for Europe has provided me with many
new experiences, with the opportunity to learn first hand about fisheries
management and marine research from a much wider perspective and
with the wonderful opportunity to live in Italy for 3 years. These 3
years would not have been the same without extraordinary colleagues
such as Finlay Scott, John Casey, Arina Motova, Dimitrios Damalas and
many others from the Water and Marine Resources Unit of the JRC,
thank you, thank you and thank you for sharing with me not only your
professionalism but also your human quality. Thank you, "Hermanos
Infernales", for providing the soundtrack to this thesis and, of course,
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thank you for your friendship, moments of endless laughter, of mutual
growth, of thesis therapies. . . with your company everything seemed to
be much better.
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see you again in the Netherlands after meeting you in Italy.
This adventure has taken place between Italy and the Netherlands. So,
thank you, Italy, thank you, Holland, thank you for showing me the
beautiful Alps, the wonderful Haarlem dunes, IJmuiden, thank you for
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captivating me with your truly special corners.
And although this experience took place away from home, the bond with
my beloved Cantabrian Sea, the Gulf of Biscay, has remained present
in this thesis. Thank you, AZTI, for providing me with data about the
Basque fleet and giving me the opportunity to delve into the lives of our
fishers, even from afar. Special thanks to Marina Santurtún, Jon Ruiz,
Lucía Zarauz, Estanis Mugerza and my dearest former boss Luis Arregi,
thank you, Peli, for the sea outings, for teaching me about nets, for
accompanying me in my first steps in the world of fisheries, in short, for
soaking me in sea salt and fish scales. I would also like to thank those
who were my mates at Azti and are now treasured friends, Aizkorri,
Nerea, Nagore, I am really lucky for having you.
Thank you, my friends from Bakio, thank you, Kuadri (if I mention
the entire bunch I will never end these acknowledgements), thank you
for your support, for your continuous interest, for supporting me and
encouraging me when I was running out of steam. Thank you, Bakio,
for teaching me to love the sea.
I would also like to thank my family, those who are with us and those
who have gone, for so many shared moments and so much love. Thank
you, Mum, Iratxe and Aunty; my muses, my warriors, my greatest loves,
thank you for being my inspiring energy, for supporting me and accom-
panying me in all my adventures, any road with you by my side is
worthwhile. My sister, life companion and eternal love, thank you for
always being by my side, thank you, Mum, for your continuous advice,
thank you for being my pillar of strength. My other pillar, Dad, you
left very soon, too soon, but thank you because your teachings and your
whole being and savoir-faire are still my beacon and my compass.
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Cuantos buenos y malos ratos han tenido que pasar hasta llegar a es-
cribir estas palabras de agradecimiento, pero por fin ha llegado el de-
seado momento. Durante estos años de trabajo muchas personas me
han acompañado, presentes o no, en esta montaña rusa de emociones,
vivencias y aprendizaje que ha supuesto hacer la tesis.
No podría empezar por otras personas, que por mis supervisores de tesis.
Jan Jaap Poos, Iago Mosquiera, Adriaan Rijnsdorp, Ernesto Jardim,
gracias por todas las enseñanzas, dedicación, ayuda, por la dirección y
el rigor que habéis aportado a este trabajo. De cada uno de vosotros he
aprendido distintas cosas, muchísimas gracias, porque ha sido un placer
crecer profesional y personalmente en vuestra compañía.
Mi más sincero agradecimiento a la Comisión Europea por contratarme
para realizar esta tesis. Trabajar para Europa me ha colmado de nuevas
experiencias, de la oportunidad de conocer de primera mano el fun-
cionamiento de la gestión pesquera y la investigación marina desde un
prisma mucho más amplio y de la preciosa oportunidad de vivir en Italia
durante 3 años. Esos 3 años no hubieran sido lo mismo sin extraordinar-
ios compañeros cómo Finlay Scott, John Casey, Arina Motova, Dimitrios
Damalas y tantos otros de la Unidad de Recursos Hídricos y Marinos del
JRC, gracias, gracias y gracias por compartir conmigo no sólo vuestra
profesionalidad, sino también vuestra calidad humana. Gracias “her-
manos Infernales” por ponerle banda sonora a esta tesis y como no, gra-
cias Lily, Fuen, Bea, Sara, Cris, mis grandes descubrimientos Isprenses,
gracias por vuestra amistad, momentos de risas infinitas, de crecimiento
juntas, de terapias de tesis, con vuestra compañía todo se veía mucho
mejor.
Nada hubiera sido lo mismo en mis periódicas estancias en IJmuiden
sin la infinita hospitalidad de Agnita y Katell. Gracias por abrirme las
puertas de vuestras casas, por las innumerables cenas y por hacerme
sentir que en cada visita que hacía, tenía un hueco en vuestras familias,
habéis sido increíbles. A ti también Alfonso, reencontrarte en Holanda
después de conocerte en Italia fue una suerte.
Y entre Italia y Holanda ha sido esta aventura. Así que gracias Italia,
gracias Holanda, gracias por enseñarme los preciosos Alpes, las maravil-
losas dunas de Haarlem a IJmuiden, gracias por cautivarme con vuestros
rincones tan especiales.
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Y aunque esta experiencia transcurría fuera de casa, el vínculo a mi
amado Cantábrico, al Golfo de Bizkaia, ha permanecido muy presente
en esta tesis. Gracias AZTI por brindarme datos de la flota vasca per-
mitiéndome que, aun estando lejos, haya tenido la oportunidad de pro-
fundizar en la vida de nuestros arrantzales. Especialmente gracias a
Marina Santurtún, Jon Ruiz, Lucía Zarauz, Estanis Mugerza y mi apre-
ciado exjefe Luis Arregi, eskerrik asko Peli por las salidas a la mar,
por enseñarme de redes, por acompañarme en mis primeros pasos en el
mundo de las pesquerías, en definitiva por empaparme en sal y escamas.
Gracias a las que fueron mis compañeras en Azti y hoy son preciosas
amigas, Aizkorri, Nerea, Nagore, que suerte teneros.
Gracias amigos de Bakio, gracias Kuadri (si menciono a toda la kuadri
no acabo nunca estos agradecimientos), gracias por vuestro apoyo, por
vuestro incesante interés, por seguir apoyándome y animándome cuándo
yo ya estaba desfondada. Gracias Bakio por enseñarme a amar el
mar.
Eskerrik asko familia, los que están y los que se fueron, por tantos mo-
mentos compartidos y tanto amor. Gracias ama, Iratxe e izeko; mis
musas, mis guerreras, mis amores más grandes, gracias por ser la en-
ergía inspiradora, por apoyarme y acompañarme en todas mis aven-
turas, cualquier camino con vosotras al lado merece la pena. Hermana
mía, compañera de vida y amor eterno, gracias por estar siempre a mi
lado, gracias amatxu por tus continuos consejos, gracias por ser mi pi-
lar. Mi otro pilar, aitatxu, te fuiste pronto, muy pronto, pero gracias
porque tus enseñanzas y tu ser y saber estar siguen siendo mi faro y mi
brújula.
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Zenbat une on eta txar igaro behar izan diren harik eta eskerroneko
hitz hauek idatzi arte, baina, azkenean, irrikatutako une hori iritsi da.
Lanean emandako urteotan, jende asko egon da nirekin, lekuan bertan
edo ez, tesia egitean sortutako emozioen, bizipenen eta ikasbideen erru-
siar mendi honetan.
Hasteko, ezinbestekoa da nire tesiko ikuskatzaileak aipatzea. Jan Jaap
Poos, Iago Mosquiera, Adriaan Rijnsdorp eta Ernesto Jardim, eskerrik
asko irakaskuntza guztiengatik, zuon arduraldi zein laguntzagatik eta
lan honi eskainitako zehaztasun eta zuzendaritzagatik. Zuok gauza des-
berdinak irakatsi dizkidazue, eskerrik asko, plazera izan delako zuokin
batera arlo profesionalean eta pertsonalean haztea.
Nire eskerrik beroena Europako Batzordeari, tesi hau egiteko kontratatzea-
gatik. Europarentzat lan egitean, esperientzia berriak bizi izan ditut,
zuzenean nahiz ikuspegi zabalago batetik ezagutu ahal izan dut ar-
rantzaren kudeaketako eta itsas ikerketako jarduera eta 3 urtez Italian
bizitzeko aukera paregabea ere izan dut. 3 urte horiek ez ziren berbera
izango honako lankide bikain hauek izan ez banitu: Finlay Scott, John
Casey, Arina Motova, Dimitrios Damalas eta JRCko Ur eta Itsas Bali-
abideen Unitateko beste hainbeste. Mila, mila, mila esker zuon profe-
sionaltasuna eta zuon giza kalitatea nirekin partekatzeagatik. Esker-
rik asko, "Hermanos Infernales", tesi honi soinu-banda jartzearren. Zer
esanik ez, eskerrik asko, Lily, Fuen, Bea, Sara eta Cris. Ispran egin
nituen aurkikuntza handiak zarete. Eskerrik asko zuon adiskidetasuna-
gatik, irribarre amaigabeko uneengatik, elkarrekin izandako hazkuntza-
gatik, tesietako terapiengatik. Zuon laguntzaz, den-dena askoz hobeto
ikusten zen.
Ezer ez zen berbera izango IJmuidenen egindako aldian aldiko ego-
naldietan, Agnitaren zein Katellen abegi eskerga izan ez banu. Eskerrik
asko zuon etxeko ateak irekitzeagatik, ezin konta ahala afari eskaintzea-
gatik eta egiten nuen bisitaldi bakoitzean zuon familietan lekua nuela
sentiarazteagatik. Ikaragarriak izan zarete. Zeuri ere bai, Alfonso, zori-
onekoa izan zelako Italian ezagutu ondoren berriro ere Holandan elkartu
izana.
Abentura hau Italia eta Holanda artean garatu da. Hori dela eta, esker-
rik asko, Italia, eskerrik asko, Holanda. Eskerrik asko, Alpe ederrak eta
Haarlemetik Ijmuidenera doazen duna zoragarriak erakusteagatik. Es-
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kerrik asko, bertako bazter ezin bereziagoekin liluratuta utzi ninduzue-
lako.
Nahiz eta esperientzia hau etxetik kanpo bizi, nire Kantauri maitearekin,
Bizkaiko Golkoarekin dudan lotuneak bere horretan jarraitu du bete-
betean tesi honetan. Eskerrik asko, AZTI, euskal flotaren datuak ematea-
gatik. Horri esker, nahiz eta urrun egon, gure arrantzaleen bizimoduan
sakondu ahal izan dut. Batez ere, eskerrik asko, Marina Santurtún, Jon
Ruiz, Lucía Zarauz, Estanis Mugerza eta Luis Arregi, nire nagusi ohi
preziatua. Eskerrik asko, Peli, itsasora egindako txangoengatik, sareen
inguruko irakaskuntzengatik, arrantza-tokien munduan lehenengo urrat-
sak ematen laguntzeagatik eta, azken batean, kresalean zein ezkatetan
bustitzeagatik. Eskerrik asko AZTIn izan nituen lankideei eta gaur egun
lagun maitagarriak diren Aizkorriri, Nereari eta Nagoreri. Zorte handia
da zuok edukitzea.
Eskerrik asko, Bakioko lagunok. Eskerrik asko, "kuadri" (adiskide guz-
tiak aipatzen baditut, ez ditut inoiz eskerron hauek amaituko). Esker-
rik asko zuon laguntzagatik, zuon interes etengabeagatik, laguntzen eta
adorea ematen jarraitzeagatik, neure onenak emanda nengoenean. Es-
kerrik asko, Bakio, itsasoa maitatzen irakasteagatik.
Eskerrik asko, familia, berton daudenei eta joan zirenei, partekatu-
tako hainbat unegatik eta hainbesteko maitasunagatik. Eskerrik asko,
ama, Iratxe eta izeko. Nire musak, nire gerlariak, nire maitasun handi-
enak. Eskerrik asko energia inspiratzailea izatearren, abentura guztietan
babestu eta laguntzeagatik. Zuok alboan izanda egindako edozein bidek
merezi du. Ahizpa maitea, bidelaguna eta betiereko maitasuna. Es-
kerrik asko, beti nire ondoan egoteagatik. Eskerrik asko, amatxo, zure
etengabeko aholkuengatik. Eskerrik asko, nire zutabea izateagatik. Nire
beste zutabea, aitatxo, laster joan zinen, oso laster, baina eskerrik asko,
zure ikasbideak, zure izaera eta zure antzea nire itsasargia eta iparror-
ratza direlako oraindik.
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1. Fisheries need to adapt their fishing behaviour to reduce discards
and mitigate the choke risks posed by the landing obligation.
(this thesis)
2. The robustness of a management strategy evaluation with respect
to prevailing uncertainties should be assessed before implementa-
tion of management rules.
(this thesis)
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Evaluation of the design and implementation of discards policies under
catch-based fisheries management regimes
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